Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 1998, Page 46

Beirut Bulletin

With Municipal Elections Scheduled in 1998, Lebanon May See Political and Social Turbulence

By Carole Dagher

The year 1998 in Lebanon promises to be a turbulent one, both politically and socially. On the political level, a presidential election is scheduled for summer. Many factors related to the electoral campaign remain unknown, the most important of which are the real intentions of the current president, Elias Hrawi.

Will he seek to extend his already extended mandate? Officially, he has announced his intention to depart at the end of his legal term. But that was also what he announced in 1995. However, the Constitution then was amended to prolong for three more years the presidential mandate, normally set for a non-renewable six-year term.

In 1998 as in 1995, every politician knows that the tone will be set by Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad. If the current high level of tension persists in the Middle East, democracy's prospects are dim in the region. And Lebanon will not be an exception.

This is why another electoral process that is scheduled to take place in April, the municipal elections, is triggering impassioned debate. Local elections have not been held since 1963. Last August, a newly-established grouping, the Meeting for Municipal and Mayoral Elections, formally launched a national campaign to collect signatures on an open-ended petition calling for the organization of local elections. What is substantially new in the campaign is that it aims to mobilize grass-roots support for a demand that has nationwide appeal. Municipal elections are arguably more popular than parliamentary elections and they have aroused widespread local interest. All political forces are actively preparing for the campaign, and the government fears that candidates from the opposition will win the seats in the majority of city councils, because municipal elections are more difficult to control than the parliamentary ones and they are generally a direct reflection of the popular mood.

On the other hand, while Lebanon is pursuing its successful come-back on the international scene—the summit of the Francophone countries held last November in Hanoi voted for Lebanon to host the summit of the year 2001—the economic situation is showing signs of strain.

Economic growth has been declining, from an estimated 9 percent and 6.5 percent in 1994 and 1995, respectively, to 4 percent in 1996 and 3 percent in 1997, according to Bank Audi's Quarterly Economic Report. The slow-down is attributed to the government's tight budgetary policies, which have raised interest rates and thus curbed investment spending. Private investment remains low due to the uncertainty of the regional situation.

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri has proposed a plan to spend some $1 billion for separate development projects throughout Lebanon. This includes money to pay for the return of the people displaced by the civil war.

Local elections have not been held since 1963.

Given the alarming budget deficit, sluggish growth and the increase of the gross domestic debt, the prime minister's proposal has generated considerable opposition. The money is to be raised partially through higher taxes, perhaps on gasoline or cigarettes, which could have inflationary consequences.

Aside from the financial risks they involve, the Hariri projects are under criticism for their lack of social compassion. Trade union and social demands have become the common denominator of a broad, but in no way united, opposition. So to prevent mass protests against its economic and social policies and to preclude opposition forces from exploiting discontent, the Hariri government uses the army to protect public security and enforce the general ban on demonstrations.

One of the major steps taken in that regard was the decision of the Council of Ministers last November to declare the Baalbeck-Hermel area in the Bekaa Valley a "military zone" under the control of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The decision aims to combat Sheikh Subhi Tufayli's destabilizing movement of opposition to the government.

The former secretary-general of the Hezbollah, Sheikh Tufayli made a resounding come-back on the political scene last May when he announced that he would organize a day of civil disobedience in Baalbeck on July 4, the culmination of what he described as a "revolt of the hungry." In past years, Sheikh Tufayli had become an opposition figure within Hezbollah, and was marginalized within the party. He was considered a non-compromising hard-liner in domestic politics (he opposed participation in the parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996) as well as international issues such as the peace process.

Sheikh Tufayli began his movement by denouncing the government's social and economic policies. He insisted that these policies have left many people, particularly in his own Bekaa region, far worse off than they were before.

A Popular Message

At a time of economic crisis in Lebanon, the message was inevitably popular. The Bekaa, particularly its northern stretches, is largely agricultural, and farmers have suffered for years from low state investment and the forcible curbing of narcotics production. (The U.S. administration officially acknowledged in November that the Lebanese government, backed by the Syrian troops in the Bekaa valley, has made important efforts to stop drug production.)

For many observers, Sheikh Tufayli's move was equally interesting because it reflected a regional fracture line within Hezbollah. The two leading figures of the party, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his deputy, Na'im Qasem, are from the south which, given the central role of the resistance, has become the focal point of Hezbollah's activities. But the party originally was founded in the Bekaa Valley, from which its first secretary-general, Abbas Mussawi, stemmed. Given Syria's tight control over the Bekaa, many observers also view Tufayli's initiative as a Syrian-backed move to prevent the Hezbollah leadership from seeking too much independence.

Even before the Baalbek rally, the government had announced that it would make available some 150 billion Lebanese pounds ($1 = 1535 LP) for the development of rural areas. This decision did not calm Sheikh Tufayli, who issued threats against any members of the government who came to the Bekaa. These threats were the catalyst for the Lebanese government decree that made the Lebanese army the guarantor of stability and state authority there.

Subsequently Sheikh Tufayli called upon his followers not to clash with the LAF. Then he revoked his ban on visits by officials after the government announced that it would implement a badly needed water project in the region, thus ending the short-lived revolt.