India's Nuclear Plans Keep Indian Electorate, and U.S., Guessing

By M.M. Ali

The New York Times disclosed in early December that the United States had obtained evidence through its space satellites that India was preparing for a nuclear test at its Pokaran facility in Rajasthan. There were other reports that Washington had been in touch with New Delhi on the issue, and that U.S. Ambassador Frank Wisner had told India of adverse American reaction. New Delhi, in turn, denied any such plans.

The New York Times followed its report with a strongly worded editorial on Dec. 29 that said: "Now comes word that India, which conducted its one and only nuclear test in 1974, is considering some testing of its own. Even worse, India now suggests it may not sign the test-ban treaty, despite longstanding support for such an agreement." The Times added: "These moves can only raise tensions in South Asia, damage the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and undercut the goals India says it espouses."

New Delhi had before it the examples of France and China, both of which have defied world opinion and gone ahead with their underground nuclear tests in recent months. Other than some protests, there were no visible adverse political or economic consequences for either power. Additionally, a recent public opinion poll conducted by the leading monthly magazine India Today and published on Dec. 31, 1995 showed 62 percent approval among Indians for a nuclear test.

This is an election year for Narasimha Rao's Congress Party government, which is being challenged seriously by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Rao may be calculating whether going ahead with a popular nuclear weapons program will give him an edge with the 1996 electorate. The flip side of the question is: what would the United States give if Rao agrees not to go ahead with the nuclear test? Will the consequences of either course make a measurable difference in the electoral outcome? Unfortunately, mixing nuclear weapons and domestic politics seems an exquisitely delicate and dangerous game. A small miscalculation could, literally, have disastrous consequences for the entire region.

Writing in the Christian Science Monitor of Dec. 28, 1995, Jonathan Landay observed: "At a minimum the foes [India and Pakistan] may be headed into an accelerating arms race that will worsen tensions and undermine their economic development...
even the smallest of inadvertent incidents could escalate into the fourth Indo-Pakistan war...Only this time, it might go nuclear."

Michael Krepon of the Henry Stimson Center, a Washington, DC think tank, warned: "South Asia is on the threshold of significantly increased tensions and nuclear dangers. It is a region prone to mishap, prone to miscalculation." An American intelligence official called the India-Pakistan confrontation "one of the world's most potentially dangerous situations."

In the light of such scary evaluations, Narasimha Rao realizes that he holds a critical trump card and in view of the geo-political importance of India, he perhaps can draw big dividends through nuclear posturing. It is an unfortunate deduction that the greater the risk, the greater the reward. He perhaps also knows that Pakistan will not be left far behind in this dangerous game. Islamabad already has alerted Washington about such an eventuality. It appears that Bill Clinton will have his hands full on the external front during his own election year. Mounting nuclear tension in the subcontinent certainly was not in the cards in Washington.

Pakistan Appoints New Army Chief

Months of speculating and weeks of tension came to an end when Pakistani President Farooq Leghari appointed Lt. Gen. Jehangir Karamat as the next army chief of staff and commander-in-chief of Pakistan's defense forces. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto concurred with the appointment and the nation breathed a sigh of relief. The office of the commander-in-chief has attained extraordinary significance because of the role that the army has played in affairs of the government. Two military governments under Generals Ayub Khan and Zia Ul Haq held power for more than 20 years, demolishing the budding political institutions, silencing all opposition and running the country arbitrarily. Only an air disaster in which the second military dictator, General Zia, was killed, probably by sabotage, opened up the possibility of a return of democracy in 1988.

Once the army leaves the barracks and enters the political arena, it sets a bad precedent. History, across the globe, is full of examples. The last civilian president of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaque Khan, an octogenarian who had his own ambitions, also played havoc with the politics of Pakistan. Taking shelter in the constitution and following the precedents bequeathed him by the late Zia, he undermined the office of the prime minister and used the commander-in-chief to bring about premature political change.

Once the army enters the political arena, it sets a bad precedent.

Once Ghulam Ishaque Khan ousted Benazir Bhutto, and subsequently he also pushed her arch-rival, Mian Nawaz Sharif, out of office, using the threat of a military takeover both times. During a third round, however, Benazir Bhutto out-maneuvered Ishaque Khan and managed to keep the commander-in-chief, Gen. Abdul Waheed, originally an Ishaque Khan appointee, on her side. So Ishaque was forced to depart. The occupant of the army chief of staff and commander-in-chief position remains the third key political player along with the prime minister and the president, and at times the most important one. The Pakistani press, therefore, keeps referring to the "ruling Troika."

It is Pakistan's good fortune that not all generals approve of the army entering politics. Gen. Abdul Waheed, now retired, was one of them. However, his viewpoint has not been shared by some military commanders. Consequently, although the army's profile has receded recently, its presence still is heavy.

Change in the Rank and File

Gen. Jehangir Karamat, who was the most senior military officer before his appointment, has the support both of the military rank and file and of the politicians, including Bhutto, Leghari and Sharif. However, General Karamat is aware that he will be presiding over an army that is increasingly different from that commanded by his predecessors. The British military traditions are dead or dying. The old Gymkhana (military clubs) where alcohol, gambling and womanizing were tolerated or actively pursued are gradually being replaced by more sober and God-fearing successors. These younger, middle-level officers are acutely aware of the corruption that permeates both the civil administration and political circles and are concerned about the army's past role in tolerating or even participating in the country's decadence.

Karamat will be taking over at a time when a group of officers is being tried in a military court on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government to bring about an Islamic revolution. The profiles that have been published of the accused portray dedicated and honest officers who have made no secret of their distaste for corruption in and outside of the military. It is this increasing sentiment in the military forces that adds a political dimension to the professional soldier in Pakistan and lends added significance to the office of the chief of the army staff.

It was perhaps in a state of despair about the downward trend in Pakistan that Shahid Husain, a former vice president of the World Bank, warned of dangerous times ahead in the Dec. 12, 1995 issue of Dawn of Karachi: "Nations in crisis do not change neatly," he observed.

Muslims of Mohammedpur

What does a refugee do when one half of the country that has provided shelter and safety suddenly changes hands? The question gains seriousness when the move in the first instance was through a deliberate political choice at considerable physical risk and sacrifice. The question has defied an answer for almost half a million people for the past quarter century. They are the Biharis who, in December 1971, suddenly found themselves in a country they had not opted to join when they fled their former homes in India a generation earlier.

With the British withdrawal, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned in August 1947 into the independent state of India and the new country of Pakistan. Pakistan itself consisted of two physically separated wings: East Pakistan and West Pakistan, in both of which Muslims were in the majority. Partition caused a great upheaval and millions crossed over from one side to the other either in search of security and peace or to place themselves in an environment of their choice. These were not tidy transfers. They were accompanied by much killing and looting. One of the states severely hit by the riots was Bihar in India. A great many members of the Muslim minority in Bihar migrated to nearby East Pakistan. An enclave of Biharis formed just outside of the capital city of Dhaka in the township of Mohammedpur.

In December 1971, the eastern wing of Pakistan seceded to become the independent state of Bangladesh. The Urdu-speaking Biharis, who had emigrated to East Pakistan, suddenly found themselves in a new Muslim country with parts of their families left behind in West Pakistan or in India. In the 1971 fighting that accompanied the breakup of East and West Pakistan, India took over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners, who included civilians as well as military personnel. Almost two years later, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the father of present Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, signed the Simla Agreement and the POWs were returned to Pakistan. It was also agreed that arrangements would be made to transfer those Biharis left in Bangladesh who wanted to move to Pakistan. A great many of them expressed such a desire. However, to this date nothing of the kind has happened.

The logistics for transfer of more than 300,000 people were discussed for a long time among the governments of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan when the option being considered was over land across the 1,000 miles of Indian territory that separated Bangladesh from Pakistan. Once that option was dropped, India disappeared from the picture. The only course then open was to transport the stranded Biharis via sea. Years have passed working this out.

Several governments have come and gone both in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Other issues in the two countries have confused the question. It is feared, although not openly admitted, that once the now almost half a million Urdu-speaking Biharis are brought to Pakistan, they eventually will settle down in urban areas of Sindh, where other Urdu-speaking Mohajirs live. This could exacerbate an already strained situation between Mohajirs and the indigenous Sindhis. Then there is the question of the cost of the transfer.

Pros and Cons

The Biharis of Mohammedpur are an impoverished people who have no means to pay for their travel when and if it becomes possible. While the powers that be continue to debate the pros and cons of the issue, conditions among the Biharis who found themselves on the wrong side of the line a generation ago have gone from bad to worse. The International Red Cross, which for many years has tried to alleviate some of their problems, has issued several reports calling attention to the deteriorating condition of Mohammedpur. Still, after 25 years, there is no political resolution of the transfer problem in sight. Meanwhile, the decline of living conditions endured by the Biharis continues.

M.M. Ali is a professor at the University of the District of Columbia in Washington, DC.