Who's Helping Shultz

While Americans watched Secretary of State George Shultz move deftly through several days of intense diplomatic discussions with the Foreign Ministers of Lebanon and Israel in mid-March, they were actually watching only the tip of the U.S.'s diplomatic iceberg. Underneath, in layer after layer, were policy planners, analysts, negotiators, administrators, publicists and many other officials who help throughout the year to give U.S. policy its substance and try to keep it afloat.

The names and positions of the scores of people who are involved in this process are to be found in a chart on page five. Ambassadors and other State Department foreign service officers who help make and implement policy while serving in U.S. missions abroad or outside of Washington are, for reasons of space, not listed.

Here are some pointers to help guide the uninitiated through the chart:

The spine of the Middle East policymaking apparatus is the Bureau of Near East and South Asian affairs, generally referred to as "NEA." Within NEA are the operational, "line" officers (known as country directors and country officers) who make the day-to-day decisions and coordinate with the activities of the U.S. missions in the area. They respond to queries by U.S. ambassadors, and provide policy guidance to them. The intimate knowledge which these officers have of current conditions in a given country often provides the original impetus for an initiative which emerges eventually as a new policy.

At the top of NEA is an assistant secretary of state, Nicholas Veliotes, a career officer who has served in that post since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. Although Mr. Veliotes has had experience on the ground in the Middle East—he was once Ambassador to Jordan and also served in Israel—he is not an "Arabist." In fact, despite regular criticism by Israeli officials and pro-Israel U.S. lobbying groups of the allegedly nefarious influence of the State Department "Arabists," there has never been one in the top job at NEA except for a brief four-month period more than a decade ago. For political reasons, it is probable there will not be one in the foreseeable future.

Philip Habib shows up on the chart because, even though he reports officially to the President rather than the Secretary of State, he works out of the State Department and for all practical purposes is part of NEA's Middle East team as a special advisor and negotiator. His designation as Presidential Envoy was made to provide him with a higher status that would be useful when dealing with top Middle East leaders.

Normally, NEA has only five deputy assistant secretaries, but the chart shows six because of a current overlap. Wat Cluverius has been appointed as the next U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem, but will remain in his present office until July. In the meantime his successor, Thomas Nassif, has already been appointed and is scheduled to start work on March 21. There will be no duplication of functions, however, because Mr. Cluverius will continue his supervision of the "peace process," while Mr. Nassif concentrates on a newly-created role as liaison officer for NEA with Congress, U.S. civic organizations, and members of the White House staff.

Outside of NEA itself, there are other officers who have an input in the policymaking process. A portion of the East African Office of the Bureau of African Affairs has been put onto the chart because that bureau has jurisdiction over some countries which fit into the definition of "Middle East" used by this publication.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research has a Near East division which does in-depth studies on Middle East countries and provides daily intelligence digests for top officials. The Policy Planning staff, recently beefed up and upgraded by Secretary Shultz, plots long-term strategies around the world and traditionally engages in speech-writing for senior grade officers. But the impact on Middle East policymaking by both these bodies tends to be peripheral—with the degree of impact often depending upon the connections, bureaucratic skills and personalities of the officers in charge. For example, sources within the State Department say that for the past six months, at least, Policy Planning had been virtually shut out of the policymaking process—but Mr. Shultz's revamping may bring it back into the picture.