Pollard: Behind Enemy Lines

By Stephen Green

The American news media seem not to have discovered this yet, but the Justice Department's pre-sentencing memorandum, filed in DC Federal District Court on January 5, establishes Jonathan Jay Pollard as one of the most important spies against the United States in the 20th century. It also provides some compelling new evidence concerning the extent of Israeli government involvement in what it once tried to dismiss as a "rogue operation."

The damage Pollard has done to US national security interests is nearly incalculable. What he gave to the Israelis was more than a thousand classified documents, some of which were hundreds of pages in length. The majority of these documents were classified Top Secret and/or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which include "data about sophisticated technical systems for collecting intelligence, as well as the product collected by the systems."

These documents provided details about Middle Eastern governments and armies; US ship positions, military tactics, and weapons systems; information about US analyses of Soviet missile systems; and a wealth of data on American intelligence-gathering, both electronic and human. The Justice Department specifically warned that possession of this information exposed the intelligence sources to "targeting" and "pressure." Translation: Pollard exposed American intelligence contacts in the Middle East, and perhaps elsewhere.

Who did he give this to? Initially, at least, the vast majority of these stolen documents went to the government of Israel. Pollard and his wife also shared some documents with the government of the Peoples' Republic of China, and with some of the Pollards' "social friends."

Interestingly enough, virtually all of the information stolen by Pollard, using an interagency accessible computer, was outside his subject (terrorism) area and geographic (Latin America) area of interest. In other words, it was information he had no "need to know." The system of protecting highly classified US government secrets had broken down completely. Pollard himself told the Israelis, when he first contacted them about spying, that he wanted to exploit, on behalf of Israel, "holes" in the US intelligence system. If nothing else, he certainly located those!

If Pollard was an important spy, he received the service, protection, and compensation befitting his role. The pre-sentencing memorandum also highlights the scale of the government of Israel's direct involvement—the sheer size of the operation in terms of funds and people, as well as the sophistication of Pollard's back-up network. Aside from the three Israeli government officials and one Embassy secretary who were named as the (so far) unindicted co-conspirators, an Israeli named "Uzi" was involved, as was an unnamed man who aided in copying documents at the Maryland home of an as yet unnamed Israeli diplomat. One, perhaps two, apartments near the Israeli Embassy were also used for meetings. At least one of these apartments was equipped with sophisticated copying equipment. Pollard also had been given a telephone number at the Israeli Embassy he could call at night emergencies. He was big time.

Money? You bet. Pollard received $50,000 over 18 months, and was promised $540,000 more over the 10-year expected life of the conspiracy. An additional $30,000 had supposedly already been deposited in a Swiss bank account. This is aside from the jewelry and other gifts costing thousands of dollars given to both Pollards. That was just to keep the Pollards themselves going. There were also salaries for the other people involved, the costs of copying equipment, and travel by all concerned to meetings in Europe and Israel. This was an expensive operation.

The Justice Department memorandum provided other, specific evidence of direct Israeli government involvement:

• It was the Israeli government that hustled Pollard's two primary handlers, Col. Aviem Sella and Joseph Yagur, out of the US in the hours after Pollard was arrested.

• Sella was (and still is) on active duty with the Israeli Air Force and has, since Pollard's arrest, been promoted and now commands Ramon air force base in Israel. Rafael Eitan, a known masterspy for Mossad and former advisor to Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, was also working for the Defense Ministry during the Pollard operation. And he too has since been rewarded by the Israeli government. He was made Chief Executive Officer of Israel Chemicals, the largest government-owned company in that country.

• Pollard was repeatedly assured by Sella and Eitan that the Israeli government would deal with the matter through political channels should he ever be arrested. At one point, he was shown an Israeli passport with his photo and a fake identity.

• In July-August, 1985, the Pollards spent several weeks in Israel, during which time Jonathan Jay visited Eitan in a hospital in Tel Aviv. Given Pollard's position in US Naval Intelligence and Eitan's past political and intelligence connections, it is hard to believe that Israeli counter-intelligence was unaware of Pollard's visit and contacts. Yet no information about the trip was transmitted by Israel to the US government.

• Every other week for 18 months, first Sella and then Yagur transmitted to Pollard detailed intelligence requirements on the information he was to steal out of the computer. These were not general requests. Sella, Eitan and, in particular, Yagur, asked Pollard for information on specific, classified weapons systems. In some cases they asked for specific documents by title, number, and so on. Only a full-blown intelligence organization could have developed such sophisticated requests. Given Eitan's past associations, the most likely possibility is Mossad.

• The Israeli government, far from cooperating with the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) in their investigation of the Pollard affair, actively tried to hinder the process. Aside from quickly spiriting Sella and Yagur out of the country, the Israelis retained and refused to return over 80 percent of the documents stolen by Pollard. Moreover, all of the 163 documents which they did "return" were copies, and thus did not have Pollard's latest fingerprints. Not one original document was returned, depriving the FBI and NIS of important physical evidence in the case.

Toward the end of the pre-sentencing memorandum, the Justice Department argues that the state of US official relations with the country receiving stolen documents has little bearing upon the damage caused thereby to the national security interest, and should have no bearing at all on the severity of the sentence given the spy concerned when convicted. In its argument, the Justice Department describes at some length the "false flag" approach as an espionage technique. This involves a situation where an intelligence source is fooled into thinking that the foreign agent represents a friendly or allied country.

The example which Justice gives to illustrate the "false flag" technique is the Jerry Whitworth case, in which the KGB managed to convince Whitworth that he was spying for Israel, not the Soviet Union. Justice argues that the Federal District Code should, in sentencing Pollard, make it clear that any breach of security regulations will be dealt with severely, so that future potential spies will not be tempted to wink at the regulations when a "friend" is concerned.

Interestingly, the Justice Department, in its discussion of the "false flag" approach over several pages, never once implies that this is what is happening to Pollard. Eitan, et al., the Justice Department seems to by saying, were exactly who they said they were: agents of the Israeli government.

Furthermore, Justice attorneys argue for a stiff sentence for Pollard on the grounds that he might divulge more classified information if he is allowed to go free anytime soon. Where would he go? Justice cites a November 21, 1985 Jerusalem Post article in which Pollard states that he wishes to emigrate to Israel. To whom would he divulge? Citing Pollard's oft-expressed love for and loyalty to Israel, the Justice Department strongly implies that Pollard's considerable memory would be put to very good use by the Israeli government if he were to arrive there.

What Justice does not say, though this becomes obvious upon reading the memorandum, is that it is the government of the state of Israel which could most effectively utilize the bulk of the particular intelligence gathered in the Pollard operation—information on Middle Eastern governments, and US weapons systems, with which the Israeli order of battle is armed.

Appended to the pre-sentencing memorandum is a Jerusalem Post article which carried the headline: "'Befuddled' Pollard: Why Did Israel Abandon Me?" In the article, Pollard compares his current posture to that of an Israeli pilot who, after having been shot down behind enemy lines, is left by Israel to languish. The Jerusalem Post was wrong. Jonathan Jay Pollard wasn't befuddled at all. He was—and is—behind enemy lines.

Stephen Green, the author of Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel, is working on a book for US-Israeli relations from 1967 to the present.