Syria and the Middle East Peace Process

By Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 244 pp. List: $16.95; AET: $12.95.

Reviewed by Laura Drake

Despite its title, this book is not about the Middle East peace process. It is a discussion of Syria's place in its geostrategic environment, providing a rare and valuable analysis of big-picture regional politics from an historical perspective. It fills an important void in that it uses a Syrian point of reference rather than the usual Israeli one.

Examining Syria's emergence as an important regional power, the authors attribute its transformation "from a plaything into a player" to its "pivotal'' geographic location, its "active frontline status," and the astuteness of its president, Hafez Al-Assad, as a strategic thinker. These attributes, the authors write, have given Syria "power and influence. . tout of all proportion to its size, population, economic potential and natural endowments." Furthermore, Syria under Assad "thrives by deftly exploiting its limited assets to the full and by vigorously . . . asserting its interests.'' As a result, the authors maintain, no lasting regional settlement can ever be obtained without the inclusion and the assent of Damascus.

Syria's motivations, intentions and priorities are presented realistically in the context of its original dismemberment by Britain and France, and the emergence of the pan-Arab Ba'th Party in Syria as a response. The authors explain that Israel is viewed by Syrians as a deadly strategic adversary because 1) it is a foreign entity implanted in the heart of the Arab world, and 2) because it threatens the rest of the Levant, which Syria perceives as vital to its own defense and part of its legitimate sphere of influence.

Such observations represent a refreshing change from the usual diet of writing by pro-Israel scholars. Whereas one such, Daniel Pipes, simplistically asserts that President Assad "can best be understood by comparing him to Saddam Hussain," these writers offer a more informative alternative: "Assad's regional policies can best be understood in the context of Syria's view of itself as the birthplace and guardian of Arab nationalist ideals [and] its frontline status with Israel..."

The book also provides an alternative to the conventional wisdom that President Assad is primarily motivated by internal politics rather than strategic considerations in the struggle against Israel. The comparison that comes to mind is not with Saddam Hussain but, ironically, George Bush.

"Assad has never been particularly interested in internal affairs," Drysdale and Hinnebusch write. And, in another place, "Assad has never been overly concerned with economic matters."

In fact, as the authors make clear, Assad is the quintessential foreign policy president: "Assad sees almost everything in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict." His number one goal has always been to strengthen Syria from the inside out, to fashion and then maintain the country as a powerful force within its immediate geopolitical environment.

The history of Syrian relations with the superpowers and with each country in the region is analyzed, both separately and in combination, from the strategic perspective of Damascus. The authors convincingly demonstrate the tendency of the Syrians to align their country with more powerful regional states in the knowledge that they are not strong enough to stand alone against Israel.

After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the Syrians postponed their goal of strategic parity because of its unfeasibility and reluctantly went along with the U.S.-led coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf war. They were rewarded with Saudi financial assistance and with inclusion as a central player in the Arab-Israeli negotiations which followed.

Damascus also was able to turn Lebanon into a protectorate. Israeli leaders could do nothing but watch as two decades of work aimed at dividing Lebanon and pulling it out of the Arab camp was halted and then reversed by the Syrians within the space of a few months. According to the authors: "At a time when the Iraqi leader was demonstrating, yet again, his exceptional talent for recklessly frittering away Iraq's considerable assets, the Syrian leader was once more demonstrating his remarkable talent for exploiting Syria's limited resources."

The current Arab-Israeli negotiations are touched upon only in passing, in the context of this larger geopolitical picture. In pursuing them, the authors write, "Assad gambled that the U.S. would not be able to consolidate a new security order in the Gulf without also addressing Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory. He will have lost his gamble if Washington only uses the crisis to smash Iraqi power, weaken the Arabs, and entrench itself in the Gulf while continuing its traditional pro-Israeli policies." Unfortunately, this is precisely what is underway. Perhaps in betting that the U. S. would pursue its long-term interests more astutely than in the past, Damascus staked too much on the longevity of the Bush-Baker administration.

The authors emphasize that Syria has always wanted peace negotiations, but only if they will lead to a comprehensive settlement. "Syria basically carries the banner of a just peace, not rejectionism," but would oppose any solution that "legitimizes Israel's conquests and confirms its dominance" in the region.

Historically, Syria has opposed U.S. peace initiatives because it was obvious that Washington was less interested in a comprehensive peace than in helping Israel to conclude separate deals that would isolate Damascus, weaken the Arabs, and confirm Israeli hegemony. The current initiative was accepted because of the perceived open-mindedness of the Bush administration. With Clinton in office, however, it seems that Washington has reverted to its usual policy of using the peace table to help Israel divide and conquer the Arabs through separate agreements.

Although this book was published in 1991, it is not at all outdated. The drawbacks are very minor: other than a few redundancies and the unfortunate choice of title, the authors have provided a valuable contribution to American understanding of what the region looks like from Damascus. This book should be read by every U.S. government of ficial and journalist dealing with the region and should be used as a textbook for every university course dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Laura Drake is director of research at the Council for the National Interest, a Middle East policy organization based in Washington, DC.