Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 1998, Pages 25, 105

Defense and Intelligence

Mixed Signals in U.S.-Israel and U.S.-GCC Relationship

By Shawn L. Twing

The United States sent and received mixed messages about its strategic relationships with several U.S. allies in the Middle East as 1997 came to a close.

At the height of the crisis in Iraq, the U.S. gave tacit approval for an ambitious Israeli military modernization program that could cost American taxpayers in excess of $10 billion. During a Nov. 4 meeting at the Pentagon between U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and his Israeli counterpart, Yitzhak Mordechai, Cohen announced that the Clinton administration will request $1.8 billion in military aid for Israel in fiscal year 1999. Since this is the same amount Israel has received annually for the past several years, it ended any speculation that in view of the end of the Cold War and Israel's increasing prosperity, U.S. aid might be reduced.

Instead, the announcement was interpreted by many as a signal of U.S. support for an Israeli military modernization plan that unofficially commits Washington to maintaining the present $1.8 billion level in annual military aid to Israel through the year 2006.

The Israeli initiative, which first was detailed in the U.S. trade weekly Defense News, conditions a massive, multi-year Israeli purchase of military hardware on continued U.S. military aid at the current $1.8 billion level. The Israeli purchases over the next 10 years will include $10 billion worth of advanced American military hardware, including fighter aircraft and attack helicopters. This also will allow Israel to continue spending $475 million of its U.S. aid annually on defense items and services in Israel, which is the only country allowed to use significant amounts of U.S. military aid for purchases from its own rather than U.S. manufacturers.

By law the United States cannot commit to multi-year funding agreements beyond the next fiscal year. Unofficially, however, it appears that the Clinton administration is sidestepping that U.S. statute by signaling to Israel that it can expect continued military aid from the United States at the $1.8 billion level for at least the next 10 years. And given Congress' repeated attempts to outdo even the Clinton administration in offering American largesse to Israel, it is doubtful that Clinton or his successors will encounter significant congressional opposition to a maneuver that would be unthinkable if it were used in connection with any other country. (For more on this topic, see "Congress and the Pentagon Add $464 Million in Aid to Israel in 1998," in the October/November 1997 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, p. 20.)

Israel can expect continued military aid from the U.S. at the $1.8 billion level for at least the next 10 years.

On an unrelated track, however, the U.S.-Israel defense relationship may be hitting a bump in the road. According to reports in Defense News, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen planned to express U.S. concerns about Israel's ongoing military relationship with China during scheduled Dec. 17-18 meetings in Tel Aviv.

At issue were negotiations between China and Israel for Israel's Python-4 air-to-air missile. The Python-4, made by Israel's state-owned Elbit company, is "perhaps the most lethal short-range air-to-air missile now in service" anywhere in the world, according to Heritage Foundation senior policy analyst Richard Fisher. It is used in conjunction with a highly advanced helmet-mounted sight also developed by Elbit, which currently is being co-developed with the U.S. Kaiser firm to equip pilots who will fly the next generation of U.S. fighter aircraft. "Thus, if China purchases the Python-4, it also may receive technology that the U.S. intends to use for its first helmet-sighted missile," said Fisher.

The Python-4's high speed, unprecedented stress tolerance, high off-boresight capabilities (which allow pilots to launch the missile at targets up to 60 degrees to their right or left), and beyond-visual-range capabilities would provide China an enormous boost in air-to-air missile technology that could further erode America's military edge in Asia. And if China were to export the Python-4 and its associated technologies—which it has done with Israel's Python-3, purchased by China in the late 1980s and re-engineered as the PL-9—both American and Israeli pilots could suffer the consequences. Among China's favorite customers are Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[Author's note: Although he was only the messenger in these cases, Secretary Cohen is no stranger to the interests of the pro-Israel lobby. While serving as a Republican senator from Maine, Cohen received $162,462 in pro-Israel political action committee (PAC) money, according to Federal Election Committee figures totaled in the 4th edition of his book Stealth PACs by Washington Report executive editor Richard Curtiss.]

UAE Paves the Way for $6 Billion F-16 Fighter Buy

The United Arab Emirates is close to a final decision for its estimated $6 billion fighter aircraft order, the largest single purchase of its kind remaining this century, and it looks like Bethesda, MD-based Lockheed Martin may be the winner. Competing for the contract are the French Rafale made by Dassault Aviation, the Lockheed-Martin F-16, and the Eurofighter 2000 made by a consortium of European companies.

In December, UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan traveled to France to finalize a $2 billion purchase of Mirage 2000-5 combat aircraft to supplement the 34 Mirages already in service in the UAE air force. The purchase of additional Mirage 2000s, made by Dassault Aviation, probably was the death knell for the Rafale.

Following the November 1997 Dubai Air Show, various defense publications reported that the UAE may be looking to British Aerospace for additional Hawk trainer aircraft. If that is true, it appears that the UAE may be giving something to everyone (British Aerospace is a prime contractor for the Eurofighter), leaving the crown jewel fighter for Lockheed Martin. It is rumored, however, that cost and the quality of the F-16's avionics are the only remaining sticking points blocking a final decision on the F-16 sale.

In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia purchased the highly capable F-15 from the United States but was forced to settle for less sophisticated avionics to receive congressional approval for the sale. Now the international arms trade is a buyer's market. No country can afford to jeopardize a $6 billion weapons sale, which could generate a quarter-million jobs. So it is extremely unlikely that the UAE will allow similar restrictions to be placed on their F-16s.

Kuwait, GCC to Improve Early Warning, Defense Capabilities

Defense ministers from the six member states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—agreed in October to begin integrating their respective early warning and command and control facilities. Initial phases of the plan, which defense industry analysts predict will cost some $500 million, include establishing an alliance-wide secure phone system linking the defense headquarters of each country, and linking their radar networks to create an integrated early warning system.

Initial contracts for the project were announced following a Nov. 3-4 meeting of AGCC defense ministers in Doha, Qatar. Hughes Space and Communications International of the United States and Ericsson of Sweden received contracts worth $88 million and $70 million respectively to begin work on the project, Jane's Defence Weekly reported. Military sources in the Gulf told Jane's that work will begin on the project in early 1998, and is scheduled for completion by 2000.

Shortly after the AGCC announced plans to begin unifying its early warning and command and control facilities, Kuwait announced ambitious plans to completely rebuild its command, control, communications, computer and intelligence network that was almost totally destroyed during the 1990-91 Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait's ambitious plans, which include "an integrated command and control network that could form the basis for the first anti-tactical ballistic missile defense system in the region," according to Aviation Week & Space Technology, will cost some $1.3 billion.

Kuwait plans to link the radars, operations centers and software of the three branches of its armed forces in a joint military operations center that could form the backbone of a regional system for the Gulf Cooperation Council. Because of the damage to Kuwait's military infrastructure resulting from the Gulf war, companies bidding for the contract will have the unique opportunity to build an entire command and control system virtually from scratch.

Despite the near-euphoria in Western capitals, particularly the United States, resulting from Kuwait's plans to build the sophisticated network, there was bad news as well. Numerous defense publications reported in November that Kuwait will buy 27 Chinese-made self-propelled artillery pieces worth some $150 million, despite considerable pressure from the United States and several European countries who have insisted that Kuwait purchase equipment that meets NATO interoperability standards. Kuwait's decision was widely interpreted as a political payoff to China, which is the only permanent U.N. Security Council member that hasn't received contracts promised by Kuwait in exchange for participation in the 37-member Gulf war coalition and continued enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq.

The 27 self-propelled guns will outfit one artillery battalion in a single brigade, according to Jane's Defence Weekly, with the purchase of another 50 howitzers apparently still open to U.S. and European defense companies.

Oman May Increase Cost of U.S. Base Rights

The United States may have to invest more in the defense facilities it uses to pre-position military equipment in Oman to guarantee continued access to those sites, senior Omani officials told Defense News in December.

Oman, the first Gulf state to enter into formal pre-positioning agreements with
the United States, occupies the southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula adjacent to the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, through which an estimated 25 to 50 percent of the world's oil flows. The United States and Oman began bilateral negotiations in Washington, DC in December in preparation for the 10-year renewal of U.S. pre-positioning and access rights in the year 2000. However, Omani officials told Defense News that they are disappointed with the cutoff of U.S. aid to Oman in recent years and an unwillingness in the U.S. to spend money on facilities used jointly by U.S. and Omani forces.

"We have no intention of closing down pre-positioning." the commander of the Omani air force, Vice Marshal Muhammad bin Mahfoudh bin Saad Al Ardhi, told Defense News. "We think the whole access agreement is a model between allies and friends, but we want to watch the agreement and be sure we are sensitive enough to what is happening around us."