Israelis Set the Stage for Direct Negotiations With the PLO

By Leon T. Hadar

The Israeli government's deportation of 415 Palestinians allegedly associated with the Islamic Hamas movement has been condemned both by the United Nations Security Council and by international public opinion as a gross human rights violation. The action, even if reversed, highlights also the bankruptcy of the policy decision of both Likud and Labor governments not to conduct direct diplomatic negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Israeli leaders are finding that those who have rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner may now be doomed to confront the more radical Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza. These groups, committed to the establishment of a Muslim state "from the [Jordan] river to the sea," not only are opposed to the Middle East peace negotiations, but also to Israel's existence. Compared to the Islamic groups, the PLO is beginning to look to many Israelis like a unit of the Salvation Army.

Opposition from the Israel lobby in Washington slowed efforts in Israel.

Dan Margalit, a hawkish columnist for the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, writes that for years Israeli leaders have criticized the Palestinians for "missing the train" by not taking advantage of diplomatic openings, reconsidering only when the opportunity had passed. Now, "by refusing to sit down with Yasser Arafat and make peace, Israel itself could end up 'missing the train,"' suggests Margalit.

His article reflects a growing sense in Israel that there must be a dramatic move on the Palestinian-Israeli front. Even as pro-Likud American propagandist Steven Emerson recently wrote in the New Republic that the intifada was dead, Israeli government television presented a documentary in which Israeli soldiers serving in the occupied territories blasted their government's West Bank policies and suggested that a withdrawal from the West Bank and negotiations with the PLO might be Israel's only way out of the Palestinian quagmire.

Likud governments to some extent encouraged the rise of the Hamas movement, hoping that Islamic radicals would weaken support for the PLO and its affiliated secular-nationalist organizations in the occupied territories. The Likud strategy was to cite the strength of Hamas to weaken the PLO's claim that it represents the Palestinians. At the same time, the rise of rejectionist fundamentalists would support the Israeli claim that "there are no Palestinians to negotiate with."

PLO Tunis and PLO West Bank

The Rabin strategy has been a little more sophisticated, but no less short-sighted. Since coming to power, the Labor government has encouraged formation of an independent Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, including members of the Palestinian negotiating team, while attempting to marginalize the PLO leadership in Tunis. But, as Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff has noted, this strategy reflects wishful thinking. Palestinian leaders in Tunis and Nablus are not competing cliques, but two branches of the same organization, "PLO Tunis" and "PLO West Bank," he wrote.

The Rabin government, frustrated over its inability to force its own version of "autonomy" on Palestinian negotiators in Washington, has complained about "disunity" in the Palestinian camp. Rabin's officials, arguing that Arafat has been sabotaging the talks, have conducted a disinformation campaign against the PLO chairman, suggesting that he is seriously ill and mentally unstable, and may soon face a challenge to his rule from within the PLO.

The cycle of violence in the occupied territories and in Israel only points to the failure of these policies. With no progress in the peace talks, the message of Hamas seems to be falling on more receptive ears among frustrated Palestinians, while the peace strategy of the PLO and its supporters in the territories is losing ground. Some polls show that close to 50 percent of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza would support the Islamic groups. If anything, the mass deportation of the Islamic leaders only helped to increase their popularity, forcing the Palestinian negotiators to consider pulling out of the talks in Washington altogether.

Legitimizing the PLO

There are indications, however, that supporters of the Rabin government are preparing conditions for opening a dialogue with the PLO, which most Israeli leaders continue to describe, albeit without the emotional overtones of yesterday, as a "terrorist organization."

At the same time Israel has been engaged in violent confrontation with Hamas, and the intifada has been turning from stones to guns, the Labor government has given a green light to its parliamentary bloc to decriminalize meetings between Israeli citizens and PLO officials. The move led to only minor outbursts by Likud members and, interestingly enough, by American Jewish leaders. The latter argued that the Israeli action makes it more difficult for them to continue to demand that the United States government stick to its ban on talks with the PLO. It was this opposition from the Israel lobby in Washington that slowed, for a while, efforts in Israel to legalize contacts with the PLO.

Another psychological barrier dropped when two senior Israeli reporters from Yediot Ahronot, Israel's largest circulation daily, met in Tunis with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Their long and balanced interview with him was published in the weekend edition of the paper, whose readers include a large segment of lower middle-class Sephardim, who tend to be Likud supporters.

The only negative reaction came from the newspaper Ma'ariv, angry that its competitor had pulled off a media coup. By contrast, when peace activist Uri Avnery interviewed the PLO chairman during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Avnery was described as a "traitor" by the Israeli government, which threatened to arrest him, while military right-wingers promised to assassinate him.

As most Israeli journalists matter-of-factly analyzed the YediotAhronot interview for clues to the PLO's thinking, Arafat, who had occupied a place in the Israeli public's mind akin to that of Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin, suddenly emerged as a legitimate statesman. Continuing meetings between members of the governmental coalition and PLO officials, and expressions of support by cabinet members for negotiations with the PLO, are gradually legitimizing it in Israeli minds as a partner for talks with Israel.

The consensus that is emerging in the Israeli foreign policy establishment is that only a more direct involvement by the PLO in the peace talks—a move that already is supported by more than 40 percent of the public—could put the talks back on track and tip the balance of power in the occupied territories in favor of the more moderate forces.

A Challenge to the Clinton Administration

A lot will depend on the new administration of U. S. President William Clinton. If the U.S. renews its dialogue with the PLO, Clinton's new Middle Eastern team will strengthen those in the Israeli coalition— the Meretz party as well as more than half of the Labor Knesset list—who support direct Israel-PLO talks. Such a clear signal from Washington would help them mobilize support for talks with Arafat. It would also help the moderate pro-PLO leadership in the territories improve its position vis a vis Hamas.

There is no doubt that such an American move would be portrayed by The New York Times' A.M. Rosenthal and like-minded U. S. media fanatics as a betrayal of Clinton's election campaign promises. They would like to see Clinton join Israel in a campaign against Islamic fundamentalism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East—while ignoring continued Israeli control of the West Bank and Israel's arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Other members of Clinton's closest circle of aides and friends, however, such as Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel ("Sandy") Berger and Peter Edelman, a personal friend of the new president, both of whom are strong supporters of Israel's Peace Now movement, would probably push for renewed American-PLO discussions as a dramatic way of igniting the moribund peace talks.