Cancellation of Kashmir Elections Has Implications for India Voting

By M.M. Ali

After a visit to the Indian-occupied portions of Kashmir, the Election Commission of India has returned to New Delhi with the finding that "free and fair" elections cannot be held in Kashmir at this time. In view of Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's previously announced determination to hold elections in December, the announcement came as a surprise to some observers. To others, however, the announcement brought relief. The last time the government of India held elections in Kashmir, in late 1987, they set off mass protests in the disputed territory which resulted in the imposition of Presidential Rule and the suspension of all local authority for six months. Ever since, Presidential Rule has been extended every six months and the entire Valley of Kashmir has been embroiled in a bloody freedom movement. (The present six-month period of Presidential Rule ends on Jan. 16.)

Although Prime Minister Rao has expressed his regret at the Election Commission's inability to hold elections, Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan may have avoided considerable embarrassment for the prime minister.

It is not clear how serious Rao was when he originally set the December date for Kashmir elections, but this is too delicate a time for the Indian government to risk the almost inevitable disturbances that would be set off by such elections. At this point, the bottom line to every major decision that Rao's Congress government takes is tied to the elections to the Lokh Sabha (lower house of the Indian parliament) that are due by July 8, 1996 and can be held earlier. The biggest challenge facing Rao is the growing influence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

In fact, everything that is taking place in New Delhi today concerning Kashmir relates to the 1996 polls. Earlier, the BJP had put Rao on notice that it would make the holding of Kashmir elections a main election plank. The BJP calculated that such elections would result either in a shock for the Congress Party or further deterioration of the law and order situation in the Valley.

Rao, on the other hand, figured that even a semblance of elections in Kashmir would enable him to face the BJP political challenge and also satisfy the wishes of the United States. His announced intention to hold elections in Kashmir also shielded him from likely criticism at last year's ceremonies in New York marking the 50th anniversary of the United Nations.

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, it is reliably understood, had been assured that if he were to make some major concessions, it would result in participation in the election by Kashmiris who were tired of the persistent warfare of the past eight years. However, when he failed to entice any significant figures from the new crop of Kashmiri leaders, Rao fell back on Farooq Abdullah, an old Delhi friend from Kashmir.

The BJP had banked on a December election debacle in Kashmir.

Abdullah, who had been discredited at home by his long association with Indian leaders, hoped to bounce back if he could wrest a worthwhile deal that he could sell to the current Kashmiri leadership. He asked for renewal of the 1952 offer to his father, the late Sheikh Abdullah, by then-Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The 1952 formula, which was never implemented, had extended total autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with New Delhi retaining authority only for defense, foreign affairs and communications. Under that formula, Kashmir's leader would be called sadar-e-riasath (head of state) and not governor, and Kashmir's chief minister would be known as the prime minister.

Rao, however, could only repeat the 1975 offer of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The 1975 deal contained minor adjustments to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution under which Kashmir would continue to be described as an integral part of India.

Rao's offer was turned down by Farooq Abdullah, who announced that his political party, the National Conference, would not participate in the December elections. With no takers, Rao is back at square one. However, the BJP also is at a loss because it had banked on a December election debacle in Kashmir to strengthen its case with Indian voters in the 1996 general elections. Nonetheless, the BJP, at its just-concluded annual convention, maintained that the Election Commission's assessment of the situation in Kashmir has vindicated its own analysis of the Congress Party's failure.

Developments during the weeks that preceded the Election Commission's announcement were equally interesting and significant. The activity had shifted to Washington and New York. Kashmiri leaders from both the Indian and Pakistani sides of the Line of Control showed up in the United States and were seen meeting both with each other and with State Department officials. Since then, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphael has traveled to the subcontinent for meetings with leaders in Islamabad and Delhi.

The U.S. Interest

The U.S. interest is in reducing the tension in the Valley so that a democratic process can begin and a settlement can be negotiated to the 48-year-old dispute. This would greatly stabilize the region and enable Washington to pay more attention to developments in neighboring Iran and Central Asia. Perhaps the U.S. also is contemplating a larger role for Pakistan as a stabilizing force in the area once Kashmir is defused.

The Election Commission's announcement is not final. Seshan has sparked a serious constitutional debate in India over whether the Election Commission is empowered merely to conduct elections or also has the authority to supercede government decisions regarding the conditions under which elections can be held. Neither the Congress nor the BJP have questioned the EC, but the matter has traveled via other routes to the Supreme Court, which is expected to rule on the issue by early January.

Commenting on the Kashmir saga that is being played out in Delhi, senior journalist Kushwant Singh wrote in The Telegraph of Calcutta on Nov. 20, "It would appear that the entire exercise undertaken in Kashmir was to throw dust in the eyes of the world. It was done in the hope that, after it was over, everyone would believe we did our best to restore democratic rule in the state." The mass circulation biweekly magazine India Today displayed in its Nov. 30 edition a photo of demonstrations by chadour-clad Kashmiri women under the headline "Disgusted, Dejected, Defiant." The magazine opined that "Forced elections held under guns will not be a political solution but will compound the political problem and cause greater alienation, if that is possible."

The Election Commission's evaluation and New Delhi's new predicament has sent a clear message to Kashmir's mujahideen (freedom fighters) about the inability of the Rao administration to deal with the Kashmir issue, and made their own stand look invincible. Now even if the Supreme Court rules against the EC, the holding of elections in Kashmir would be more difficult than ever before. In the light of the EC assessment, Rao may ask for another six-month extension of President's Rule, and be permitted to ignore the five-year constitution limit to such rule, which already has been exceeded in Kashmir. Perhaps he can call for general elections in early 1996, and face the Kashmir question after the Lokh Sabha polls.

Pressler Amendment Waiver

Although on Oct. 24, 1995 a House-Senate conference committee approved by a margin of 11 to 3 an exception to the Pressler Amendment that barred all U.S. assistance to Pakistan (see the December 1995 Washington Report, p. 38), the matter is not yet over. The one-time waiver that was approved is part of a larger foreign assistance bill which still must be passed by the Congress. In the meanwhile, interesting theories are being offered explaining why and how the 11-3 vote came about.

A straightforward explanation is that the $368 million Pakistan had paid for U.S. arms that no longer could be delivered was a debt that the U.S. government owed to Pakistan, and the 11 members who voted in favor of the waiver were merely honoring an agreement. At the time the principal sponsor of the waiver, Sen. Hank Brown (R-CO), said: "We ought to consider...how people around the world will respond to the United States...They will look at how we treated Pakistan...It would be wrong to both keep the money and the military equipment..." In the words of Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Maleeha Lodhi: "Ultimately this was a vote for fairness—fairness to an old ally."

Others wanted to look deeper into the maneuvers that accompanied the change of heart on Capitol Hill. To secure the arms it had paid for or recover the payment, the government of Pakistan retained lobbyist Mark Siegal, the Burson-Marsteller public relations firm, and the lobby-law firm of Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds, all at a cost of $540,000 per year. For its part, India retained the public relations firm Edelman Public Relations Worldwide, whose roster includes David Springer and former Ronald Reagan aide Mike Deaver, at a cost of $700,000 a year.

"India's hubris is chutzpah squared," said one U.S. defense analyst. Journalist and television talking head Morton Kondrake wrote in the Washington Times of Oct. 21,* that "India unsuccessfuly tried to persuade Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to intervene with the United States to oppose the Brown amendment." Reacting to rumors that India was relying on its close ties to Israel to halt the U.S. move to pay its debt to Pakistan, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Itamar Rabinovitch stated publicly that "Israel takes no stand on this transaction."

The ever-suspicious Pakistani press was intrigued at the seeming unwillingness of Israel to lobby for India and against Pakistan in Washington. Pakistani journalists wondered whether a deal had been struck. Speculation over the terms of such a deal ranged from the promise of outright recognition of Israel by Pakistan to scaling down of Bhutto administration demands regarding Kashmir and Pakistan's nuclear weapons research.

The Herald, a leading Pakistani monthly political magazine, reported in its November issue: "Top [Pakistani] government officials privately admit that at one stage before the final voting, the Israeli government sent messages to Pakistan expressing its willingness to help in the passage of the Brown Amendment." The Herald went on to say: "This was perhaps Israel's way of opening up a channel of communication, one which could ultimately lead to Pakistan's recognition of the Jewish state."

In this context, it is interesting to note that a degree of mystery still surrounds the whereabouts of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for about four hours after she landed at John F. Kennedy airport in New York last fall to attend the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. Ever-watchful Pakistani correspondents could not account for that gap in her New York schedule at a time when over 175 heads of state, including the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, were in town.

Similarly, Assistant Secretary of State Raphael's current visits to Kabul, Islamabad and Delhi, and particularly her meetings with both government and opposition leaders in Pakistan, were interpreted as a direct followup to the October-November parleys in Washington and New York with Bhutto and other South Asian leaders. The 11-3 vote, whether it was a simple good deed or a complex deal-clincher, has prompted lively discussion and divergent perspectives. From now on, every emissary to and from the subcontinent will be carefully scrutinized by the Pakistani media.

*Reprinted in Other Voices" in the Dec. 1995 Washington Report, p. 108.

M.M. Ali is a professor at the Uniiversity of the District of Columbia in Washington, DC.