A Gun Without Bullets

By Amir Oren

Following is the translation by Dr. Israel Shahak of an article by Amir Oren, a prestigious Israeli military and strategic commentator, published in the Sept. 29 issue of the Tel Aviv daily Ha'aretz before the Nov. 4 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Opponents of agreements entailing compromise usually say that every war arises from peace. They mean, to quote Henry Kissinger, that one should be wary of a peace that contains the seeds of war. The statement is so common that it might eclipse its Latin rejoinder: "Those who want peace should prepare for war."

In the life cycle of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, it could be said that there is no peace except in the wake of war. However, the Israeli-Egyptian peace demonstrates that this equation is overly simplistic, since it ignores a third dimension—the nature of the U.S. administration which is supposed to turn a war into a lever for peace.

After 28 years and eight presidents, one may generalize: a Democratic administration linked by its umbilical cord to U.S. Jewry is much more reserved than are Republican administrations about pressuring Israel to make concessions in exchange for Arab concessions, even when the latter are of comparable value. If U.S. Jewry does not support a peace that requires Israeli concessions, then the Democrats will not push toward that end.

In the absence of peace, such tolerance on the part of Washington causes the initiative to pass to the Middle East. Then it appears to be a choice between two alternatives: a direct Israeli-Arab deal (Begin-Sadat or Rabin-Arafat) to circumvent the dawdling Americans, or a war.

Anger in Damascus about the Israeli agreements with Jordan and the Palestinians may prompt Syria to light a fire, large or small, under the political pressure cooker. Prime Minister Rabin seems to believe this, and he expressed this belief in public when he spoke last week about the danger posed by Syrian ground-to-ground missiles. This is a constant Israeli consideration in the background of the decision to talk with Assad about returning the Golan Heights. Yet, there is a risk of a gap between what is said and what is done. For example, in the spring of 1973, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told the General Staff for a similar reason: "Gentlemen, prepare for war."

Israel is prepared today neither for war nor for extended tension and the resultant lengthy call-ups of reserves. The Israeli army, as opposed to the civilian sector, is indeed prepared for war—but only for the war for which it is prepared. This means that if the enemy is willing to grant Israel opening conditions that give it the right to serve the first stunning blow, and thus shorten the duration of the confrontation, the Israeli army will be able to carry out its preparation and plans. It is easy to be enticed by counting months passing without signs of war into expecting a peaceful future; when preparedness for a possible war is less important than translating agreement with Arafat from paper to cities.

In the present national budget, dictated by the public through its elected representatives, there is not enough for security. In the security budget, which is mainly directed at paying officers and maintaining the weaponry, there is no development of equipment. The emergency stores are lagging behind the day-to-day expenditures.

"In this area, it is better to be slightly paranoid."

In the contest for money, the road bypassing Hebron wins over bombs, the absence of which might be crucial in battle. But not all the faults in the army's preparedness for the next war derive from material deficiency. Glaring weaknesses in both the economic and military infrastructures are neglected. Such structures might collapse in the face of an enemy capable of making direct hits.

Hi-tech defense forces branches such as the air force, navy, armor and artillery have advanced and become more sophisticated. But the infantry with its numerous divisions and its heavy losses in Lebanon in 1982 is not sufficiently prepared. The battalion commanders drafted following the Yom Kippur war in 1973 have risen in rank but lack combat experience in operating army divisions.

Lebanon and the intifada have exercised, at best, only their basic skills and their ability to operate under pressure. Their operations in recent years have about as much relevance to their efficiency in a major war as playing football has to the development of West Point cadets into future combat officers. The Israeli army has talented officers, but they excel in their talents more than in their training.

"Rainbow II" will be followed by "Degree II" (both are army plans for implementing the Oslo accords). But the increased call-ups for reserves will come from age segments not usually intended for warfare. The call-ups of first-rate reservists to serve in the West Bank will be reduced. Instead they will be trained in warfare according to Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak and his deputy, Matan Vilna'i.

Yet a real price may be paid for gambling away the time available to Israel for closing the gaps in its preparations for war. The dangers inherent in this gamble were voiced by the previous head of the human resources department of the army, General Haggai Shalom, and his successor General Ami Sagui. The gamblers are convinced that they hold two winning cards: intelligence information and political coordination.

From Bargaining to War?

A crisis in negotiations with Syria will provide warning of a transition from bargaining to war. During the months following such a warning, Clinton will fill up the Israeli army warehouses, now hungry for equipment. The debt the U.S. may demand that Israel pay, following a war or as the price of preventing it, will be seen when bargaining with Syria is renewed at the point at which it stopped. But if Assad needs a Sadat-like military maneuver to prove his willingness to sacrifice for the sake of "Arab honor," Israel will pay with needless losses.

The Democratic administration now hesitating to intervene with Rabin and Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad also will hesitate to invest in preventing another Israeli-Arab war. American power is employed today only for protecting the most vital American interests, such as protecting the oil fields. In that case the U.S. pays nothing since the bill is sent to the insured parties in the Gulf.

In January 1997, a Republican administration may take over both legislative and executive branches. It will be tight-fisted and willing to twist arms. It may offer Israel both honey and a sting in a package deal, preferably without war. But, as the James Bakers and Henry Kissingers of the end of this century believe, if missiles succeed in pressuring Israel where words fail, so be it.

"In this area, full of closed up and aggressive regimes, it is better to be slightly paranoid," said an Israeli general this week. He is an officer not overly enthusiastic about the accord with the Palestinians. But as far as he is concerned, partial withdrawal from the territories is not a reason to resign, while yet another blow against the Israeli army's preparedness for war is. In the fluctuation between calm and suspicion, he—not alone—prefers paranoia.

Not all Israeli generals are prepared to take a risk today, in order to possibly reduce the overall risk tomorrow. The leaders of the central and southern commands, whose areas of responsibility include the regions administered by the Palestinian National Authority, are concerned about their security and their budgets more than about a war with Jordan or Egypt. Their places determine their positions, as usual. But it is the government which is charged with the "supreme responsibility for state security" and is composed of politicians. The latter tend to choose preparing for elections which, as was proved in September 1973, are always closer for them than is war.