Facing Uncertain Future and Violent Present, Algerians Turn to Idealized Past

By Greg and Laidia Chouat Noakes

Algeria faces an extremely uncertain future after the most turbulent year in its history since the post-independence power struggles exactly thirty years earlier. In 1992, Algerians witnessed the cancellation of the nation's first free parliamentary elections, the forced resignation of one head of state and the assassination of a second, the seizure of power by a military-backed regime, waves of arrests, and armed clashes between radical Islamists and security forces throughout the country.

Political life in Algeria has been largely frozen since the declaration in January 1992 of an official state of emergency and the deepening conflict between the "forces of order" and militant Islamist groups carrying out a program of terror attacks. The running battle between security personnel and Islamist insurgents is out of control, with each side pledging to outlast the other.

A psychological turning point last June was the gruesome murder of Mohammed Boudiaf, a hero of the revolution who had returned from 27 years of exile to assume power following the imposition of martial law. The unprecedented assassination of an Algerian head of state shocked the country. Now, lingering doubt about the identity of the parties behind the killing contributes to the population's already healthy cynicism. An official investigative panel's finding that Lembarak Boumaraf, a 26year-old sub-lieutenant assigned for the first time to the president's bodyguard on the day of the assassination, acted alone in killing Boudiaf and wounding 41 others, raised more questions than it answered.

Since the assassination, ordinary Algerians increasingly are affected by heightened security measures undertaken by the current government of President Ali Kafi and Prime Minister Belaid Abdeslam. Arrests of suspected Islamist commandos are carried out by heavily armed police patrols and at roadblocks manned by military gendarmes.

A night curfew was imposed Dec. 5 on Algiers and the central part of the country, affecting over half of Algeria's 26 million people. Islamist insurgents responded with new attacks, including a daytime ambush in the Algiers neighborhood of Kouba in which four policemen were killed and one seriously wounded. The following night, security forces retaliated with a series of raids in which 13 armed militants died. Shootings and bombings have continued to alternate with arrests and counter-insurgency operations.

Despite the hardships of the strict curfew, there is firm public support for the police and army. Aside from the obvious desire for the restoration of public safety and security, the overwhelming majority of Algerians are genuinely outraged by the senseless acts of violence and destruction committed by the small fringe groups waging armed struggle against the state. Though many Algerians are supportive of the Islamist message put forth by the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other parties, few advocate a violent imposition of the "Islamic solution."

There also is widespread public compassion for victims of the civil strife. Of nearly 300 security personnel killed last year, most were ordinary policemen who left behind widows and small children. A number of innocent bystanders have been caught in the crossfire as well. Although there also is sympathy for the thousands of Algerians held without trial for almost a year on suspicion of supporting the FIS, the country clearly is not prepared to see an Islamic state built on the corpses of policemen.

Public support for the security forces does not translate into widespread support for the Kafi-Abdeslam government, however. Most see the present regime of long-serving technocrats backed by the army as a necessary evil. Although it is useful for the reimposition of public order, it is perceived as lacking legitimacy because of its ties to the old system of Algerian politics.

This old order accounts in part for the fact that, despite the nation's groundbreaking experiment with democracy, many Algerians remain apolitical. Deprived of any meaningful political life for most of the last 30 years, most Algerians see an overactive interest in politics as a quick way to land in trouble with the authorities. Three decades of corruption and inefficiency on the part of the FLN (the former ruling party), the current utter confusion and petty infighting among the myriad leftist opposition groups, and the annulment of FIS electoral victories have left Algerians skeptical and disillusioned. After years of hollow promises and empty talk, the political system is seen by all to have failed, and public confidence in both ruling and opposition figures is at an all-time low.

More Immediate Concerns

Theoretical debates about the nature of an Islamic state, the role of a strong central authority or the interactions of civil society and the democratic system have little resonance with a population concerned with more immediate matters. Unemployment, particularly among the roughly 60 percent of Algerians under the age of 30, continues to rise. An acute housing shortage is aggravated by a steadily growing population. In some households in the teeming cities, family members take turns leaving their flat in order to give those left behind more room.

Prices for food, fuel and other basic necessities climb while salaries for those lucky enough to have jobs stagnate or decline. Because of the capital crunch, it is not uncommon for workers to go a month or two without pay. As the standard of living for most Algerians falls, the high hopes of the 1960s and '70s have given way to fear for the future, particularly among the young.

Many Algerians are looking instead to an idealized past for inspiration. Six months after his death, Mohammed Boudiaf has taken on heroic proportions, the personification of altruism and self-sacrifice in politics. His image as the good guy sheriff who rode in to clean up the town, only to meet his end in a cloud of dust and a hail of bullets, has its darker ramifications. Many Algerians believe their system is bound to snuff out the heroes.

Boudiaf's official portrait continues to hang in government offices, while the most popular new 1993 wall calendar features his photograph. There is even a dressmaking fabric called "Boudiaf," though this may not be such a compliment, since another type of cloth is named for former President Chadli Benjedid, who is regularly excoriated in the Algerian press and may be investigated on charges of corruption.

Chadli's predecessor is another subject of renewed popular attention.

The presidency of Houari Boumediene, dead for some 14 years, is increasingly seen as a kind of golden age when all Algerians worked together to build a new nation and were proud of their country and its achievements. Boumediene's ardent nationalism, egalitarian social policies and sense of vision seem to many Algerians to be severely lacking today.

Interestingly, democracy has no place in this golden age, since Boumediene held more personal power than any Algerian president before or since. As one newspaper editorial put it, "Decisions [under Boumediene] might have been unilateral but at least they had the merit of being fair."

Boumediene has his own calendar, and photographs of the former ruler have made their appearance in shops and cafes across the country. Conspiracy theories about Boumediene's death in 1978 from a rare blood disease are making the rounds, with the KGB, the CIA and the French government as prime suspects.

Finally, many Algerians have turned back more than 30 years to their bloody struggle for independence from France as a model of unity, individual determination and national purpose. The government has encouraged this image of the revolution by featuring historical analyses and commemorations on state-run television.

Algeria's press also has picked up the story, emphasizing the revolution's nationalist, religious, or socialist bases depending on the individual paper's policies. Once the most open and politically sophisticated in the Arab world, Algerian newspapers have been rocked by government suspensions and threats and are now much tamer animals.

The unity, courage, dedication and resolve of the shuhada (martyrs) and mujahideen of the revolution are the qualities most Algerians believe their country needs today. Unfortunately, there are no groups or individuals encompassing Boudiaf s independent reformism, Boumediene's firmness and sense of purpose, and the revolution's ardor and solidarity on the scene or on the horizon. Since, in fact, Boudiaf was elevated to power by the army, Boumediene's regime was characterized by authoritarianism and a stagnant centralized economy, and there was tremendous behind-the-scenes conflict and dissension during the revolution, it is unlikely that anyone could live up to such unrealistic expectations. Still, given the paroxysm of violence and division gripping their country, and their dim uncertain future, it is small wonder that Algerians are clinging to an idealized past.

Greg and Laidia Noakes recently returned from a visit to Algeria.