The Assassination of Yahya Ayyash: Untimely and Unwise

By Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

Not many people outside Hamas's circles shed genuine tears on hearing of the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, known as "the engineer," who was accused of being the mastermind behind several suicide bombings in which scores of innocent Israelis were killed. The Israeli government, which appears to be behind the assassination, must seriously consider whether, at this particular juncture in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, this move was timely or wise. The answer on both scores has to be a categorical no.

A Formerly Sound Strategy

Israel's counter-terrorism strategy—hunting down terrorists regardless of prevailing political conditions—has worked well over the years. According to Israeli intelligence sources, that policy has prevented acts of terrorism because the terrorists could not count on any political circumstance that would inhibit Israeli secret agents from hunting them down. But as sound as this strategy may have been, the killing of Ayyash on the eve of the first Palestinian national election, when the two nations are at an historic crossroads, was both foolish and damaging.

For the past several months Hamas has suspended all violent attacks against Israel. Even though refusing to participate officially in the Palestinian elections, it has allowed its members to enter the race as independent candidates for the 83-member Palestinian legislative council. This alone—at the very least—should have provided sufficient grounds for the Israeli government to acknowledge Hamas' gesture, indirect and temporary though it may be. Rather than capitalizing on the lull in violence and offering in return a conciliatory response such as suspending the hunt for terrorists, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who had to approve such a sensitive mission, allowed temptation to override prudent political judgment.

Granted that Ayyash has caused tremendous loss, pain and suffering to many Israelis. The question is not whether he deserved to die, but whether his death could "heal" some of the wounds he inflicted, or cost many innocent Israelis even greater suffering. Moreover, it is hard to see the logic by which Ayyash's death could promote the mutual goal of reconciliation between the two sides. Peres apparently was persuaded by the overzealous head of the Shin Bet, Israel's secret service, to place the strategy of relentless pursuit of terrorists above practical political considerations. Having been discharged for failing to prevent Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, the head of internal security sought to redeem himself before his departure by one final act—an act attesting more to injured pride than to foresight in the service of his country.

The murder of Ayyash has strengthened rather than weakened Hamas.

The unwise murder of Ayyash has raised serious doubts among Palestinians about Israel's commitment to making peace. The assassination has harmed the PLO-Hamas dialogue which had led to an understanding to suspend violence and not sabotage the elections—an understanding which could have eventually developed into an agreement. The act disillusioned many moderate Hamas members in the territories who were willing to give the peace a chance. It has embarrassed the Palestinian Authority and undermined Chairman Yasser Arafat's credibility. It has strengthened rather than weakened Hamas, whose power had been eroding because of weariness with bloodshed and the excitement over self-rule and the elections. It has given further credence to extremists who argue that Israel wants to destroy them no matter what they do. Finally, the assassination has renewed the dynamic of rage among Palestinians in the streets, fostering a backlash against the peace process and eroding the trust that both sides have toiled so hard to cultivate during their long and difficult negotiations.

Israel's counter-terrorist strategy, with its reliance on extensive intelligence-gathering capacity, technological sophistication, and swift retaliatory strikes, has certainly succeeded in reducing the level of anti-Israeli terrorism and kept many terrorists on the run. But its effectiveness is sharply diminished when it fails to respond to the changing political climate. Now Hamas and other radical groups will have little or no incentive to continue with what was widely interpreted as a moratorium on terrorist attacks in Israel. When the Israeli government ignores such a gesture, whatever the motive behind it, it can only be the loser.

Provoking Retaliation

It is foolish for the Israeli government to think it can force Hamas to surrender or formally abandon violence. That did not happen with the PLO and it will not happen with Hamas. What Israel can, at best, expect is a gradual reduction of violence, provided Israel responds in kind. Ayyash's killing will do nothing but provoke a retaliatory attack by Hamas, thereby renewing the cycle of violence and claiming the lives of more Israelis who will die because of their government's shortsightedness.

Whether Peres made the decision to have Ayyash killed because he wants to dispel the view that he is soft on national security issues, or because he gave in to the need of the head of internal security to salvage his shattered reputation, the outcome can only be damaging for Israel and the Palestinians. An effective counter-terrorism strategy is a political tool, but it becomes counterproductive when it ignores the political reality it is supposed to promote.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is professor of international relations at the New School for Social Research in New York.