Grins and Grimaces

A few weeks ago, as many readers may remember, there was a photo appearing on page one of a number of major newspapers which showed U.S., Lebanese and Israeli delegates toasting their success in having finally agreed to an agenda for their talks on Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanon. After weeks of haggling, an agenda had been approved which included not only Israeli troop withdrawal but other matters which the Israeli side said it wanted straightened out before any Israeli troops could leave. Among these was an item calling in effect for a "normalization" of Israeli-Lebanese relations.

In the photo, the chief delegate of Israel is smiling broadly as he raises his glass—as well he might, after having managed to gain acceptance from the others of the principle that there could be matters in addition to troop withdrawal which were worthy of discussion at the current stage, and that these were of equal importance. The chief delegate from Lebanon is looking quite glum—presumably for the same reasons that made the Israeli delegate look so cheerful. The U.S. delegate is wearing a wide grin.

The newspapers which published the photo did not seem to attach any importance to the grins and grimaces. To judge from the captions, the editors regarded the event captured by the photographer as evidence of a dramatic breakthrough for peace in Lebanon.

Our own view is that the photo can stand as the symbol of still one more tragic misstep in U.S. policy, which does not appear even to be recognized by U.S. policymakers, much less acknowledge by them.

The misstep lies in having given the Israelis the option of dealing with other issues before withdrawing—thus allowing them to turn what was supposed to be an Israeli war against the Palestinians, however unjustified in itself, into a war against the Lebanese as well. From the beginning of the invasion last June, the Israelis had used a variety of pretexts to justify it—with the pretexts changing as the troops advanced. But the common denominator of all of them was that the enemy was the PLO, not the state of Lebanon. We should have taken the Israelis at their word, and insisted that we would not be a party to having Lebanon make concessions on such things as normalization while Israeli troops remained in occupation of the country—an act which is ipso facto—an act of war.

If our President had acted more wisely, he would have made a public statement, long before the present agenda was ever set, similar to that of President Eisenhower when Israel was balking at withdrawing from Gaza after the 1956 Suez war: "Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory ... be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal?" This is a principle on which he could well have found a consensus in this country, as Eisenhower did. Letting this principle go into the dustbin by agreeing to—in fact, helping negotiate—an agenda which permits Israel to put conditions on its withdrawal is not going to bring peace any closer in Lebanon. But it does further sully the credibility of the United States.

In short, the agreement on the agenda was nothing to celebrate. It was certainly nothing to smile about. To grimace instead, would not have been enough. We would have preferred to find the U.S. delegate out in the corridor, refusing to be a party to the Israeli blackmail of Lebanon. Better yet, he could have been back home working out ways to use our aid leverage to induce Israel to stop using American money to make war on its neighbors. This is what Eisenhower did to back up his declaration of principle—and as we all know, it worked.