February/March 1996, Pages 26, 97
Point of View
American Leadership on Kashmir Can Further Peace
in South Asia
By Chulam Nabi Fai
The people of Indian-occupied Kashmir have no means to make their
demand for final release from India's brutal control directly heard
by the U.S. government. In these circumstances, we, U.S. citizens
of Kashmiri origin, urge our government to assume the leading and
active role in evolving a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute
for which the United States is uniquely qualified. We urge that
it exercise its good offices with all the three parties to the dispute—the
people of Kashmir, Pakistan and India—immediately to set a credible
peace process in motion. Every day of delay means many innocent
lives lost. We ask for no partiality but we do expect that our government
will uphold the principles proclaimed by our founding fathers for
a world order, governed by the rule of law. We also expect that
it will not turn a deaf ear to the cries of anguish coming from
the Vale of Kashmir.
Pertinent Considerations
In this context, the following considerations are most pertinent:
1. When the Kashmir dispute erupted in 1947-1948, the United States
championed the stand that the future status of Kashmir must be determined
by the will of the people of the territory and that their wishes
must be ascertained through an impartial plebiscite under the supervision
and control of the United Nations. The U.S. was a principal sponsor
of the resolution which was adopted by the Security Council on April
21, 1948 and which was based on that unchallenged principle. Following
the resolution, the U.S., as the leading member of the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), adhered to that stand.
The basic formula for settlement was incorporated in the resolutions
of that Commission adopted on Aug. 13, 1948 and Jan. 5, 1949.
2. These are not resolutions in the routine sense of the term.
Their provisions were negotiated in detail by the Commission with
India and Pakistan and it was only after the consent of both governments
was explicitly obtained that they were endorsed by the Security
Council. They thus constitute a binding and solemn international
agreement about the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
3. The part played by the United States government was apparent
from: a) The appeal made by President Harry Truman that any contentious
issues between India and Pakistan relating to the implementation
of the agreement must be submitted to arbitration; b) the appointment
of an eminent American, Admiral Chester Nimitz, as plebiscite Administrator;
c) the bipartisan expressions of support for the U.S. position from
statesmen as different otherwise as Adlai Stevenson and John Foster
Dulles; d) the appeal personally made in 1962 by President John
F. Kennedy to the president of Ireland to the effect that Ireland
sponsor a resolution in the Security Council reaffirming the resolutions
of the Commission; e) the forceful advocacy by the U.S. delegation
of points regarding the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory
to the plebiscite at countless meetings of the Security Council
from the years 1947-48 to 1962 and its sponsorship of 12 substantive
resolutions of the Council to that effect; f) the protracted negotiations
conducted by another distinguished American, Mr. Frank Graham, from
1951 to 1958 in the effort to bring about the demilitarization of
Kashmir, making possible the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.
The realities of the dispute have become more accentuated
with the passage of time.
4. All this may be regarded as history but there is no reason why,
when the human, political and legal realities of the dispute not
only have not changed but have become more accentuated with the
passage of time, it should now be regarded as irrelevant. It is
no less relevant to the settlement of the dispute than the termination
of the South African mandate was to the question of Namibia or than
the circumstances of the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia in the Soviet Union were to the reassertion of their independence.
5. The statements made by the U.S. government that it urges India
and Pakistan to try to reach a solution in accordance with the Simla
Agreement may be well-intended but their effect is to encourage
India's obdurate stand. These statements not only sideline the United
Nations; they also amount to a repudiation of the principle espoused
by the United States itself that the primary factor in the dispute
relating to a territory is the people of that territory. Kashmir
does not constitute an undemarcated frontier between India and Pakistan
which could be marked through a bilateral agreement between the
two. It is inhabited by a people with their own history, their own
language and culture, their own individuality; it is not real estate
which can be parcelled out between two countries. The people of
Kashmir cannot understand how and why the Simla Agreement should
be regarded as superseding the pledge made to them under the authority
of the United Nations, with the firm support of the United States,
that they will be enabled to decide the disposition of their state
by their own will.
6. What is both baffling and dismaying is that this should happen
even at the present stage of international affairs. The United Nations
is being progressively empowered to intervene in human rights emergencies
within states. Yet it is supine when the emergency occurs in a disputed
territory whose people have been pledged the exercise of their right
of self-determination by the United Nations itself. Should the U.N.
wait until these people—the people of Kashmir—perish through India's
sustained program of gradual genocide? Should preventive diplomacy
be kept in reserve until the worst happens and there is nothing
left to prevent?
7. The massive violations committed by India have not been adequately
reported in the world press because India at first barred and then
limited the access of media representatives to Kashmir. Yet, despite
this factor, they have been documented enough by human rights activists
in Kashmir and also in India to justify international intervention.
In these circumstances, we urge the following steps: a) That the
U.S. government encourage the secretary-general of the United Nations
immediately to designate a personal representative for Kashmir,
of high international standing, who would confer with the governments
of India and Pakistan, visit both the Indian-occupied part of Kashmir
and Azad Kashmir and report on the situation in the state; b) Should
the secretary-general not consider himself competent to despatch
a representative to the area, the U.S. government convene a closed-door
meeting of the Security Council for the necessary authorization—such
a meeting would not involve a public and acrimonious debate between
India and Pakistan. It could be made plain to both that no issue
is being pre-judged by this measure.
Alternatively, the United States government send a high-level official
to the subcontinent to urge the governments of India and Pakistan
immediately to initiate a peace process through a meeting between
the two heads of governments. The meeting could be held at any appropriate
place: in Washington at U.S. initiative or in New York or Geneva
at the invitation of the U.N. secretary-general. It should be made
clear that, at an early stage of the process, the accredited leadership
of the people of Kashmir, the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC),
would be associated with it.
The U.S. leadership must also recognize that the Kashmir question
must be an integral part of any regional dialogue. One cannot talk
of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia without simultaneously
addressing the regional conflict of Kashmir. It is important to
note that the people of Kashmir do ask for a settlement that would
be in accordance with their wishes, impartially ascertained. The
modalities for putting such a settlement in place can be worked
out through negotiations.
Finally, Kashmiri Americans call upon the American leadership (both
Democrats and Republicans) to take a stand on the Kashmir issue
in their 1996 platforms, and send a strong message to Kashmiri-American
voters that they stand with them.
Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai is executive director of the Kashmiri American
Council, 733 15th St. N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005.
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