Resolutions Undercut Palestinians, Bolster Dayton Settlement for Bosnia

By Ian Williams

While the Fiftieth Anniversary Session of the U.N.'s General Assembly is special, it is still business as usual. And one perennial item of business is the struggle to confirm the rights under international law of the Palestinians, despite Israeli and U.S. efforts to downgrade them into disposable assets.

Discounting the rights of Palestinians is an uphill struggle for the diplomats of both countries, however, since the rest of the world is slightly less expedient in its view of international obligations. As always, the big battle is in the wording—with advocates of the Palestinians trying not to give close American allies an excuse to abstain. Few if any countries above the size of microstates ever vote with the U.S. and Israel on these issues, but that does not prevent the U.S. delegation from speaking as if it is the other 180-plus U.N. member countries that are marching out of step.

Sometimes Arab diplomats are exasperated at the manner in which Europeans seem willing to provide a fig leaf for U.S. intransigence on Israel's behalf. For example, UNRWA's mandate is up for renewal and, as well as providing more jobs, education and relief for Palestinians than anyone else, one aspect of UNRWA's task is a sort of residual responsibility for "Resolution 194," the U.N. resolution which established the right of return for Palestinian refugees after 1948.

In the past, the U.S. had always supported that resolution, but under the Clinton administration things have changed. Now U.S. diplomats have made it plain that they will not support the current resolution renewing the UNRWA mandate to June 30, 1999 if it includes a reference to Resolution 194.

Nor are the issues in the case as clear cut as they seemed. People of good conscience on the U.S. side, which is the major funder of UNRWA, wanted to lock in a U.S. commitment to UNRWA against predators like Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC). So they pursued a compromise solution with some Arab diplomats which would have separated the two aspects so that the reaffirmation of 194 would be in a separate paragraph. The U.S. would vote for the mandate—and abstain on 194. However, this eminently pragmatic solution underestimated the importance to the Palestinians of 194 and its political and legal implications for UNRWA, and in the end the compromise fell through.

In fact, interdepartmental bickering at the U.S. State Department may also have derailed the ambitions of Terje Larsen, who is the U.N.'s special coordinator for all multilateral aid to Palestine, and who has been building up his own official empire there. Ilter Turcman, the current director of UNRWA, is due for replacement, and U.N. sources say that Dennis Ross was pushing hard for Larsen to replace him. Indeed the proposal was to combine the two positions in one, putting a great deal of power in the hands of someone who many Palestinians saw as all too close to the Israelis and the Americans.

As always, the big battle is in the wording.

The rest of the State Department seemed skeptical of the Ross-Larsen initiative, as in fact was Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who takes a dim view of empire-building propensities on the part of his staff. It now seems almost certain that the U.N. will announce soon the appointment of Peter Hansen as head of UNRWA. Hansen presently is undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, where he has built up a good reputation, not least with the Palestinians.

Other Middle Eastern resolutions were, as usual, passed overwhelmingly, although the one welcoming the Middle East peace process attracted the nays of Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Iran because it omitted any mention of southern Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 425 condemning the Israeli occupation.

A resolution condemning the occupation of the Golan Heights was passed by 66 votes, with guess which two against. However no fewer than 79 countries abstained, not because they approved of the occupation, but because of new condemnatory language which they felt did not encourage the peace process.

On Jerusalem, the U.S. abstained along with 12 others on a resolution condemning the Israeli annexation of the Holy City. Israel alone voted against the resolution. The U.S.'s Lane Kirkland explained that the General Assembly should not "interject itself into that complex and emotional issue," and advised that as a general rule it should keep its nose out of issues that could be solved by bilateral negotiation. Of course, it is not a general rule. In fact it is very particular, applying to only one country and one set of negotiations.

Dayton "Invitation" Accepted

Another set of negotiations, the Dayton Agreement, "invited" the U.N. Security Council to pass some resolutions—and on Nov. 22 it obediently did so, throwing in an extra one on the Serb-Croat agreement over Eastern Slavonia.

Resolution 1021 invoked U.N. Charter Chapter VII—which makes it binding—to lift the arms embargo originally imposed in 1991 at Belgrade's request in Resolution 713. The embargo will be lifted 90 days after the secretary-general has reported to the Council that the parties have signed the peace agreement. The embargo will continue for heavy weapons and the ammunition for them, mines, military aircraft and helicopters.

After 180 days, the secretary-general should report on the implementation of the Dayton annex 1B which deals with arms control. Unless the Council decides otherwise, the arms embargo would be entirely lifted. That annex determines a formula for the respective strengths of the armed forces of the various parties to the agreement. (The Russians abstained on this, wanting some form of fallback as there is in 1022.)

Resolution 1022 lifts the economic sanctions against Belgrade "immediately," but with the proviso that failure to sign the peace agreement, if the others have, would precipitate the "automatic" reinstatement of economic sanctions within five days of the secretary-general reporting this to the Council. The resolution retains sanctions against Pale until the commander of IFOR, the NATO force, certifies that the Bosnian Serbs have withdrawn behind the zones of separation.

Even after the sanctions have been lifted, if Belgrade and Pale are reported to be "failing significantly to meet their obligations," the suspension of sanctions would terminate five days after the Council has received such a report—unless the Council decides otherwise. The sanctions, and the threat of them, would only finally be lifted 10 days after "free and fair" elections in Bosnia, provided that the Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn from the zones of separation.

Resolution 1023 blesses the Serbian-Croat agreement and promises to consider "expeditiously" the request for the U.N. to establish a "transitional administration" in Eastern Slavonia.

The Dayton agreement is indeed a modified Munich. It accepts the apartheid argument that Catholics, Muslims and Serbs cannot live in one state, and need their bantustans, while allowing the Serb nationalists to keep control of the areas they have gained by mass murder. The Serb flag will fly above the mass graves of Srebrenica. In that sense, it is essentially similar to the cantonization plot that the Europeans have been pushing almost from the beginning and for which they made the U.N. an accomplice.

It is also true that, unlike the U.N. force, IFOR has an unequivocal mandate that allows it to use force any time that a roadblock is set up or it is hindered in any way. With strong leadership, that mandate could prove decisive in crippling the self-appointed leaders of the Bosnian Serbs.

On the positive side, that leadership will not be diluted by squabbles among the contributors, as the U.N. was. On the negative side, the leadership will have to come from a White House whose behavior so far does not make one automatically think of strength and consistency.

On the other hand, an election year can make heroes of us all. We could be optimistic and think that it would be a foolish Serb who would come between an incumbent president and re-election and hope that the Pale Serbs' foolishness stays consistent.

Ian Williams is president of the U.N. Correspondents Association and author of The U.N. for Beginners, published by Writers and Readers Inc.