Charting a Path Toward a Landmark Syrian-Israeli Agreement

By Nabil Kaylani

The euphoria that accompanied the historic Rabin-Arafat handshake has been somewhat dampened by a concomitant slow-down, however temporary, in the Syrian-Israeli negotiating track. Conventional wisdom has it that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin does not want to overload the Israeli political circuit by having PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Jericho and Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad on the Golan Heights at the same time. Conversely, the cautious Assad does not wish to be perceived as following in Arafat's footsteps while prospects for a successful implementation of the PLO-Israeli accord are, at best, uncertain.

On the face of it, Israel's occupation of Syria's Golan Heights is the sticking point between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Applying U.N. Security Council Resolution 242's land-for-peace formula, Israel is supposed to withdraw from the territory it seized from Syria in 1967 in exchange for Syrian acknowledgement of Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. But the Israelis have refused to commit themselves to total withdrawal unless Assad spells out in clear terms the kind of peace he has in mind, something that the Syrian leader has been, thus far, reluctant to do.

To break the impasse, it has been proposed that Israel, without withdrawing, acknowledge Syrian sovereignty over the Golan in order to induce Syrian acceptance of a comprehensive peace. In his January summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Geneva, Assad struck a conciliatory tone, but in the absence of a favorable Israeli response, nothing has changed fundamentally.

Considering what is at stake, the posturing of Syria and Israel appears frivolous if not downright cynical. It is certainly uncharacteristic of a Rabin who has the political courage to shake Arafat's hand, and a Syrian president who has masterfully steered his country through the maze of Middle Eastern politics. In fact, however, these two leaders are painfully aware that there is far more to peaceful relations between their countries than the evacuation of the Golan Heights and the so-called Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon.

In spite of routine denials, Israeli leaders realize that the Gaza-Jericho agreement with the PLO is an interim phase which will in all probability lead to a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan. Even the sensitive issue of East Jerusalem, heretofore described by Israelis of both Labor and Likud affiliation as "non-negotiable," has been put on the negotiating table simply because the entire process will bog down in the absence of an eventual agreement on this sensitive subject.

If all of this has been tacitly conceded, then the remaining unknown is the nature and form of the future relationship between Israel and Jordan/Palestine. Initial speculation has focused on the desirability of a common market between Israel and its neighbors. Should this come to pass, then the stronger, more developed Israeli economy would so predominate as to reduce Jordan/Palestine to a state of vassalage.

By conceding little today, Prime Minister Rabin is hoping for an economically viable Israel, with an extensive sphere of influence serving as a conduit to the larger Arab market, tomorrow. These Israeli expectations are the catalyst for the aggressive campaign waged by the Clinton administration for an early lifting of the Arab economic boycott against Israel, since Israelis perceive it as the main impediment to Israel's eventual economic integration in the Middle East.

Similar machinations are behind Syria's stern rejection of a premature lifting of the Arab boycott against Israel. President Assad evidently wants assurances that go beyond the imperative of Israeli military withdrawal from Syrian and Lebanese territory. He is consciously staking a strategic claim for Syria in the new order that the Israeli-PLO accord has made possible. The precise nature of that claim is not yet clear, in-as-much as the national aspirations of the Syrian regime have been nebulous.

A De Facto Division

If, however, Jordan/Palestine finds itself within an Israeli sphere of influence, then Syria most probably will maintain its control, albeit indirectly, of Lebanon. This means a de facto division of the Levant— in historical terms, the eastern Mediterranean region between Turkey and Egypt— into a Syrian-dominated north and an Israeli-dominated south. This would duplicate the partition that France and Great Britain agreed upon at the San Remo conference in 192O, but with Syria as heir to France and Israel as heir to Britain.

Another possible, though considerably more difficult, scenario is to expand the proposed common market to include Syria and Lebanon, thereby giving Jordan/Palestine a counterweight to Israeli power both economically and politically. But this outcome could not be achieved without unfettering the Syrian economy. Assad apparently has not ruled out this option. Since the Gulf war, the Syrian government has introduced "Law 10," which initiated a modest economic liberalization program. But reforms have been limited to foreign trade and investment. Since the domestic system remains hobbled by regulations, Assad may be willing to shift to a free market economy only when Syria is assured of its proper place in the New Middle East order.

Such are the primary obstacles to a Syrian/Israeli accommodation which must be explored by Assad and Rabin as they negotiate a total withdrawal for total peace agreement.

In fact, Israel cannot ultimately deny Assad's wishes. Should Israel find his minimal demands unacceptable, then he certainly has the capacity to derail the entire peace process. Syria hosts several radical Palestinian organizations opposed to Arafat's leadership and the Gaza-Jericho deal. These groups presently are working to divide the Palestinian community and frustrate the PLO mainstream led by Arafat.

In addition, the Syrians can permit the Iran-funded Hezbollah extremists in Lebanon to start another cycle of violence on Israel's northern border. And finally, Assad has the option of pulling out of the peace process altogether and reinvigorating his strategic alliance with Iran, a move that would have negative regional implications.

The Middle East is at a crossroads. After the momentous Arafat-Rabin handshake, the future of the region hinges on a "strategic reconciliation" between Syria and Israel not unlike that of France and West Germany after World War II. Just as the Paris-Bonn alliance has become the cornerstone for the European Community, so could a Tel Aviv-Damascus nexus launch a regional common market in the Middle East.

Such an auspicious denouement cannot be contemplated, however, unless Israel abjures all hegemonic designs, and accepts the notion of total withdrawal from occupied Arab territories as a precondition for its regional integration. Meanwhile, Assad must start the twin processes of relaxing his authoritarian rule and privatizing the Syrian economy.

Nabil M Kaylani is professor of international relations at the Rochester Institute of Technology.