Saying Nay To Arms and Aid

By Dennis J. Wamsted

Jordan Arms Deal Put On Indefinite Hold

The debate over the Reagan Administration's proposal to sell nearly $2 billion of advanced weapons to Jordan has ended. The sale was "postponed" and, barring progress toward Middle East peace, may remain in limbo for good. On February 3, Secretary of State Schulz notified the House of Representatives and the Senate that the Administration was postponing the sale indefinitely. Schulz asserted that a Congressional vote against the sale a virtual certainty would "severely damage the ongoing (peace) process," and promised Congress that President Reagan would not proceed with the sale without giving them ample time to review and debate the issues. Moreover, Schulz added, the Administration would put forward a new proposal only while Congress was in session.

Though the postponement was clearly an admission of defeat for the Administration, Schulz tried to cast it in its best light. He praised King Hussein's courage and his commitment to peace, while pointing out that Congress' recalcitrance on arms for Jordan had undermined the Administration's efforts on the peace process. Congressmen, on the other hand, chose to interpret the Administration's actions more optimistically. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN), for instance, rationalized postponement as the best way to resolve the issue, since it kept open U.S. options with King Hussein while maintaining U.S. support for the peace process.

After all was said and done, though, the fact still remained: the Administration's foreign policy has suffered yet another defeat at the hands of the pro-Israel lobby and its Congressional supporters. As one senior Reagan official admitted: "We think that the arms sales is justified and needed for Jordan. We still consider Hussein an important friend." Another senior U.S. official expressed concern about the consequences: "We are sending a strong message to moderate Arabs that the United States does not have a stake in them anymore." At the State Department, one senior official concluded that Hussein could take no bold steps towards peace without the arms, because American support could not be relied upon. [Congress was not ignorant of the ramifications, however. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy had earlier outlined to a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee how the Jordan arms deal would help with the peace process.]

There was concern of a different nature in Congress. The Senate's principal opponent of the sale and one of Israel's staunchest Congressional allies, Alan Cranston (D-CA), saw a definite Congressional victory for Israel in the postponement, but a victory that was likely to be without winners. Cranston obviously had in mind the precedent of Saudi Arabia, which purchased British Tornados when turned down on U.S. F-15s. Now the Saudis have a plane virtually as capable as the F-15, without any restrictions on its deployment. [The U.S., in effect, gave up as much as $12 billion in business to position advanced aircraft at a Saudi airbase closer to Israel.]

Saudi AWACS Delivery In Jeopardy

The decision on Jordan arms raises obvious questions about the sale of additional weapons to Saudi Arabia. Assistant Secretary Murphy told a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that a notification on Saudi arms would be forthcoming, but that the Administration had not yet decided on the exact timing. Murphy's approach was cautious. He portrayed the Saudi package as containing nothing really new, only materiel related to earlier equipment, and tied the new sales to maintaining the free flow of oil and stability of the Arabian peninsula. Failure to fulfill Saudi Arabia's defense requirements, Murphy warned, would send the Saudis to other sources of supply and would cost the U.S. billions of dollars and thousands of jobs.

Secretary Schulz also informed a Congressional subcommittee that a Saudi arms proposal was in the offing. Asked whether the Saudis had helped with the peace process, the Secretary replied that they had. The Administration clearly realizes that any sale to Saudi Arabia faces an uphill battle. One senior Administration official predicted a Saudi sale would face the same opposition that the Jordan sale had faced. Faced with these prospects, the Administration might well decide to avoid the issue by continuing to delay notifying Congress a strategy which would, no doubt, please the pro-Israel lobby and its Congressional supporters.

Congress, for its part, is prepared for a fight. Senator Cranston announced in mid February that he would hold hearings on the scheduled delivery this summer of five AWACS and eight tanker planes sold earlier to Saudi Arabia. Cranston made no secret about his intention to delay or actually stop the planes' delivery. His argument is that the Saudis have not fulfilled the terms of the sale, which make delivery conditional upon an official Presidential determination that the Saudis had substantially helped peace efforts in the Middle East. [President Reagan, under pressure from Congress when the AWACS deal was proposed in 1981, had made an informal promise to that effect, which Congress later wrote into law.] Cranston and the Israel Lobby maintain the Kingdom has not been helpful. The Senator specifically charged the Saudis with financing the PLO and Syria, and with aiding international terrorism by promising to help Libya weather the effects of American sanctions.

U.S. officials insist, however, that the Saudis have been working behind the scenes to encourage Arab moderation and peace talks. Administration sources say lawyers already are drafting documents certifying Saudi compliance with the Congressional strictures. Yet, in the wake of its defeat on the Jordan deal, the Administration is clearly worried. "Given the track record on Jordan, you have to take [Cranston's] threat seriously," one Administration official conceded. A number of sources feel that even if the AWACS are ultimately delivered, U.S. credibility in the Middle East will have suffered.

Cranston's attempt to derail the AWACS deal may force the Administration to make a tough choice: Either drop the $8.5 billion AWACS deal to increase the chances of pushing through the new $1.1 billion sale, or preserve the AWACS deal and risk losing on the new proposal. Sources on the Hill reason that the President will not want to force Republican Senators to support two controversial arms sales to Saudi Arabia in an election year. (A Congressional resolution of disapproval for both sales would force a Presidential veto, The Democratically controlled House would then vote to override, leaving the ultimate onus in the hands of the Republican controlled Senate.) Or, in the words of a Senator (who asked to remain anonymous): "There are just so many times you can twist a Senator's arm."

New Reagan Foreign Aid Requests In Trouble

President Reagan has sent to Congress a $994 billion budget for fiscal year (FY) 1987 (which begins October 1, 1986) which calls for elimination of several popular government programs and reductions in virtually all domestic programs. A number of Senator and Representatives have already voiced concern over the budget's provisions and bitterly attacked Reagan's proposed increase in foreign aid from its current level of $14.9 billion to $16.2 billion.

The new budget would give Egypt and Israel the same official amounts each received in FY 1986 i.e., $3.0 billion in grants and forgiven loans for Israel and some $2.3 billion in grant aid for Egypt. Other large benefactors include Turkey ($975 million, up $237 million from the FY 1986 figure), Pakistan ($669 million, up $41 million), Greece ($501 million), Jordan ($135 million, but down $37 million from FY 1986), Morocco ($150 million) and Tunisia ($70 million).

House Democrats consider Reagan's budget virtually unpassable. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL) and House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Chairman David Obey (D-WI) have indicated that foreign aid may be cut by anywhere from 15 to 50 percent in the coming fiscal year. Fascell rated chances of an increase as "slim or none." Obey argued that if we couldn't afford to pay our own bills, we could hardly afford paying other's through foreign aid. Obey plans to cut U.S. foreign aid by 50 percent to every recipient except Israel, Egypt and Pakistan. Obey said his plan conformed to the requirements of Gramm-Rudman Hollings and stipulated reductions in economic aid to Israel, Egypt and Pakistan by the same percentage that other non military domestic programs are reduced. [Current projections for FY 1987 have G R H required cuts running at the $35 to $40 billion level. This translates into a 16 percent reduction in economic aid levels for Israel, Egypt and Pakistan under the Obey plan.]

The pro-Israel lobby and its Congressional supporters will work to insulate Israel from the effects of Gramm Rudman Hollings. However, Congress is unlikely to increase foreign aid in FY 1987. This is a Congressional election year, when cutting or eliminating popular domestic programs is particularly sensitive. What may happen is that Congress will trim all foreign aid levels (except Israel's) in order to preserve valued U.S. domestic programs.

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington, D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.