February 1989, Page 36
Update on Congress
The 101st Congress: Already, An Arms Sale Imbroglio
By Dennis J. Wamsted
A cooperative, bipartisan spirit pervaded Washington through December
and January, as both newly elected President George Bush and the
101st Congress attended to ceremonial and organizational endeavors.
Notwithstanding this initial comity, three pro-Israel congressmen
issued a blunt warning to the new president and his administration:
Congress will oppose any new arms sale proposals to Saudi Arabia.
"We view with alarm ... the prospect of a new, divisive proposal
to add our most offensive weapons systems to the already teeming
Saudi arsenal," Reps. Mel Levine (D-CA), Lawrence Smith (D-FL),
and Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA) wrote President-elect Bush in December.
"We do not believe that such arms requests are justified, especially
so soon after Saudi Arabian arms purchases both from us and our
allies." The three, who are among Israel's staunchest congressional
supporters and who cooperate extensively with the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), said that, "under present
circumstances, we would take the lead in Congress to oppose actively
an administration request to license export of such a major new
Saudi arms package. We also do not believe that prompt consummation
of such new military sales would advance the Middle East peace process
or other vital US interests in the region," the three continued,
adding that an early decision to propose an arms sale to the Saudis
would lead to "a bitter battle" between Congress and the
administration.
At the same time, the Saudis, a long-standing American customer,
are back in the market for at least two advanced weapons systems,
according to published reports. Among the weapons on the Saudis'
purchase list: a new main battle tank and upward of 120 fighters
to replace the kingdom's aging, US-built F-5 interceptor aircraft.
The US-manufactured M-1 tank and either the F-16 or F-18 jet fighter
would satisfy the Saudis' needs, according to industry officials.
But it is unlikely the kingdom, still upset that sales "promised"
by the Reagan administration but derailed by the Democratically
controlled Congress, will formally request additional US weaponry
unless it receives assurances from the new administration that the
request will be approved by Congress.
Bush Facing Tough Choices
In short, the Bush administration will be forced to decide in
the coming months whether to risk the ire of Israel's congressional
supporters, perhaps even at the expense of some other administration
program, by pushing ahead with a comprehensive Saudi arms proposal.
On the other hand, if the administration bows to this congressional
dictate, the US could easily lose a third multibillion dollar arms
sale to the British, who have profited enormously from Congress's
unabashed pro-Israel bias in the 1980s.
One thing is clear: The Saudis will purchase the weapons they desire,
as they have repeatedly demonstrated by turning to Britain for advanced
jet fighters after failing to secure the planes from the US. The
only question, then, is whether the US, Britain, or some other country
such as France will profit from the Saudis' military purchases.
Given the pervasive concern about the huge US trade deficit and
America's international competitiveness—both issues that surfaced
repeatedly in the 1988 elections—there is at least some reason
to believe that President Bush will confront the pro-Israel coterie
in Congress that has so misshapen US Middle Eastern policy over
the past decade. A catalyst for action by the administration may
be last summer's Saudi decision to purchase from Britain, after
being rebuffed repeatedly by the US Congress, 120 Tornado jet fighters,
60 trainers, 50 battlefield helicopters, and two minesweepers.
The sale was recently valued at $68 billion by Saudi Arabia's deputy
information minister, Fouad al-Farsy. The US Chamber of Commerce
and the Pentagon have estimated that every billion dollars in US
exports translates into 40,000 new American domestic jobs.
Carlucci Critical of One-Sided Mideast Policy
An undercurrent of opposition to the chokehold exercised over US
Middle Eastern policy by pro-Israel congressmen, particularly with
regard to arms sales to America's Arab allies, has existed for years
both on Capitol Hill and within the executive branch. Rarely, however,
is this opposition aired in public, which makes former Secretary
of Defense Frank Carlucci's speech last fall before a group of US
businessmen assembled by the American-Arab Affairs Council all the
more intriguing.
"I see tens of billions of dollars worth of jobs going abroad
instead of sustaining our key defense industries and bolstering
the US economy," Carlucci said. "I see foreign soldiers
on Jordanian and Saudi installations, providing training and maintenance
assistance, where American servicemen have served until now. There
can be no comfort in the knowledge that the US will meet increased
difficulty in achieving the broad range of our foreign policy objectives
in the region, as Arab states now turning to Soviet and other non-American
sources of military advice and assistance become less receptive
to American policy positions," the secretary continued. "We
need a new sense of realism about the strategic purposes of our
policies in the Middle East." Carlucci was particularly critical
of "various interest groups" and a number of congressmen
for their opposition to arms sales to US allies in the Arab world.
"The notion that US defense cooperation with moderate Arab
states poses a danger to Israel is ill-founded and untrue,"
he said. "Israel must regard non-American arms in the hands
of its neighbors as a higher risk."
The secretary also dismissed a "truism" repeated by the
pro-Israel lobby that the Arab countries are unwilling to coexist
with Israel. "I am convinced that most Arab states are willing
to live in peace with Israel, but are themselves continually threatened
by radical forces in the region. That is why I believe that moderate
Arab states must be strong enough to resist intimidation and take
the bold steps to negotiate with Israel."
Carlucci's largely unreported speech is a the more important
because he is expected to play a key, albeit informal, advisory
role for incoming Defense Secretary John Tower. In addition, in
December shortly before he left office, Carlucci toured the Persian
Gulf for talks with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain,
and reportedly discussed the possibility of US arms sales to the
Arab states of the gulf in 1989.
Another Gulf Tour
Secretary Carlucci wasn't the only US official planning to tour
the gulf during the two-month interregnum. Sen. Dennis DeConcini
(D-AZ), one of the most vocal opponents of arms sales to the Arab
countries, was scheduled to meet with officials in nine Arab countries
and Israel in January. Interestingly, the Arizona Democrat, who
was re-elected to a third term last November and who sits on the
pivotal Senate Appropriations foreign operations subcommittee, which
controls the US foreign aid program, wasn't planning to travel alone.
In addition to his wife, DeConcini was to have been accompanied
by Earl Katz, a Phoenix businessman who has been finance chairman
of DeConcini's recent election campaign and who is active in pro-Israel
affairs. When this reporter and other newsmen questioned the propriety
of DeConcini's action in putting Katz on the Senate payroll temporarily
to qualify him to travel on military aircraft, and then requesting
a security clearance so that Katz could participate in secret embassy
and military briefings, Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman
Robert Byrd (D-WV) withdrew his permission for the trip.
Dennis J. Wamsted is a free-lance writer specializing in the
US Congress and Middle Eastern affairs. |