For Clinton, It’s a Question of Decision

by Paul Findley

In his first term, Bill Clinton showed little vision or even certainty in foreign policy. His second term may be different, but the emphasis must be on the word may.

A few promising factors can be cited.

He is relieved of concern about winning votes in his next candidacy.

Although in the prime of his life, Clinton is unlikely to seek elective office again. He shows no inclination to follow the example of John Quincy Adams, the president who returned to the U.S. House of Representatives after serving two terms in the White House.

That being the case, Clinton, inevitably, will be able to give greater attention to his place in history as he prepares for the next four years.

Undistinguished to Date

So far, Clinton’s place in history is not distinguished. His first term was lackluster at best, the first two years focused on a liberal agenda capped by an ill-fated attempt at sweeping reform of the nation’s medical system. In mid-term, the electorate rejected liberalism and, for the first time in many years, confronted a Democratic president with a Republican-led Congress.

In foreign policy, intervention in Haiti may eventually emerge as a plus for Clinton, but waffling and compromise typified most of his record elsewhere. Bosnia is a bloody and disgraceful chapter. It records the slaughter of over 200,000 Muslim civilians before the United States acted and negotiated a political settlement at Dayton, Ohio, that places Bosnia at the ultimate mercy of the Serb power structure that engineered the massacres and then tried to cover them up.

Israel is now led by Binyamin Netanyahu, a prime minister whose candidacy Clinton plainly opposed and who is intensifying Israel’s anti-Palestinian apartheid system that had already been well advanced by his predecessors. Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu’s cabinet minister in charge of settlements, has provided detailed plans for a shocking increase. His plans call for building two new cities in the occupied territories that will provide homes for more than 100,000 Jews. This is in addition to the steady expansion of settlements that is already underway elsewhere in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Officially, the United States opposes the construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, but this opposition is paper thin. With the exception of a short-lived demand by George Bush, no president has ever tried to use the impressive leverage at his disposal to stop settlement construction. Bush had a showdown with Yitzhak Shamir that proved fatal to Shamir’s candidacy for a new term as Israeli prime minister, but, within weeks after the return of Yitzhak Rabin to power, Bush dropped his opposition and settlement construction continued unabated.

Clinton can force show-downs with Netanyahu simply by suspending aid.

In his second term, Richard Nixon issued an order to Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, to draft papers suspending all aid until Israel cooperated in a comprehensive settlement of issues with its Arab neighbors. By then, Nixon was nearly overwhelmed by the Watergate scandal and did not sign the documents.

It is my belief that Jimmy Carter would have exerted pressure on Israel had he been re-elected, basing this partly on his early initiatives that I observed during my congressional service and also on his activities and statements since leaving office. Carter began his first term with brave intentions but, under heavy pressure by Israel’s lobby, began to waffle. In the Camp David accords’ reference to Palestinians, he was outfoxed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. From that learning experience, Carter, I believe, would have been more resolute in a second term.

Ronald Reagan, badly abused in his first term by Begin’s bloody assault on Beirut, in his second term offered a mild plan for Mideast peace, but backed off when Begin denounced it.

Although Reagan’s view of the Middle East remains rather murky, he seemed to embrace the indefensible notion that Israel has a right to the occupied territories.

I can offer a bit of insight. One day I had a brief conversation with President Reagan. It came when a group of Republicans completed a discussion on agricultural policy with the president in the cabinet room of the White House. When the discussion ended, I seized the opportunity to make a plea for Palestinian rights. Approaching Reagan, I said, “Mr. President, the Palestinians are badly abused. They are human beings and have the right to statehood; the right to have their own homeland. I hope you will help them.”

Reagan seemed puzzled by my statement and asked, “But where will they go?” This question astounded me, as Reagan seemed to imply that the Palestinians, not the Israelis, were the intruders in the occupied territories.

I answered, “They are already in their homes where their ancestors have lived for hundreds of years. Israel should withdraw and let the Palestinians build their own state right where they are.” Reagan may have heard the first few words of my response, but by then his aides had pulled him away, ending this brief exchange.

One thing is clear. Clinton has the instruments at hand with which to force change in Israeli policy. He can force showdowns with Netanyahu simply by suspending aid. President Carter prevailed twice upon Begin by threatening suspension. The ultimatum was issued quietly and it worked. Both times, Begin agreed to alter Israeli military policy in Lebanon. Unfortunately, Carter did not persist in applying pressure on Begin. Had he done so, a just peace could have been achieved in the Middle East a decade ago.

Bush’s brief showdown with Shamir demonstrated the influence on the Israeli political scene that a resolute U.S. president can achieve. It was, I am convinced, the principal factor that brought defeat a few months later to Shamir’s Likud Party. Netanyahu, although elected directly to the position of prime minister by Israeli voters, controls the Knesset by a tiny margin that could disappear overnight. He cannot risk defying a clear ultimatum from a U.S. president.

If, for example, Clinton sent word that U.S. aid will continue only if Israel foregoes all settlement construction, construction would soon stop and the prospects for a just peace would quickly brighten. If Israel’s U.S. lobby tried to frustrate this ultimatum, Clinton would have no trouble rallying the American people to his side—as Bush did.

Will Bill Clinton, unlike second-term presidents Nixon and Reagan, act as a powerhouse for justice in the Mideast? It will depend on how hard history tugs at his sleeve.