Government and Society in Rural Palestine

By Ylana Miller. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. 218 pp. $19.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by John Munro

Unfortunately, those who speak out most vehemently with respect to the dispossession of the Palestinians from their historical homeland are more likely to be fired with ideological commitment than historical facts; only seldom is there an attempt to analyze what really happened in a scholarly, objective way. Fortunately, in this study by a scholar who made extensive use of archival resources and, judging by her copious bibliography, had wide-ranging access to previously unpublished material, we have what is likely to be as dear a picture as is likely to emerge.

She begins with some basic questions: If it is true that in 1947 Arabs made up two-thirds of the population of Palestine and owned most of its cultivable land, how was it that they so easily lost their homes and land to a relatively small Jewish community "just emerging from the shocks of World War II"? She continues: "Did the Palestinians 'lose' their homeland because they were backward, primitive, and reactionary? Or was Israel the product of persistent victimization of Palestinian Arabs by an imperialist power that supported Zionist colonialization? Did the Palestinians sell each other out, or were they helpless sufferers in the face of a sophisticated enemy with endless resources?" The rest of the book provides the answers and as we might expect, given the author's scholarly rather than partisan perspective, they are not as clear cut as either side would wish.

Official British accounts of the Palestine mandate tend to reinforce the idea that all the British were concerned with was maintaining law and order, that they neither sought to prepare the way for the Zionists nor actively supported the local inhabitants against the Zionist aim of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. However, as the author points out, the mere fact that the British were there, maintaining law and order, meant that in order to carry out what they perceived as their main task, they created a situation which ultimately favored the Zionists.

British policy was dictated in part by a desire to maintain political calm, which they thought could best be achieved by working through the traditional Arab leaderships. Unfortunately, Miller demonstrates that it had serious, negative consequences for the Palestinians, because its general effect was to promote what the Zionists were bent on achieving. Furthermore, the Palestinians, unlike other Arabs of the time, were not simply confronting a single colonial power, they were also confronting the Zionists.

The British attitude had several important, far-reaching consequences. In practical terms, the Palestinian Arabs simultaneously looked to the British government for aid and at the same time regarded it as being responsible for the Zionist presence. This, in turn, led to a split in the Palestinian-Arab population in new ways. On the one hand, the British sought to maintain religious and regional differences among the Arabs, following their usual practice of "divide and rule." On the other hand, they introduced a new form of political organization that helped to fragment the potential Arab leadership along new lines: Arab officials who served the Palestine government began to develop skills and ties that would prepare them to serve in a new, limited Palestinian nation-state. At the same time, nationalist leaders who remained outside the official structure maintained pan-Arab ties and continued to rely upon family and religious links for their authority. These two groups overlapped, and while individuals of either might come from the same village or even family, each had different social and political roles to play.

The author develops this thesis through her analysis of the mandate government, the civil service, village administration, rural education—in an especially provocative chapter on the latter, she explains how the British managed to stifle national awareness—and the 1936-1939 Arab revolt.

While one is inclined to accept Miller's final assessment "the tragedy of Palestine grew out of a struggle between two peoples, each desperate to survive and each unable to comprehend the apocalyptic view of the other," such a conclusion does tend to overlook the moral dimensions of the Palestine conflict, which have proven to be especially enduring.

It is not enough to say that "when it finally exploded, one side won and the other lost the battle." This, however, does not in any way invalidate what Dr. Miller has written. On the contrary, she has produced a clear and thoughtful analysis of the history of rural Palestine which is likely to serve historians well for years to come.

John Munro is a regular columnist for Middle East Times. Acknowledgment to Middle East Times.