As Iraq Awaits Saddam's Downfall, King Hussein Revives Hashemite Claim

By John M. Levine

In the midst of the excitement over the August defections from Iraq and fresh revelations on Saddam's weapons program, one of the most profound developments in the Arab Middle East in recent years has gone largely unnoticed in the West: Jordanian King Hussein's resurrection of the Hashemite claim to the Iraqi throne.

The opening salvo of this campaign, prompting great concern in certain Arab capitals, came in the king's Aug. 23 address to his nation where he subtly but firmly laid out the religious and historical basis for his claim.

Declaring in his opening lines: "God Bless the Arab Hashemite Prophet," the king reaffirmed his dynasty's legitimacy as Muslim rulers through its direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam. This is extremely significant. Not even Saudi King Fahd, the Custodian of the Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina (a title previously held by King Hussein's great-grandfather and his forefathers) can claim this.

The king recalled the brutal death of his cousin and closest boyhood friend, King Faisal II, in the July 1958 Iraqi revolution, comparing this to the historic martyrdom at Karbala in Islam's early days of Imam Hussein (the Prophet's grandson). The latter's memory is particularly revered by Shi'i Muslims, now a majority among Iraqi Arabs. The Islamic imagery used is extremely powerful, with the blood of the martyred Faisal II, Imam Hussein, and other Hashemites throughout history flowing from the same fountain.

King Hussein appealed to the Iraqi people's deep sense of history, from Karbala through the Hashemite-led Arab revolt against the Ottomans, to the Jordanian and Iraqi armies fighting side-by-side in modern times, against Israel in 1948 and 1967, and Iran in the 1980s. It is a clear declaration that Iraqis and Jordanians are one people, brothers-in-arms and in history, temporarily separated by the revolution, and now by Saddam's Ba'this. He pointedly referred to "the liberation of Iraq from all causes of its suffering, whether internal or external." Liberation means what it did in Kuwait: throwing out an unwanted tyrant.

The king described the Iraqi republic established after Faisal II's overthrow as "an experiment." By definition, failed experiments are discarded and the status quo restored. The Iraqi people themselves may have no innate longing for a restored monarchy, but know that it did them less harm than the "republican" regimes they have endured.

In a commitment to the integrity of Iraq as one sovereign nation within the existing borders, the king claimed that the Hashemites, during their 37-year rule of Iraq, unified all elements and ethnic and religious groups of Iraqi society. In fact, one of the main reasons they were installed by the British in 1921 was that the Iraqi people were just as hopelessly divided then as they are today. A constitutional monarchy was—and King Hussein suggests may still be—the best solution.

Music to the West's Ears

This is music to the ears of a West which sees Saddam's ability to hold a sovereign Iraq together, even by terror, as the only reason for leaving him in power until a stabilizing successor appears. It also addresses Turkey's fears—and to a lesser extent those of Syria and Iran—of a separate Kurdish state. By hailing the only good outcome of the Gulf crisis as being the definition and recognition of Iraq's borders with Iran and Kuwait, the king reassured these two countries that a Hashemite Iraq would live within its present boundaries.

Although the king expressed a personal disinterest in the Iraqi throne, few Arab commentators believe that he would object to another Hashemite moving in. One must remember that he thinks dynastically. Mahfouz Al-Ansari of Cairo's government-line Al-Gomhariya newspaper called the king's comments "just a denial aimed at asserting his right." Significantly, the king described himself as the deputy and inheritor of the late Faisal II's presidency of the pre-revolution Arab Hashemite Union which grouped Jordan and Iraq, and which once tried to bring Kuwait under its aegis. He mourned how Faisal died young with his life's work undone, implying that it is the solemn duty of his heir to pick up where the unfortunate Faisal was forced to leave off.

There is even a suitable candidate in the wings, his cousin Prince Raad Ibn Zaid, who could claim to be heir, although he has not yet done so. Jordan's Foreign Minister Abdul Karim Al-Kabariti has described Sharif Ali Ibn Al-Hussein, who conveniently offered himself for service should the Iraqi people call for a restoration of the monarchy, as "unsuitable."

The great dilemma with Saddam for the Iraqi people, the Arab world and the West as well, is that the devil you know is better than the one you don't. When Saddam goes, someone worse might follow. King Hussein certainly would be acceptable to the West (and even Israel). How the Iraqis and their neighbors might react remains to be seen.

Practically, the Hashemites could be a good deal for Iraq.

Practically, the Hashemites could be a good deal for Iraq. If someone else took power, fiercely competing tribal and other interests in Iraq might ensure their early demise, plunging the country into chaos. The Kurds have demonstrated that they are not unified among themselves. The Takritis have ruled for too long, too badly and too brutally. Many others see themselves as equally entitled to power after Saddam. In fact, however, without a strong, widely respected leader, Iraq probably would descend into civil war. To date, the Arab governments based upon ruling families or party dynasties of credibility have the best survival records compared to republics. The Hashemites are one of those dynasties, and eminently so.

Despite the king's reassurances, Jordan's Arab neighbors and Iran are hardly enthusiastic about the prospect of a Hashemite Iraq. Early last September, Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad paid a surprise visit to Cairo to join Egypt's Hosni Mubarak in voicing concern over "foreign interference" in Iraq. Concurrently, Assad's vice president was in Tehran for what the Iranian press called "major consultations on ways to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity" with President Rafsanjani. The following week, senior Turkish, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministry officials dealing with their common Kurdish problem expressed similar concerns. Significantly, all three countries host elements of the fractious "Iraqi opposition" and have large Kurdish minorities.

The concerns are very real, given the synergy in a U.S.-supported Amman-Baghdad axis. A Jordan-Iraq confederation would threaten Egypt's hard-won regional pre-eminence. Syria, not on the best of terms with either Jordan or Iraq, would be quarried by a combination of the two. Iran may fear a pro-Western Hashemite Iraq more than a Ba'thi one. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—both still justifiably disgusted with King Hussein for his role in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis—would see an Iraq-Jordan confederation as a threat to their regional importance, and to their relative influence in Washington. Even now, the U.S. Embassy in Amman is the largest in the Eastern Arab countries. The Saudis also worry that a strong Hashemite power eventually might renew a claim to their western Hijaz region, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The king's speech had puzzling aspects. Disingenuously, he credited Saddam Hussain's defector son-in-law Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan Al-Majid with "removing the scales from my eyes" to see the real suffering in Iraq. Incredibly, he whitewashed Kamel, praising him as "capable, competent and honorable" and even describing him as "speaking in the name of millions of Iraqis." There was even uninformed speculation shortly after the defection that General Kamel might be the king's man to replace Saddam.

King Hussein could not have been ignorant of the situation in Iraq, or of the fact that Kamel is closely associated with the repressive nature of Saddam's regime. And history's sole surviving Hashemite monarch seems unlikely to promote a Takriti thug to the position taken so violently from his cousin and boyhood friend on a bloody July day 37 years ago.

The king's praises may be because the guest can be of service to the host. General Kamel may be the king's key to winning over to the Hashemite cause those Takritis who want to survive in a post-Saddam Iraq. These individuals must realize that when Saddam goes, there will be an explosion of bloodletting and vengeance throughout Iraq. Anyone close to the center of power could die violently. Their best hope is to associate themselves with the succeeding power structure, as General Kamel hopes to do, but just before Saddam's fall.

Quite how King Hussein will continue to play things now remains to be seen. Certainly, Jordan will not march into Iraq. If the Hashemites return to Iraq it will be by invitation of whoever takes power from Saddam. Perhaps leaders of a military coup will call in the king or another Hashemite nominated by him as a figure who can be respected by all parties in Iraq.

The Iraqi people deserve better than Saddam. Some may decide that they can do a lot worse than King Hussein.

John M. Levins, an Irish-born Australian resident of Kuwait for 10 years, is the author of Days of Fear, a book about the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait scheduled for publication in 1996.