Excerpts from Testimony on the Persian Gulf Crisis Before the Senate Armed Services Committee

General David Jones, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nov. 28, 1990

We must do whatever is necessary to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but we should do everything in our power to ensure common ends and means, especially among the leading Arab as well as non-Arab nations...

It would help to establish that time is not on Iraq's side, as Saddam Hussain manifestly wants us to believe...

I must confess to a nagging concern about the means and ends. By calling for an offensive military option and increasing the projected Desert Shield force levels, the president has clearly decided to send a strong message to Saddam Hussain about the seriousness of the US resolve. This high-risk tactic might succeed in forcing an acceptable political resolution to the crisis, or if combat is unavoidable, will give us the forces needed to prevail alongside our coalition partners. If so, I will applaud the president's nerve and foresight.

My main concern with this latest scheduled reinforcement isn't that we might choose to fight but rather that the deployment might cause us to fight, perhaps prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily. I would stress that this is a risk, not a certainty, but one that ought to be taken seriously...

A smaller force can maintain deterrence and, if properly configured, can also inflict painful interdiction virtually indefinitely. It is also less obtrusive in a radically different culture such as Saudi Arabia. The support problem's not trivial for a protracted deployment, but with troop rotation this is manageable ...

There are indicators that the embargo is having the predicted effect on about the predicted timetable ... In the area of military hardware, we and our allies can repair and replace our equipment as needed, while time works against the Iraqi armed forces ...

The world will draw enduring lessons from the way this crisis is resolved ...

The Middle East is a laboratory case study in inevitability of eruption when fundamental problems are left to fester. Given the regional combination of energy dependence, the Palestinian impasse, disparities of wealth and resources, conservative versus radical religious and political discord, and the proliferating high technology weaponry, the only surprise about the invasion of Kuwait was that anyone was surprised that something would happen.

Until those conditions can be resolved through negotiations and international supervision, we can expect that violence will remain a permanent feature of the Middle East landscape. I submit that the United States, working with the Soviets and other interested nations, can play a powerful leadership role to help search out constructive solutions to many of the regional problems. However, this leadership role, indeed, the influence we will exert in the region for many decades to come, will depend heavily on the outcome of the current crisis.

Admiral William Crowe, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nov. 28, 1990

For the first time in 40 years, we are confronting a major international crisis and not working at cross purposes with the Kremlin. We should not overlook the importance of that fact. This development has given the president an unprecedented latitude for maneuver and in turn has severely constrained Baghdad's options ...

As to the economic embargo, it is the first time we have been able to mount truly unified sanctions ... No embargoed material is moving into Iraq by sea, and the air blockade is proving relatively effective...

The increased oil income Saddam had in mind has not materialized. In fact, Baghdad has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year, and as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, this figure would be $30 billion at the current oil price...

The embargo is biting heavily, in my judgment. Given the standard of living Iraq is used to and the increasing sophistication of Iraqi society, it is dead wrong to say that Iraq is not being hurt. It is being damaged severely. That also, I believe, goes for the Iraqi military, which depends on outside support ... it is the most effective peacetime blockade that I have personally witnessed.

Granted the embargo is not working as rapidly as many would prefer, but if we wanted economic results in two or three months, then a quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts, I note, however, do believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of 12 to 18 months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work, but whether we have the patience to let it take effect...

In sum, the president's initial moves have already achieved a great deal. The argument that Saddam is winning and being rewarded, I believe, is both weird and wrong. Obviously, this fact is often overlooked by those calling for more direct action...

For instance, the Arab-Israeli dispute is alive and well. To say the least, the Palestinians have been irrevocably alienated by the Israeli government's policies. There will never be true stability in the area until this dispute is sorted out ultimately...

Put another way, today's problem is a great deal more complex than merely defeating Saddam Hussain...

I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long-term is our primary national interest in the Middle East...

I am persuaded that the US initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited, and perhaps further polarize the Arab world. Certainly, many Arabs would deeply resent a campaign which would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers and force them to choose sides between Arab nations and the West.

James Webb, Former Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 29, 1990

If we go to war with Iraq, it is not inconceivable that the end result would be yet another cycle of ancillary confrontation including an Arab-Israeli war, Iran re-establishing itself as the dominant regional power, and the Soviets emerging as the intermediary of choice in the region. This alone counsels our caution as we reach toward a solution to the crisis of the moment.

Testimony regarding religious observances that begin in March, and other such conditions, are, in my view, minor considerations or perhaps red herrings. Does anyone really believe that we can launch an attack in January, then secure, occupy and stabilize Kuwait and withdraw from Saudi Arabia by March? And does anyone truly believe that the forces still in Saudi Arabia during these religious observances would be less at risk in the immediate after wash of a war where infidels launched an attack on Arabs?

With respect to goals, the administration needs to clarify our national goals in the event force is to be used. Is our goal simply the ousting of Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait? If so, does this mean we accept their definition of the battlefield, and fight only those forces in Kuwait? Or if we are going to fight other forces, does this mean we are prepared to enter a general war with Iraq? If we are going to enter a general war with Iraq, would we do so while at the same time taking into account the hesitations of others, including some Saudi officials, that a large-scale destruction of the Iraqi military would be harmful in the long term because it would allow both Iran and Syria to grow stronger in a region where both countries have created great turmoil and worked against the interests of the United States? Are we also prepared for the inevitability of yet another Arab-Israeli war, and the immediate shifting of alliances that would accompany it, with our troops at risk and even engaged in combat activities in the world's most unpredictable region? ...

Or is the goal the ousting of Saddam Hussain? If so, should this be done through a firepower kill, which certainly would invite the same sort of retaliation, perhaps through terrorism aimed at our own leaders? Or does the administration believe that the chaos of war will lead to Saddam Hussain's overthrow? On this point, is it not better to continue isolating Saddam Hussain from the international community, which in the long run will humiliate him before his own people and bring about his demise, while denying the other potential Iraqi rulers the rallying point of his martyrdom?

James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense and Energy, Former CIA Director, Nov. 27, 1990

The United States has had an intimate relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That reflects a number of shared strategic objectives as well as Saudi efforts to stabilize the oil market, most dramatically in the period after the fall of the Shah. It is embodied in the Carter Doctrine, which pledges military resistance to external assaults on the kingdom, as well as the Reagan corollary, which subsequently pledged resistance to internal subversion. Failure of the United States to honor such commitments would raise questions about the seriousness of the United States not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere. It is notable that down through Aug. 2, Kuwait itself rebuffed attempts of the United States to provide similar protection, though President Bush's remarks since that date have tended to establish a US commitment to the security of Kuwait...

Let me turn now to the alternative strategies available to the United States and its allies. The first, of course, is to allow the weight of the economic sanctions imposed in August gradually to wear down the capacity and the will of Iraq to sustain its present position. The embargo, backed up by a naval blockade, is the most successful ever achieved aside from time of war. Early on, it was officially estimated that it would require a year for the sanctions to work. It now appears to be working more rapidly than anticipated. In three months' time, civilian production in Iraq is estimated to have declined by some 40 percent; oil exports are essentially nil; and export earnings have dropped correspondingly. The horde of hard currency earnings necessary to sustain smuggling is dwindling away. The economic pressure can only grow worse.

While Iraq's military posture does not appear to have been seriously affected as yet, as the months go by, that, too, will be seriously weakened. Lack of spare parts will force Iraq to begin to cannibalize its military equipment. Military industry, as yet significantly unaffected, will follow the downward path of civilian industry. In short, the burden on both Iraq's economy and her military strength will steadily increase.

We know that such burdens must ultimately affect political judgment and political will. In time, the original objectives of the United Nations will be attained. Already Saddam Hussain shows a willingness, if not an eagerness, to compromise. One no longer hears that Kuwait is for all eternity the 19th province of Iraq. But, for some, "ultimately " may not be soon enough. And for others, the original objectives may not be sufficient.

To the extent that those original objectives are augmented by demands that Saddam Hussain stand trial as a war criminal, that Iraq provide compensation for the damage it has done, that Iraq's military capacity must be dismantled or destroyed, or that Saddam Hussain must be removed from power, Saddam's determination to hang on will be strengthened. Some may prefer such a response in that it precludes a settlement and makes recourse to military force more likely ...

One should note that since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them because they will not have produced the hoped-for results in six months' time...

Saddam Hussain is being punished, and punished severely. He has forfeited $20 billion of foreign exchange earnings a year, indeed $30 billion at the current oil price. Iraq's credit is totally destroyed, and the remnants of its hard currency reserves are dwindling. When Saddam looks across the border at Saudi Arabia or the UAE, they are prospering because of his actions, from which he himself has derived no benefit. He is likely to be consumed with envy. His own economy is rapidly becoming a basket case. Moreover, the position of preponderance that he had earlier achieved in OPEC is now gone. He is diplomatically isolated.

His military position will slowly be degraded. His pawns in Lebanon have been wiped out by his chief Ba'athist rival, Assad, who has immensely strengthened his own position. He has been forced to accept an embarrassing peace with Iran, and that nation's position relative to Iraq is slowly being improved. Sympathetic nations, such as Jordan and Yemen, have been harshly treated, and neither they nor he have had any recourse.

On the benefits side stands only the looting of Kuwait. In brief, Saddam Hussain staked Iraq's position on a role of the dice and lost ... To allow our own political rhetoric to obscure the severe punishment that has already been meted out, or to suggest that our current policy is in some way unsuccessful, and that Saddam's position is now or is potentially enviable, strikes me as misconceived ...

I believe the direct cost of war of combat, including that of a probably "scorched earth" policy in Kuwait, will be the lesser part of the total costs. The Middle East would never be the same. It is a fragile, inflammable, and unpredictable region. The sight of the US inflicting a devastating defeat on an Arab country from the soil of an Arab neighbor may result in an emnity directed at the US for an extended period, not only by Iraq and its present supporters, but ultimately among the publics of some of the nations now allied to us...

If the US conveys the impression that it has moved from the original international objectives to the sterner objectives that Saddam Hussain must go, that Iraq's military establishment and the threat to the region must be dismantled or eliminated, etc., then, whatever incentive Saddam Hussain may presently have to acquiesce in the international community's present demands and to leave Kuwait will shrink toward zero. This may please those who have decided that the war option is the preferable one, but it makes it increasingly hard to hold together the international coalition, which we initially put together to bless our actions in the Gulf.