Go Beyond Demands for Unconditional Surrender

By Zbigniev Brzezinski

Most Americans, I'm sure, share the hope that the president's recent and laudable decision to initiate a direct dialogue with the Iraqi government will lead to a serious and comprehensive exploration of a nonviolent solution to the ongoing crisis. Wisely, the president indicated that the purpose of such a dialogue is not merely to convey an ultimatum but to convince Iraq that its compliance with the UN resolution is the necessary precondition for a peaceful settlement. It is thus not an accident that those who so fervently have been advocating war have promptly denounced the president's initiative.

Such a dialogue has to go beyond demands for unconditional surrender, but involve also some discussion of the consequences of Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions. That means that Iraq, in the course of the ensuing discussion, will have to be given some preliminary indications of the likely political, territorial, and financial aftermath of its withdrawal from Kuwait.

I stress these points because those who favor a military solution will now exercise pressure on the president to reduce the incipient dialogue essentially to a mere transmittal of an ultimatum. That, I trust, everyone recognizes would be pointless and counterproductive. It would simply accelerate the drift to war.

It is possible to envisage a series of sequential but linked phases, all premised on Iraq having satisfied the necessary preconditions regarding Kuwait.

First, of course, sanctions would be maintained until Iraq implements its willingness to comply with UN resolutions regarding withdrawal.

Two, binding arbitration by a UN-sanctioned body within a specified time frame would be accepted by the governments of Iraq and Kuwait regarding territorial delimitations, conflicting financial claims, and other pertinent matters.

Three, an international conference would be convened to establish regional limitations on weapons of mass destruction, pending which a UN-sponsored security force would remain deployed in Kuwait, and perhaps in Saudi Arabia…

Any dialogue to the above effect will be conducted while Iraq is being subjected to severe sanctions. The US would be, therefore, conceding nothing while conducting the talks. It is Iraq that is under duress, not us...

Nor would any such outcome ... be tantamount to rewarding aggression. Those who argue that do so because they desire only one outcome, no matter what the price to America—the destruction of Iraq...

However, it is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that the talks will initially prove unproductive. In my view, that should not be viewed as a casus belli. Instead, we should stay on course applying the policy of punitive containment. This policy is working. Iraq has been deterred, ostracized and punished. Sanctions, unprecedented in their international solidarity and more massive in scope than any ever adopted in peacetime against any nation ... are inflicting painful costs on the Iraqi economy ...

By some calculations, about 97 percent of Iraq's income and 90 percent of its imports have been cut off, and the shutdown of the equivalent of 43 percent of Iraq's and Kuwait's GNP has already taken place. This is prompting the progressive attrition of the country's economy and war-making capabilities...

The administration's argument that the sanctions are not working suggests to me—in the first instance—that the administration had entertained extremely naive notions regarding how sanctions actually do work... Sanctions are not a blunt instrument for promptly achieving total surrender...

The administration, echoing the advocates of war, has lately been relying on the emotionally charged argument that we confront a present danger because of the possibility that Iraq may at some point acquire a nuclear capability...

This latest case for war also does not meet the tests of vitality or urgency to the American national interests. First of all, it is relevant to note that when the United States was threatened directly by the far more powerful and dangerous, Stalinist Russia or Maoist China, it refrained from engaging in preventive war... Deterrence has worked in the past, and I fail to see why thousands of Americans should now die in order to make sure that at some point in the future, according to experts some years from now, Iraq does not acquire a militarily significant nuclear capability.

Second, it is within our power to sustain a comprehensive embargo on Iraq to impede such an acquisition. Unlike India or Israel, Iraq does permit international inspection of its nuclear facilities. This gives us some insight into its program. Moreover, much can happen during the next several years, including Saddam's fall from power...

More than that, war would be highly counterproductive to the American national interest. A war is likely to split the international consensus that currently exists, the US is likely to become estranged from many of its European allies, and it is almost certain to become the object of widespread Arab hostility...

This prospect is all the more tragic because the United States would thereby be deprived of the fruits of its hard-earned victory in the Cold War. We stand today on the thresh hold of an historic opportunity to shape a truly cooperative world order based on genuine cooperation and respect for human rights. Yet, our overreaction to the crisis in the Persian Gulf is now adversely affecting both our priorities and our principles...

One has to anticipate the possibility that Iraq will seek to draw Israel into the war. Does the administration have a contingency plan in the event that Jordan becomes a battlefield? What might be the US reaction if some Israeli leaders seek to take advantage of an expanded war to effect the expulsion of all Palestinians from their homes in the West Bank? The Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict could thus become linked...

In the region itself, it is probable that fundamentalist Iran will become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and that terrorist Syria will inherit the mantle of leadership among the Arabs. It is also possible that the destruction of Iraq by America and the resulting radicalization of the Arabs might leave Israel, armed as it already is with nuclear weapons, more tempted to use its military force to impose its will in this volatile region...

Consider the other alternative. Suppose we maintain this pressure, this continuous attrition and ostracism of Saddam. But suppose we also engage in this process of discussion ... and we do lead to some progressive, very difficult and complex resolution.

We'll still be needed in the region as an ally because Iraq will not have been destroyed, even though it will have been weakened. The Saudis, Emirates, and the others will want us to be in the region. And there's a difference between being in the region as an ally ... and being a policeman in a region which has exploded...

This view is abridged from former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's Dec. 5, 1990 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.