January 1994, page 42
Special Report
Peace an Urgent Need for Kashmir
By Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai
The barbaric situation in Bosnia has outraged the
world, which regrets that the enormous toll of human lives and suffering
was not averted by timely action at an earlier stage. The failure
of the international community can be explained but not denied.
Yet in another part of the globe—the Indian-occupied
region of Kashmir—atrocities of a similar nature are being
perpetrated by the Indian army and paramilitary forces without fear
of a corrective international response. To date no power or combination
of powers has blown the whistle on India.
Certain characteristics of the situation in Kashmir
distinguish it from other deplorable human rights situations around
the world. First, it prevails in what is recognized under international
law and by the United States as a disputed territory. According
to an agreement between India and Pakistan negotiated by a United
Nations commission and endorsed by the Security Council, the territory's
status is to be determined by the free vote of its people under
U.N. supervision.
Second, the situation in Kashmir represents a government's
repression not of a secessionist or separatist movement, but of
an uprising against a foreign occupation.
Third, the fact that Kashmir met with studied unconcern
by the administration of President George Bush has given a sense
of total impunity to India. It has also created the impression that
the U.S. is selective in its application of human rights and democracy,
and will condone even a blatant breach of these principles if it
wishes to protect the offending party. During the Bush administration
there was a glaring contrast between the outcry over the massacre
in Tiananmen Square and the official silence over the killing and
maiming of a vastly greater number of human beings in Kashmir. Reliable
estimates of Kashmiri civilian casualties put the number at 32,O00
since 1990. Women and children are particular targets of the organized
sadism of Indian security forces.
Finally, it is a case of the U.N. being unable to
address a situation to which it has devoted a number of resolutions
and where it has established an official observer presence, though
with a limited mandate. The Military Observers Group in India and
Pakistan (UNMOGIP), stationed in Kashmir to observe the cease-fire
between India and Pakistan, is one of the U.N.'s oldest peacekeeping
operations.
These peculiarities become more baffling because the
mediatory initiative which would halt the violations of human rights
and set the stage for a solution would entail no deployment of U.S.
troops, no financial outlays and no adversarial relations between
Washington and New Delhi.
A 46-Year Dispute
The status of Jammu and Kashmir (the official name
of the state) has been in dispute between India and Pakistan since
both became independent in 1947. A U.N. commission obtained acceptance
by both parties of a peace plan involving a cease fire, demilitarization
of the state and a plebiscite under the supervision of a U.N. appointed
administrator. The cease-fire took effect accordingly, but the plan
bogged down when India balked at implementing the demilitarization
phase, which envisioned a synchronized withdrawal by the forces
of both countries. The situation lapsed into a stalemate.
A popular uprising against Indian occupation of the
Valley of Kashmir and adjacent areas has changed the character of
the dispute in recent years. It highlights the centrality of the
role of the people of Kashmir in the determination of the area's
status, a factor previously recognized only marginally.
Two paradoxes helped spark the uprising. First, if
the U.N. can resolve other intractable issues, why is it unable
to fulfill the pledge made to the Kashmiris that they would be able
to decide their own future? Second, if honoring U.N. resolutions
and the use of U.N. mechanisms in the settlement of international
disputes is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, how can the peace
plan worked out by the U.N. and affirmed in nearly a dozen Security
Council resolutions be ignored?
Virtually all of the moderate Kashmiri leadership
recognizes the need to adjust the peace plan to the current circumstances.
What is not acceptable is any erosion, much less a
negation, of the role of Kashmiris in determining their own status.
Although India has very skillfully cordoned off the
Kashmiri situation from international scrutiny since the start of
the uprising, sketchy reports that have pierced the curtain of silence
point to a campaign by India to brutalize the Kashmiri population
into submission. This campaign has been documented by Amnesty International,
Asia Watch, Freedom House, India's Committee for Initiative on Kashmir
and even the Human Rights Report of the U. S. State Department.
The apparent lack of American concern over the human rights situation
in Kashmir has sustained India in carrying out its repression.
The Diplomatic Front
On the diplomatic front, the U.S. has maintained that
the dispute should be settled bilaterally by India and Pakistan
in accordance with the 1971 Simla Agreement between the two states.
However, the Simla Agreement, unlike the U.N. peace agreement, does
not deal directly with the Kashmir issue but merely talks of negotiations
for a final settlement over Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, India's
interpretation of the Simla Agreement would eliminate a role for
the Kashmiri people in resolving the crisis.
The experience of the last 46 years demonstrates that
no major dispute between India and Pakistan has ever been resolved
through bilateral negotiations. The Simla Agreement has been a dead
letter as far as Kashmir is concerned because India, the occupying
power, has little incentive to negotiate a settlement. The U.N.
Charter stipulates that if parties to a dispute fail to resolve
it bilaterally, they are obliged to submit it to the Security Council.
It is undeniable that such a failure exists in the case of Kashmir.
To insist that the Kashmir issue be settled bilaterally, therefore,
is tantamount to recommending that it should be left unsettled.
During the Cold War, India maneuvered itself into
a privileged position by playing the superpowers against one another.
Now the Indian lobby is pursuing the line that New Delhi shares
common security concerns with the U. S. against militant Islamic
fundamentalism. Yet resistance against the Indian occupation of
Kashmir is not motivated by fundamentalism, but by a desire for
self-determination.
India argues that a vote by the people of Kashmir
in favor of either independence or accession to Pakistan would be
a serious blow to India's secularist system and could threaten the
cohesion of the Indian Union. By advancing these positions, India
tacitly acknowledges that it holds Kashmir by coercion and that
if Kashmiris were given the ability to decide their fate, they would
not vote in favor of India. The existence of disintegrative forces
within India itself must also be taken into consideration. India
might better keep those forces in check by settling the dispute
over Kashmir, reducing military expenditures, cooperating in the
effort to de-nuclearize South Asia and concentrating on its economic
potential.
U.S. Policy Options
The Clinton administration faces two options with
regard to Kashmir. First, it can continue the Bush administration
policy of ignoring the Kashmiri dispute while warning India and
Pakistan against going to war with each other. Besides condoning
the atrocities being committed in Kashmir, this policy rests on
a tacit agreement between India and Pakistan that war between them
is unacceptable. With the growth of extremist parties in India,
however, such an agreement is extremely vulnerable. Even now, India
has refused to join the proposed five-power conference (made up
of the U.S., Russia, China, Pakistan and India) for the de-nuclearization
of South Asia. The prospect of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent,
which contains a fifth of the world's population, cannot be dismissed
in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.
The second U.S. option is to play a more activist
mediating role by initiating a new peace process for Kashmir. This
could take the shape of a quadrilateral dialogue involving the U.S.,
India, Pakistan and Kashmir, or an appropriate use of the new mechanisms
and abilities of the United Nations. In either case the U.S. would
supply the necessary catalyst for a settlement.
In any solution, the violence in Kashmir must be halted.
Initially the state of Jammu and Kashmir must be demilitarized through
a phased withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops. In order
for this to be accomplished, New Delhi and Islamabad must understand
that the process of demilitarization is a separate issue from the
rights, claims and recognized positions of the parties involved.
After the peace process is underway, the rights and claims of the
actors involved in the dispute can be considered in a nonviolent
atmosphere.
To succeed, the American response to the Kashmiri
situation must be based on the principles of the right of a people
with a distinct historical and cultural identity to decide their
own future; the sanctity of international agreements worked out
by the United Nations; a peaceful and stable subcontinent free from
the possibility of a regional nuclear exchange; and the consistent
application of human rights standards. Such an approach could lead
to a just and peaceful resolution of the 46-year old dispute that
would be a lasting credit to U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton
administration. On the other hand, reluctance to undertake such
an initiative neither contributes to a long-term strategy of global
peace and security nor answers the demands of human conscience and
the principles of justice.
Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai is the executive director of
the Kashmiri American Council in Washington, DC. |