wrmea.com

January 1990, Page 19

What Should the US Do About Lebanon?—Two Views

Bush Policy is Realistic and Constructive

By James F. Sams

The Bush administration's policy toward Lebanon is balanced, realistic and constructive and reflects deep understanding of the issues dividing Lebanon.

The key components of the US position are support for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon, and political and constitutional reform. The US opposes the partition of Lebanon and has consistentlyadvocated the withdrawal of non-Lebanese military forces.

The leaders of all major factions have publicly supported the three goals of independence, unity and political reform. However, none trusts the others' commitment to achieve them.

The "Eastern" view, represented by General Aoun and his supporters, has rejected the Taif Agreement and has been unwilling to recognize the Hrawi government, ostensibly because there is no agreed timetable for withdrawal of Syrian forces.

The "Western" view of the Taif Agreement, represented by President Hrawi and his supporters, while advocating withdrawal of Syrian forces, does not make a timetable for withdrawal a precondition to national reconciliation and reconstitution of Lebanese political institutions.

The US (and virtually the entire world community) supports the Hrawi government, and the Taif Agreement under which it was established, because no credible process to deal with Lebanese internal problems and the issues involved in Lebanon's relations with Syria and Israel can be initiated in the absence of a Lebanon united under one recognized and legitimate government.

The policies of the Bush administration represent a significant and positive change from the prior administration, which relied too heavily upon extensive military assistance to the Amin Gemeyel government in the apparent belief that Lebanon could be pacified by a strong Lebanese army. President Bush has pursued a more restrained policy, has wisely avoided becoming directly enmeshed in Lebanese internal affairs, and has successfully avoided identification with one "faction" or "side."

The US is asserting a policy of restraint by stating that while we recognize and support President Hrawi, we strongly oppose the use of force over areas under the control of General Aoun and his supporters. If one lesson is to be learned after 15 years of conflict, it should be that Lebanon will survive as a free and independent state only through a process of reconciliation through negotiation and compromise, and not by force of arms.

Supportive as I am of US policy in Lebanon, however, I remain highly critical of our broader Middle East policy. The Bush administration has been unwilling to address in any substantive way the major underlying causes of conflict in the Middle East. Any discussion of the Lebanese crisis would be incomplete without reference to the linkage between the internal problems of Lebanon and the issues which continue to destabilize the region as a whole, including but not limited to the de facto Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, the "Palestine Question" and Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights.

James F. Sams, an American of Lebanese Druze ancestry, is president of the American Development Services Corporation of Washtngton, DC, an executive committee member of the American Task Force for Lebanon and a former president and chairman of the National Association of Arab Americans.