The U.S.-Egypt Friendship

By Hermann Frederick Eilts

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's March, 1985, visit to Washington symbolizes the close, bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Egypt which has now existed for almost 12 years. Both sides would be well-advised not to forget, however, that this happy state of affairs has never before been the norm in relationships between our two countries. At best, these were correct; at worst, they were strained and often badly so. For those Americans and Egyptians who worked so hard to craft a new diplomatic intimacy, the hope is that it will endure. But neither Americans nor Egyptians should take it for granted.

In fact, in the past few years, a noticeable "tepidity" has developed in our relationship. For Washington and Cairo alike, one senses, the bloom is off the rose. As long as both governments respect the rationale and honesty of their policy divergencies, however, and strive to keep them within manageable bounds, the greater reality that has of late infused our bilateral dialogue can even be a healthy thing.

Leaders' Priorities Have Changed

American and Egyptian officials cite variant reasons for what some term a rigidification of our bilateral relationship. The leaderships in both countries have changed since the halcyon days of Carter and Sadat. Reagan and Mubarak, while wanting to preserve a close U.S.-Egyptian dialogue, each have different priorities from those of previous administrations in their countries. Mubarak, while committed to the obligations Egypt assumed at Camp David and in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, aspires to Egypt resuming a leadership role in the Arab world.

Mubarak has been criticized in some American circles, but he has played his role skillfully on the Middle East scene. Despite frequent Israeli insensitivity to the political concerns of its Egyptian treaty partner in places like Iraq, Lebanon and with the Palestinians, Mubarak steadfastly rejected domestic and Arab pressures to jettison the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as the price for readmission to the Arab world.

It is regrettable, to be sure, that since late 1982 an Egyptian ambassador has not been resident in Israel and that EgyptianIsraeli normalization remains frozen. Israeli critics of Mubarak, echoed by some poorly informed Americans, charge that this situation violates the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. That is factually untrue. While one of the exchanges of letters appended to the peace treaty stipulated that Egypt would send an ambassador to Israel, once the first phase of Israeli military withdrawal from Sinai had taken place, in the many talks that U.S. representatives had with the late President Sadat on establishing ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations between the two countries—from Kissinger to Carter—it was always emphasized on the American side that under internationally recognized droit l'ambassade, each party retained the right to withdraw its ambassador should it at any time deem actions by the other to be incompatible with its national interests.

The Egyptian obligation to send an ambassador to Israel, important though it was to the U.S. and Israel, was not an international servitude imposed by one state on a subdued adversary. Indeed, despite an Israeli effort during the final stages of treaty negotiations to require Egypt to subordinate its Arab obligations to those about to be assumed toward Israel, Egypt adamantly rejected any such notion. Both sides had ultimately to settle for an American proposal that in effect equalized both sets of obligations.

The Recall of Egypt's Ambassador

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982, which many elements in Israel today rue as an abysmal failure of political judgment, made the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador virtually inevitable. Neither Camp David nor the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was ever intended to give Israel a free hand anywhere else in the Arab world and in total disregard of Egyptian interests in the area. Mubarak deserves credit for withstanding as long as he did the intense domestic and Arab pressures generated by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. His method of showing disapproval by withdrawing his ambassador was the least he could do in terms of political gestures.

An Israeli ambassador is still in Cairo, and an Egyptian embassy remains in Tel Aviv—not Jerusalem—even if only at a charge d'affaires level. The channel for bilateral dialogue has not been disrupted, even if the symbolism of diplomatic symmetry has. One hopes that the recent Israeli decision toleave Lebanon, once implemented, will induce Egypt to return an ambassador to Israel. There have been escalating Egyptian demands that this will only take place when resolution of the Taba issue takes place and when Israel recognizes the political aspirations of the Palestinians. These are understandable and long-standing Egyptian objectives, but they should not be allowed to defer resumption of ambassadorial level diplomatic relations with Israel—if for no other reason than to strengthen Israeli moderates like Peres. Egyptians should not ignore the importance of the latter point.

On the American side, sadly, there has been a lack of "good chemistry" between some of our senior officials and senior Egyptian officials. Some members of the Reagan Administration, not having been involved in the agonizing task of negotiating Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, seem disturbed that Mubarak is not as compliant with their wishes as they believe the late President Sadat would have been. The Egyptian decision again to have a Soviet ambassador in Cairo, while wisely accepted by Washington with equanimity, clearly rankles. So do Egyptian actions in canceling the promised Ras Banas base facilities and their reluctance to engage in publicized joint military exercises.

If these are American complaints against the Egyptian administration, Mubarak also has his litany of dissatisfactions. To mention but a few, the American Administration sat by idly when Israel invaded Lebanon and went beyond the initially-stipulated 25-mile zone as far as Beirut, even feigning ignorance of Israeli intentions. Indeed, the suspicion exists in Egypt that this was abetted by former Secretary Haig, which his recent autobiography hardly refutes. Nor does the Administration's ambivalent stance on the Taba issue engender Egyptian confidence in the U.S. Insignificant though Taba is in the greater scheme of things, it looms disproportionately large in Egyptian minds. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, Egypt perceives almost total American disinterest in insuring any kind of fair deal for them. Finally, American economic and military assistance to Egypt, generous though it has been, is seen by Egyptians as inadequate, poorly implemented and intended to enable Washington to interfere in Egypt's internal affairs. Indeed, it is disturbing that our substantial economic and military assistance programs to Egypt, second in volume only to those for Israel and probably because of this, have become major sources of friction between our two countries. In many Egyptian eyes they have come to be viewed as evidence of neo-imperialistic American intentions and are associated with the high American profile in that country.

Dialogue Hasn't Assuaged Misgivings

The point is not that any of these American or Egyptian notions is entirely right or wrong. They are very real perceptions, however, and each bears a grain of truth. Somehow, despite excellent ambassadors in each other's capitals, the dialogue between our two countries has failed to assuage growing mutual misgivings.

To be sure, notwithstanding their unequaled, self-deprecating sense of humor, Egyptians are not easy to work with. (I say this as one with long and happy experiences with them.) They are as filled with paranoias of their own making as are Israelis.

This said, it needs be acknowledged that Americans can be equally difficult to deal with. All too often we project a patronizing image of political and economic infallibility. We want Egypt to restructure its economy, and more recently to place more emphasis on the private sector, as though doing so will ever be a solution to Egypt's multitudinous social problems. We provide large amounts of economic and military aid, often projecting the image of blatant payoffs in doing so, but then ignore equally important and legitimate Egyptian political concerns.

In the pursuit of Middle East policy, including the long-stagnant peace process, we have so often been vacillating friends. Indeed, Egyptians must ask themselves whether the U.S., given the relative regularity of administration changes and resulting policy priority shifts, is structurally able to pursue any consistent Middle East peace policy.

In short, if blame there is, we both share it for the "cooling" that has developed. When we entered our new bilateral relationship just over ten years ago, each of us had inflated expectations of what the other could and would produce. Egypt, as the strongest and largest Arab state, we believed, would produce the Arabs; the United States, as the stronger superpower, they believed, would produce Israel. In addition, it would somehow, magically, right the troubled Egyptian economy. Inevitably, we have each disappointed the other.

The new U.S.-Egyptian relationship should not be taken for granted. Both sides must carefully nourish it, if it is to prosper.

Whatever our divergencies may be on Egypt's handling of the Israeli factor, formal peace exists between Egypt and Israel and a "cold" peace is better than no peace at all. Our joint efforts helped achieve this; our further joint efforts, coupled with those of other peace-oriented governments in the area, can revive the too-long stagnant process. Mubarak's initial proposal for U.S.-sponsored talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation makes eminent sense and should be seriously considered. The Israeli acceptance deserves praise. Assuming there is similar Jordanian-Palestinian acquiescence, it is now up to the U. S. not to lag behind and to play the responsible role that previous administrations have played.

Dr. Eilts was U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1965 to 1970 and to Egypt from 1973 to 1979. lie presently is Director of the Center for International Relations and Distinguished University Professor of International Relations at Boston University.