January 1989, Page 10
Special Report
Pressure for Peace
By Robert G. Hazo
There have been occasions in history when conscience apparently
triumphed over self-interest, or when statesmen saw that making
compromises in the short run could obviate larger concessions in
the long run. Since such instances are rare, however, a good rule
of thumb to apply to national conflicts is that "power yields
nothing without demand."
It is obvious that pressure from a majority of the Palestine National
Council, who are prepared to give Arafat's proposal a chance, as
well as from both the Soviets and some major Arab states (especially
the oil producing ones), went into preventing rejectionists from
blocking the concessions adopted in Algiers in November.
Most Middle East specialists agree that only similar pressure will
move any Israeli government to make the minimum concessions acceptable
to a majority of the Palestinians: a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem. This is true even
though a majority of Israelis, and perhaps American Jews as well,
are now willing to endorse trading land for peace if Israel's security
is guaranteed.
Seven Forms of Pressure
There are, in my opinion, seven forms of leverage that might propel
any Israeli government toward such a peace agreement. They are listed
in the order of their efficacy, not in the order of their likelihood:
1. A direct confrontation with the Israeli lobby
in the US involving the use of economic leverage by an American
president to force settlement of the Palestinian as well as the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even if it is viewed as improbable, this
form of pressure is by far the most likely to succeed. Though presidents
have frequently avoided such showdowns, it remains a fact that no
US president has ever lost a direct confrontation with the lobby.
Those who dared and won were Dwight Eisenhower, who threatened to
remove tax exemptions on bonds and gifts for Israel if it did not
withdraw from Sinai in 1956; Jimmy Carter regarding arms sales to
the Saudis and Egyptians; Ronald Reagan regarding the Bitburg visit
and the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia; and now, dialogue with the PLO.
Another such battle would touch off massive congressional opposition.
However, any president using the bully pulpit to explain directly
to the American people why priority must be given to American rather
than Israeli interests would win. Even before the profound shifts
in American public opinion in 1988, pro-Israeli convictions did
not run deeply outside the American Jewish community and followers
of certain fundamentalist Christian leaders. A forthright and well-documented
presidential appeal to patriotism, showing that American economic
and geopolitical interests, as well as America's good name, are
in jeopardy because of Israeli expansionism, would succeed.
Use of Economic Pressure
2. Collectively, the Arabs are capable of exerting
enormous economic pressure on the US to lever Israel into a settlement.
The so-called moderate governments have not exercised this option
because they look to the US for security. Offending the US might
quickly become the lesser evil, however, if either a secular or
Muslim fundamentalist charismatic leader should rally the Arab masses
to put pressure on their current governments to change policy or
be overthrown. Under such circumstances, Arab leverage would not
be exercised via oil, given the current glut, but rather through
reduction of the current huge volume of Arab purchases of American
goods and services, and removal of Arab government investments in
US Treasury notes that help finance the current US deficit.
3. After the Camp David treaty removed Egypt from
the military equation, Syria set for itself the goal of strategic
parity with Israel. Syria's failure to date to become a credible
military threat to Israel is probably because its supplier, the
Soviet Union, has held back weaponry in the interest of world detente
and because Syria has serious economic problems. There have, however,
been sketchy reports that Syria may be developing chemical or biological
weapons of its own. There are other reports along these lines concerning
Libya. That the Israelis take such reports seriously is confirmed
by their effort to let the world know that everyone in Israel is
now supplied with a gas mask.
Israel is also building defenses against Syrian (and other Arab)
missiles. Europe is a regular supplier of arms to the Arabs and
the appearance of Chinese missiles in Saudi Arabia is not without
significance. The real obstacle to Arab military parity is the history
of Israeli preemption when an Arab country is even suspected of
preparing a serious military threat. That was the case when Israeli
aircraft attacked an Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad. Given the
will to do it, however, such a buildup can be achieved. When achieved,
it need never be used to defeat Israel, but only convince Israeli
strategists that another war would involve unacceptable losses.
4. Steadily growing public criticism of Israel
is formally recorded in polls and readily apparent from observation
of call-in shows on radio and TV, and in letters to the editor.
Writers for the American Jewish press are deeply concerned with
this. The Rev. Jesse Jackson brought criticism of Israel into the
open among both blacks and whites, a great many of whom resent the
more than $3 billion in taxpayer funds which they feel should be
put to use in the US rather than Israel.
In the interim, US opinion about Israel is also likely to change
if the average American feels endangered, via a US-USSR confrontation
over the Middle East, or deprived as during the oil boycott. There
also are highly significant public opinion movements within the
American Jewish community such as the potential split between liberal
national Jewish organizations and the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC).
5. Thoughtful Israelis already are deeply concerned
about Palestinian demographic pressure. There is no widespread interest
in annexing the West Bank and Gaza and granting its inhabitants
citizenship. Nor is there a majority in Israel willing to allow
a Palestinian state. Approaches to the problem include the Peres
proposal to grant autonomy to densely-populated Palestinian areas
(what the Palestinians call being given the right to collect their
own garbage), or deportation of Palestinians from occupied territories,
for which there is a substantial precedent from Israel itself in
1948, and very much smaller but significant precedents since them,
most recently as a result of the uprising. If an open advocate of
"transfer" like Ariel Sharon were to gain power, deportation
of a large portion of the two million Arabs living under Israeli
rule would be such a draconian measure that external forces, whether
from the superpowers or from Arab states that do not want a mass
migration of Palestinians into their countries, would surely appear
to stop it. Meanwhile the demographic pressure will continue to
grow.
6. If the intent of the intifadah is to cause
the Israelis trouble and let them know that the Palestinians mean
business, even at the risk of life and limb, it has succeeded. Estimated
costs of the extra forces mobilized to quell the uprisings as well
as of damage to the Israeli economy already exceed $1 billion in
one year. Even if the uprisings become less frequent and much of
the Palestinian population again becomes dormant, which seems likely
without help from the outside, the cost to the Israeli government
will remain high because at any moment the uprising can break out
again, as spontaneously as it began.
Intifadah's Influence on World Opinion
7. World opinion obviously has been profoundly
influenced by Israeli brutality in dealing with the intifadah, and
before that by the atrocities committed during the invasion of Lebanon
and the siege of Beirut. Already there are not more than a handful
of governments that would vote against Palestinian self-determination
or a state of their own.
Secretary George Shultz, in his hapless way, increased sympathy
for the Palestinian cause when he prevented Yasser Arafat from addressing
the United Nations. His efforts led to a final vote of 153 to 2
to transfer the UN General Assembly session on Palestine to Geneva
so that the new Palestinian position could be heard. Once heard
and initially rejected by Schulz, the pressure from other countries,
from his colleagues in government, and likely from the president
and president-elect, must have been very strong to force a reluctant
Schulz to execute a 24-hour about-face caused, he claims, by small
verbal changes.
Almost 60 countries, at this writing, have received with recognition
or encouragement the Algiers declaration of a Palestinian state
now willing to reconcile with Israel. Low intensity positive world
opinion, including that of the Catholic Church, has been in the
Palestinians' corner for some time now. If it shifts to high intensity
because of some new horror, or begins to affect opinion in the US
and Israel, or if it is translated into economic sanctions on Israel,
then it may, indeed, improve the chances for real, lasting change.
Abba Eban, surely one of the most reflective of Israeli political
figures, described the intifadah as a situation that cannot get
better without a major change in the status quo. On the other hand,
if the status quo is maintained, sooner or later it will catalyze
one or more of the pressure points listed above.
In this sense, if in no other, time is Israel's enemy. So are those
misguided American "friends of Israel" who, following
Israel's lead, are seeking to dissuade the new administration from
taking the first steps essential to getting both Israelis and Palestinians
to sit down and negotiate the peace agreement both sides so desperately
need.
Robert Hazo is chairman of the Middle East Policy Association.
He has lectured extensively on the Middle East both in the US and
abroad.
Seven Possible Pressure Points on Israel
- Economic leverage applied to the Israelis by the US.
- Economic leverage applied to the US by Arab states.
- A credible military threat to Israel by some of the Arab states.
- A shift of opinion in the US, Israel, or both.
- The demographic pressure of the Palestinians living under Israeli
rule.
- The pressure of rebellion by Palestinians living under Israeli
rule.
- World opinion backed by boycotts or sanctions.
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