We Can Achieve Our Objectives If We Define Them Clearly

By Michael Collins Dunn

There is a real possibility that by the time this sees print, or within a few weeks thereafter, the United States and its allies will go to war. If they do, US forces will face a fully armed, trained, modern army, the world's sixth (some say fifth) largest. It will not be an "intervention" like Grenada or Panama, or a peacekeeping debacle, like Lebanon. It will be war, probably more intense on a daily basis than anything that US forces have had to face in the field since Korea. It is therefore important that everyone—policymakers, military planners, and just plain voters—think clearly about what war means, what its goals should be, and what its limitations must be. Without clear thinking and defined limits, wars become quagmires.

War, as the man who helped invent modern war against populations put it, is hell. War means killing, the death of young men and women, the mass destruction of property. Major war in the modern world also probably means significant civilian casualties. War should always be the policy instrument of last resort. There are no bugles sounding in modern war, except the ones which sound "Taps" over the dead.

The Shock of Reality

But human society is still far from perfect, and wars still occur. Dozens rage around the world at any given time, and some places Eritrea, Cambodia, parts of El Salvador seem in a state of perpetual combat. But the major powers do not go to war readily, or often. When they do, they often meet with the shock of reality: the blood on the bunting. Many Britons cheered the task force which sailed for the Falklands, and one British friend of this writer was cheering the Royal Navy on right up until the Argentine cruiser Belgrano was sunk and the reality of hundreds of men dead had to be confronted. Such a moment will come if war comes to the Gulf, and any country choosing to make war must prepare its people for those hard moments.

These reflections are not intended to persuade readers that war must be avoided. It may be too late for that: as Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Bandar Bin Sultan has said more than once, " the war began on Aug. 2. " But if war does come, it is essential that everyone think clearly about it.

First, it is essential that one understand one's enemy—this is a principle as old as Sun Tzu, 2,500 years ago. In modern times, it is important that we not mistake a current enemy for a previous one. This is a common enough mistake: every modem world leader is eager to fight Adolf Hider.

Only the most committed pacifist would say there can never be a justifiable war. Because the war against Hitler's atrocities is the last war many people feel comfortable with, it is tempting to equate new enemies with Hitler. If Saddam Hussain is Hitler, then we must deal with him as we did Hitler. (Lyndon Johnson made similar comments about Ho Chi Minh.)

But Hitler is dead. New enemies of world peace, the "New World Order," or whatever other cause is being defended, are not Hitler. We must not try to fight World War II again: we won that one, but only once.

Secondly, we must have clearly defined, unambiguous goals. This has become a favorite theme of critics of George Bush's Gulf policy, but they do not always explain what they really mean. I suspect they do not mean what I do.

Insisting on clearly defined objectives is not an "anti-war" position, nor is it a case of being a "nervous nellie," as a previous president referred to protesters of a previous war. Rather it is simply insisting on adherence to one of the fundamental principles of war. The "principles of war" as listed by most Western armies today begin with the principle of the objective. A commander who has ill-defined goals will find it difficult to find the tactical or strategic means of achieving anything at all.

Karl von Clausewitz (no "nervous nellie" he) said that "No war is commenced, or, at least, no war should be commenced, if people acted wisely, without first seeking a reply to the question, What is to be attained by and in the same?" If one does not define one's objective, one cannot achieve it. Put another way, we cannot know when we have won.

Vietnam was a classic case of ill-defined objectives. It began as a counter-insurgency war against the Vietcong. By 1968, the Vietcong was defeated as a fighting force, but the North Vietnamese Army was fully in the fight, and by 1975 had conquered South Vietnam. If the US goal was to defeat the Vietcong, the US won. Somehow I suspect few Vietnamese or American veterans would agree that that was the case. If, on the other hand, the US goal was to defeat North Vietnam, it is clear the US lost.

Defining one's goals in war (or in diplomacy) means knowing when you have won, or at least when you have won enough to end combat. That is extremely important to keep in mind in the weeks or months before the shooting starts, if it does. I share with most people the hope that Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait without war, or that some diplomatic solution may be found. But there is a very real chance that all sides are now headed towards a shooting war, and this is all the more reason to think clearly about its goals and limitations.

It has become something of a cliche among President Bush's critics that he has not adequately defined America's objectives in the Gulf or explained "why we are there. " This is only partly true. Bush has repeatedly identified four goals in the Gulf: the defense of Saudi Arabia; the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; the protection of American hostages; and ensuring the stability of the Gulf region.

The first three are clear enough, though one may debate how best to achieve them. The fourth is somewhat open-ended: how does one best assure the continuing stability of the Gulf, or any region? By removing every potential adversary? Or by deterring them? By intruding a permanent American presence? Or by building up a regional security system which does not require non-Arab or non-Muslim forces in the region? By eliminating all nuclear, chemical, and missile weapons from the region? By eliminating only Iraq's, but leaving other countries' in place? Or again, by assuring through deterrence that regional nuclear powers will not be tempted to use their weapons?

Open-ended objectives are not objectives at all. They may commit one to the ultimate destruction and total elimination of the enemy. The Western powers had an open-ended commitment to destroy Hitler without condition and without negotiation, and did so, but at great cost to themselves, the peoples of Europe generally, and European security for two generations. Unless the evil is as great as it was then, the remedy should not be so absolute.

It is therefore important to define this fourth objective more clearly. How does one secure the stability of the Gulf region?

Limit Objectives, Not Tactical Targets

In saying that objectives must be limited, I do not intend for a moment to imply that we should "tie the hands" of military forces in the field. The worst of all possible mistakes is the "incremental" approach to the application of force. War is applied violence, and any gentler definition is misleading. It is violence applied to achieve policy ends which cannot be achieved without the use of violence. (This, by the way, is what Clausewitz meant when he said that war was the extension of policy—usually translated "politics "—by other means. It is far less cynical than the usual misquotation makes it seem.)

If war comes, it is always better to seek a quick victory over the enemy's military forces, shortening the war, than to seek a gradual escalation of force which probably will prolong the war and increase casualties. Vietnam was the ultimate example of the incremental mistake: it lasted for a decade, killed 58,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and ended little differently than if the US had never intervened.

War is applied violence, and any gentler definition is misleading.

In the past, the superpower confrontation has sometimes imposed limits on US forces in war. The unwillingness to bomb Chinese sanctuaries north of the Yalu River in the Korean War was imposed by the fear of Soviet intervention and escalation to global war. Similarly there were limitations on American ability to carry the war to North Vietnam in the Vietnam war. These superpower restraints do not apply in the present crisis—with the world arrayed against Iraq—though other constraints do.

This does not mean that American and coalition forces should use every weapon in their arsenal to destroy Iraq in the first minutes of a war. Clearly the moral high ground enjoyed by the Western/Arab-Islamic coalition at the moment would evaporate if nuclear, chemical, or biologic weapons were used by the coalition, or if massive bombings of Iraqi population centers were to occur. The Iraqi people are not the enemy.

Rather, what is meant by the distinction I am making is that one can define one's objectives without necessarily tying one's hands tactically. One could, for example, clearly state that the coalition has no intention of occupying or dismembering Iraq, but this would not mean that US forces could not attack Iraqi military targets to protect their efforts to recover Kuwait.

What Should Our Objectives Be?

What sort of long-term objectives will best ensure the future stability of the Gulf region? First, they should not be utopian. Some say that an end to the war which left Iraq with the capability of building missiles, pursuing nuclear research, etc. would be unacceptable. This sort of thinking commits the coalition to a World War II-style strategy of destroying the enemy to his last bunker, wiping out his infrastructure, and essentially crushing his state. This can only be done if one is willing to pay the price the West paid in World War II: years of war, hundreds of thousands of bombing sorties, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead. It is unrealistic and unnecessary in a world in which containment and deterrence have been shown to work.

Secondly, the goals must be defined and limited. The enemy should know at every step what would be expected to bring about a cease-fire. If Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait know that the moment they have left Kuwait they will have peace, they might be quicker to leave. If Saddam Hussain believes that the Western and Arab coalition will pursue him to the final bunker, he has no motivation for compromise.

Thirdly, the goals must be achievable, within acceptable costs. The US could have defeated North Vietnam, of course: by invading the North, occupying its cities, perhaps using nuclear weapons. Those costs were unacceptable. Those who demand that Iraq be left without any ability to wage future war are seeking a World War II/Germany solution. That would be more costly than the American people are likely to accept, and it would destroy the Arab-Islamic coalition. Kuwait can be freed, if necessary, by force. Iraq cannot be subjugated without years of effort and unacceptable casualties, nor do US interests require that it be.

The interests of US friends in the region in fact demand that it not be destroyed, merely contained.

Iraq cannot be subjugated without years of effort and unacceptable casualties.

In my opinion, if and when war becomes necessary, the following positions should be adopted by the coalition forces:

Iraq out of Kuwait. An end to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the restoration of a Kuwaiti government. Indications are that the Kuwaitis themselves will insist on a more responsive and representative form of government; this is their choice.
Containment of further aggression. Once Iraqi aggression against Kuwait has been reversed, the interests of the West and the moderate Arab states should be to contain any further aggression through a combination of deterrence and regional security systems.
Intentions made clear. The enemy (Iraq) should be given every understanding of the intentions and limitations of the coalition war, if one becomes necessary. If the enemy is convinced that he will be pursued to the final bunker in Baghdad, there will be no incentive to compromise. If his frontline troops are convinced they will be destroyed anyway, they will have no incentive to withdraw without fighting from Kuwait. So far as possible, foreign ground forces should operate on Iraqi soil only as necessary tactically to support the liberation of Kuwait. There should be no yielding to temptation to "push all the way to the Yalu," to cite an earlier war.
Future regional security without foreign ground troops. Security of the other oil states against outside aggression. This should not involve a guarantee of their internal systems, since that is not our concern, but rather an assurance that they will be protected against attack by more powerful neighbors from any direction. This can best be achieved by a combination of a regional security system based entirely on Arab or at least Muslim forces, with Western forces "over the horizon" only for emergency contingencies. This security system could involve a protective force of Egyptian, Moroccan, Pakistani or other regional troops for the protection of Saudi Arabia, with the oil states offsetting the costs and underwriting economic development in the contributing countries. This is not a case of "buying mercenaries": the countries mentioned have a genuine national interest in preserving the stability of the Gulf oil states, where many of their nationals have long been employed.
Preservation of the state system as it currently exists. It is true that most nation states of the Middle East derive their boundaries from colonial times. (Ironically, while Kuwait has had a clear existence since the 1750s, Iraq is a post-World War I creation. The Iraqis should have been the last state to preach revision of colonial borders, for Iran, Turkey, Syria and other neighbors could very readily claim parts of Iraq.) But this is a reason for maintaining the present state system: to tamper with it opens Pandora's box and invites a World War I-style redrawing of the map. That may come anyway, but it should come from the internal dynamics of the region, not from Iraqi aggression or outside response to Iraqi aggression.
No unilateral disarmament ultimata. It is essential that Arab and Muslim allies of the West not perceive a double standard in the proclamations now being made about the intolerability of Iraq's nuclear program. In Southwest Asia today there are three probable nuclear weapons powers: in order of acquisition of weapons capability, these are Israel, India, and Pakistan. To declare that an Iraqi nuclear program is in itself unacceptable, when the US took no action against the Israeli and Indian weapons programs (and only cut off aid to Pakistan this year), would be perceived as an unfair diktat not only by hostile Arab states but by friendly ones as well. Iraq's nuclear program can be contained and deterred by the same means used to contain and deter nuclear weapons use in Europe for 45 years. Every effort should meanwhile be made towards a nuclear-free, chemical-free, biological-free weapons environment in the Middle East, one applying equally to all states of the region.
A future Iraq. We should recognize that an Iraq which does not seek to conquer its neighbors could be an important stabilizing factor in the region. At the moment, critics are quick to denounce anyone who ever supported or "tilted towards" Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. But the geopolitical realities will not go away. Iran is a radical country of 55 million people which by early in the next century will have 100 million people, more than twice all its Gulf neighbors combined. Iraq today may have the world's sixth largest army (according to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), but Iran has the world's ninth largest, and if one counts the Revolutionary Guards, or Pasdaran, much larger still. A disarmed Iraq, with its army eliminated or reduced to a nullity, would create a power vacuum which would invite Iranian pressures not only against Iraq but against the Arabian Peninsula states.

Everyone hopes that there will be no war. But if war must come, a contained, defined war with goals and clear targets is far preferable to a vague crusade with no clear end in view. US and Western interests in the Arab world will suffer whatever happens (including a negotiated peace). That is the Catch-22 of this crisis. They will suffer far less if Iraq can be extricated from Kuwait without war. If war comes, they will suffer less if the war is defined and contained than if it becomes an all-out crusade to destroy Iraq.

Michael Collins Dunn, Ph.D., is senior analyst with The International Estimate, Inc., a Washington consultancy, and Middle East editor of its biweekly newsletter, The Estimate.