The Saga of May 17th

With all the balloons of bungled U.S. policy up in the air at the same time, it has been impossible for most people to follow just what has gone wrong for the U.S. in Lebanon. But if you've kept your eye on one particular ballon—a large one in depressing colors, with "May 17, 1983," stamped on it—you already know the major reason why things are in such bad shape.

This date—which is, of course, the one on which the U.S.-brokered Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement was signed—marks the occasion when the U.S. position in Lebanon, already precarious, began its long, inevitable slide towards defeat.

Up until May 17, there was still a chance for the Administration—if it had only tried to understand the basic factors at work in the country—to have played a helpful and accepted role in putting Lebanon together again after the Israeli invasion of June, 1982. But the withdrawal agreement, promoted by the U.S. in apparent obliviousness of its defects and of the negative impact it would have in Syria and among the Muslim and Druze communities of Lebanon, made such a role no longer possible. (Readers who may think we are engaging in hindsight should read our editorial in the May 16, 1983, issue and our policy story in the May 30, 1983, issue.)

The defects of the agreement were threefold:

Firstly, the agreement allowed Israel to use soldiers on security patrol in south Lebanon on a 24-hour-a-day basis even after "withdrawal;" it put restrictions on the presence of Lebanese troops in the south, and on their equipment; and it prohibited the use by Lebanon of certain weapons anywhere on its territory, and on its naval vessels (as per The Annex, Article 2, Paras. B, C, E, F, G and I, and Article 3, Paras. B and F, along with the published "Agreed Minutes" on all the foregoing).

Secondly, the agreement called for "normalization" of relations between Israel and Lebanon, in language which is indistinguishable from that of a peace treaty (as per the preamble, and Articles 1 through 12).

Thirdly, the implementation of the agreement was made subject to the provisions of a "sideletter," in which the U.S. assured Israel it would not have to withdraw until Syria did.

When the contents of the agreement were revealed, Syria exploded with anger. It reacted with special umbrage to "normalization," on grounds that Israel was being rewarded for having invaded Lebanon. To Syria, the agreement read more like a surrender document. The Syrians were also very angry at the side-letter, which seemed to equate Israel's invasion with Syria's entry into Lebanon by invitation.

What made things worse was that the U.S. had the negotiations weregoing on. This was a serious mistake, since Syria is a country whose views must be taken into account in any permanent settlement—and the slighting of Syria only added an extra dimension to its rage. It is also conceivable that if the U.S. had consulted the Syrians, it might have had a glimmering of the intractable problems that the agreement, in the form that it was being proposed, would create.

Instead, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz—who viewed the agreement as a personal achievement—stuck to it doggedly, even as he urged President Gemayel to "broaden" his government to include the viewpoints of opposition factions. Ironically, after President Gemayel and opposition leaders met in Geneva at U.S. urging and asked the U.S. to try to revise the agreement, the U.S. turned the request down. The U.S. continued to refuse to disown it even as fighting spread in Lebanon, and even as it became clear that the primary, most immediate cause of the flareup was the agreement's continued existence.

The saga entered a new stage on February 16, when President Gemayel accepted a "peace plan" which called for abrogation of what he had agreed to on the 17th of May.