February/March 1996, Pages 12, 13, 110
Is 1996 the Year for “The Big Push on Cyprus?”—Two Views
The Dayton Agreement on Bosnia Points the Way
for Cyprus Solution
By Namik Korhan
It is likely that the one person most closely associated with negotiating
an end to the Bosnian conflict, Richard Holbrooke, will easily recognize
the similarities between Bosnia and Cyprus. Having helped end Europe's worst
incidence of post-World War II ethnic cleansing, one may expect
Mr. Holbrooke to contribute to the settlement of the dispute
on the small island, 40 miles off the Turkish mainland. After
all, the Serbs, in their bloody campaign against the Bosnian Muslims,
took more than a page from Greek Cypriots—they read the whole book
on ethnic cleansing.
The similarities between Bosnia and Cyprus are indeed striking.
In Cyprus, as in Bosnia, a Muslim population lived side by
side for years with a larger Orthodox Christian community.
In both countries, extremists launched violent attacks against
their vulnerable Muslim compatriots to drive them from their
native lands. Three years after the British ceded power to the Republic
of Cyprus, created in 1960 by the London and Zurich Agreements,
Greek Cypriots expelled all Turkish Cypriots from the national
government, denied us our guaranteed rights as equal partners
and launched a reign of terror against their Turkish Cypriot
neighbors.
The tactics used by the Greek Cypriots and the Serbs were the same—annihilation
of entire communities, forced relocation and unchecked brutality.
The immediate results were eerily similar as well: the aggressors
got away with it. Here is how Rene MacColl and Daniel MacGeachle
of London's Daily Express reported on the initial stages
of the violence on Dec. 28, 1963:
"We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia
in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five
days. We are the first Western reporters there and we have
seen sights too frightful to be described in print and horrors
so extreme that people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced
to a mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears."
Three days later, London's Daily Herald reported: "A
few days ago, 1,000 people lived here, in their solid stone built
homes which hug the coast road to Kyrenia, 13 miles from Nicosia.
Then in a night of terror, 350 villagers—men, women and children—vanished.
They were all Turks." Substitute "Bosnian Muslims"
for "Turks" and both accounts could have been written
from Tuzla, Mostar or Sarajevo.
These and other reports were followed up with very little official
action to halt the slaughter. In Bosnia, the West hemmed and
hawed for months, while snipers rained bullets on civilians
and shells exploded in downtown Sarajevo. In Cyprus, the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed
in 1964 and still remains there more than 30 years—and hundreds
of lost lives—later.
And, in both cases, the aggression did not end until a third party
asserted itself. For Cyprus, that was Turkey, which assumed
its right as a guarantor to protect the Turkish Cypriot community
after a Greek-engineered coup on the island. Ten years into
UNFICYP's ineffective mission, Turkey intervened to stop what
the U.N. and the West would not—the systematic, government-sponsored
elimination of the Turkish Cypriot community. In that respect, the
1974 Turkish military intervention was one of the great humanitarian
acts of this half century, accomplishing what the U.N. failed
to do in more than a decade of "peacekeeping."
But if an agreement can be reached in Bosnia, there is reason to
believe that a similar solution might also prevail in Cyprus.
In fact, the Dayton Agreement gives us hope precisely because
it contains many of the same elements that the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus has long contended must be part of any
solution on Cyprus. Foremost among these is the inviolate
principle that we will never agree to any solution that does not
explicitly guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriot community,
which will only occur under a system that acknowledges our
full political equality. Once the Greek Cypriots accept and
respect this incontrovertible fact, the basic elements of
a solution will fall into place, including:
* Recognition of the sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriot community.
In 1960, the Turkish Cypriot community entered into a partnership
with our Greek Cypriot countrymen to form the short-lived
Republic of Cyprus. We will never again place our families
in the position of relying on the good will alone of the Greek
Cypriots. Sovereignty, born of true political equality, is
the only safeguard we have.
* Establishment of a Federal Republic. Once the Turkish Cypriot
community is accepted as an equally sovereign partner, the
next step will be to create a bi-zonal, federal state that
will allow both communities significant powers to manage their
own affairs. Such a state would have a central government
with representation from both sides, and would be responsible for
managing the fundamental issues affecting the entire island.
* Respect for the United Nations negotiations. UNFICYP aside, the
U.N. has made a sincere effort to resolve the post-1974 Cyprus
situation through negotiations. In 1994, TRNC President Rauf
Denktash formally accepted virtually all of the U.N.'s Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) for Cyprus which, if enacted, would
have laid the foundation for serious long-range negotiations.
The Greek Cypriots initially expressed approval of the CBMs, assuming
the Turkish Cypriot side would reject them. When TRNC President
Denktash said yes, however, the Greek Cypriot side quickly
changed its position to no. The same fate befell the 1985
and 1986 U.N.-brokered Framework Agreements.
* Conceding the "enosis" fantasy. The Serbs dreamed
of creating a "Greater Serbia" from Bosnian territory.
The Greek Cypriot equivalent is "enosis"—annexation
of Cyprus by Greece, over the dead bodies of Turkish Cypriots
if necessary. In 1974, Greek military officers who felt the
ethnic-cleansing campaign was not progressing fast enough
staged a coup against the Greek Cypriot administration, which
triggered the legal Turkish military response. Part and parcel
of recognizing the equality of the Turkish Cypriot community
is giving up the pan-Hellenic notion that Cyprus will ever become
a Greek possession.
Each of these broad themes has been incorporated into the Dayton
Agreement with the consent of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian
Muslims. Yet the Greek Cypriots, despite years of lip service,
have demonstrated no seriousness in reaching an agreement
based on these themes. In fact, it is quite the opposite.
The Greek Cypriots have engineered a cruel embargo on the TRNC
that has left the economy in dire straits. They routinely
shut off water and electricity to the north. Their duplicity
at the bargaining table has left U.N. negotiators at their
wits end for decades. They have laid claim to the title "Republic
of Cyprus" and misrepresent themselves as speaking for
the entire island's inhabitants. Unfortunately, the unthinking
recognition by the West of the Greek Cypriots as the "government
of Cyprus" has emboldened them to reject sharing power
with Turkish Cypriots. Instead of coming to terms with us,
they would rather pursue membership in the European Union—which
we also support—provided a just solution is first achieved.
These actions clearly demonstrate that the Greek Cypriots
have no intention of accepting our one immutable requirement—equality
for the Turkish Cypriot community.
Now that international attention once again is turning toward Cyprus,
we Turkish Cypriots find ourselves in a peculiar position. There
is no denying the outstanding lobbying capabilities of the
Greek Cypriots, who, in an Orwellian twist, would have the
world believe they are the victims. They continue to press
their case against us and Turkey, diligently crossing the
't's and dotting the 'i's of their legal briefs, pressuring European
governments into taking harsh measures against the TRNC and obfuscating
the issue by focusing international attention on the Turkish military
presence, rather than addressing core issues. (Incidentally,
the Athens Court of Appeals ruled that the intervention was
legal and that Turkey acted entirely within its rights as
a Guarantor Power to save the Turkish Cypriots.) Meanwhile,
south Cyprus has become a money-laundering haven for the Russian
underworld and a base of operations for international terrorist
groups.
Having won the battle 21 years ago to stay alive, we are losing
the public relations war to the very oppressors who caused
the present situation. The Turkish intervention was the final
chapter of a decade-long Greek tragedy forced on the Turkish
Cypriots, not the beginning of it.
The Turkish Cypriot residents of tiny Sandallar, Murataga and Atlilar
villages could attest to this. Many of them already had endured
severe hardship until the night when, as they were called
out of their homes by Greek Cypriots who knew them by name,
they were gunned down. All 126 of them, including babies as
young as 16 days old, were buried in mass graves. Today, all
that is left is a quiet memorial listing the names of each of
the murdered, the burning memory each Turkish Cypriot has of those
dark days, and our commitment to ensure that it never happens
again.
Namik Korhan is the Washington representative of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. |