January 1990, Page 46a
Book Review
Warriors Against Israel
By Donald Neff, Amana Press, 1988. 371 pp. List: $19.95; AET:
$14.95 for one, $19.95 for two.
Reviewed by R. Annick Avera
On Oct. 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria shocked Israel and the world by
successfully invading Israeli-occupied territory. Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat had threatened for more than two years to
resort to war to recover Egyptian Sinai, seized by Israel in 1967.
Nevertheless, Israel was totally unprepared when the attack finally
came. In both the Sinai and the Golan Heights, Israeli outposts
were overrun by determined and well equipped soldiers whom, in the
first days of the war, advanced nearly unchecked.
In his book about this event, veteran author and correspondent
Donald Neff traces the life of Anwar Sadat from his rise to power
after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1969 to his role in the
October War of 1973. The author obviously admires Sadat, who emerges
as the leading figure in Warriors Against Israel. Neff portrays
the evolution of Sadat from a seemingly ineffectual leader into
an internationally acclaimed statesman.
Warriors Against Israel is the final book in Neff s trilogy
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. (The other titles are. Warriors for
Jerusalem, covering the 1967 war, and Warriors at Suez, covering
the 1956 war.) For this in depth study of the October War, and the
events which made it inevitable, Neff draws on the memoirs of Sadat,
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Golda
Meir and others who played leading roles.
In Israel, Golda Meir had become the prime minister in February
of 1969, just seven months before Muammar Qadhafi led a successful
coup to seize power in Libya. In November of 1970, former Air Force
Commander Hafez al-Assad became the leader of Syria through a bloodless
coup.
The rise of new leaders in Egypt, Syria and Libya called for more
sensitive US policies in the area. Instead, when President Richard
Nixon's first secretary of state, William Rogers, offered a plan
to carry out UN Security Council Resolution 242's land-for-peace
formula, he was thwarted by then National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger.
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was building its influence in the
Middle East by offering Egypt, Syria and formerly pro-Western Libya
arms and technical assistance.
After delineating the general political atmosphere in the Middle
East, Neff returns to Egypt and the problems facing Anwar Sadat.
Domestic unrest and the constant threat of being overthrown by his
political enemies gave Sadat little room for diplomatic maneuvering.
He repeatedly indicated to the US that he was prepared, even anxious,
to negotiate with Israel. His overtures were ignored or ridiculed
by the ubiquitous Kissinger, who replaced Rogers as Secretary of
State in Nixon's second term.
Sadat was in a diplomatic bind. Egyptian confidence was crumbling
as Israel continued its occupation of Sinai, pumping oil from Egyptian-owned
wells and allowing Jewish "settlers" establish towns on
Egyptian lands. Yet Egypt was not strong enough to fight, and Sadat's
calls for negotiations were ignored by both Israel and the US.
Frustrated, Sadat declared 1971 the "year of decision."
The people of Egypt began psychologically preparing for war, but
the Soviet Union delayed promised arms shipments. As 1971 passed
with no move from Egypt, Sadat began to lose credibility both at
home and internationally.
Neff briefly departs from the Sadat story to describe the emergence
of Black September and other radical Palestinian terrorist groups.
The murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics alienated
world sympathy from the Arab cause, and escalated the covert and
bloody war between Israel and the Palestinians.
Humiliated by his powerlessness, and frustrated by Soviet unwillingness
to supply him weapons, Sadat shocked the Kremlin and the international
community in July 1972 by ousting the 15,000 Soviet military advisers
in Egypt. This should have caused both the SovietUnion and the US
to take him moreseriously, but the US was preoccupied by elections.
Even after his re-election, Nixon was distracted by the unfolding
Watergate scandal and Kissinger's decisions were skewed by his persistent
bias toward Israel. As a result, the US did nothing to prevent the
coming war, while the Soviets finally began supplying the weapons
Egypt and Syria needed to wage war to recover the lands they lost
to Israel in 1967. In a secret meeting, Sadat and Assad chose October
1973 for a joint attack on Israel.
Neff goes on to relate the tactical details of the war, illustrating
the advances of Egypt and Syria and the successful counterattacks
by Israel after it was resupplied with US weapons. He also describes
the political maneuvering during the war, culminating in the embargo
against the US and Europe by the Arab oil producers of the Middle
East. Neff concludes with an outline of Kissinger's dubious "shuttle
diplomacy," and glowing praise of Sadat as a statesman of vision.
Neff's smooth writing makes Warriors Against Israel
read more like a novel than a history. Oddly, while he illuminates
for the reader the perceptions and motivations of Sadat, Nixon administration
personalities and Israeli leaders, never does Neff provide an intimate
glimpse of Assad and his advisers, perhaps because of a lack of
sources in secretive Syria.
Warriors Against Israel is an excellent choice for
anyone wishing to develop a better understanding of the events that
led to the 1973 War, and its lingering influence on the current
status of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
R. Annick Avera is an international studies/economics major
at the American University in Washington, DC.
Warriors Against Israel is available from the AET
Book Club.
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