Rafsanjani Reached Out to U.S.

By James M. Dorsey

The ambassador was apologetic. My appointment would have to be rescheduled. Together with all other heads of diplomatic missions in Tehran, he had been summoned at short notice to the Iranian parliament.

"This is highly unusual," he explained. Parliament Speaker Hojatolleslam Rafsanjani "does not usually summon the diplomatic corps. That is the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry."

As an afterthought, he added: "Why don't you accompany me? It could be interesting." Only 17 months later—when the story broke of US contacts with and arms shipments to Iran—did I realize just how historic Rafsanjani's June 1985 45-minute speech to the Tehran diplomatic corps had been.

Buried in the standard fare of anti-American and anti-Iraqi rhetoric, Rafsanjani for the first time disclosed Iran's wish to communicate with the "Great Satan" and indicated Iranian flexibility regarding an end to the Gulf war. At the time, this policy shift appeared to go unnoticed.

If the United States was prepared to apologize for its "foul deeds" of the past, Rafsanjani said, it should "take the initiative" in attempting to establish channels of communication with Iran.

Rafsanjani repeated his statement twice during a visit he made to Peking and Tokyo shortly thereafter. Prior to his speech, he had personally intervened to achieve the release of some of the 40 American TWA passengers held hostage in Beirut by Shiite fundamentalists. Iran did not side with the captors and instead publicly denounced terrorism.

Much of Rafsanjani's speech was devoted to Iran's conditions for ending its war against Iraq. He reiterated Iran's demand that an international tribunal determine who was the aggressor. But the speaker said Iran no longer insisted on prior guarantees that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein be condemned, although he believed this should be the tribune's verdict.

Western and Arab diplomats in Tehran reported in the days following Rafsanjani's speech that they had been approached by Iranian officials seeking channels to the United States. All the Iranians insisted upon was that their approach be kept secret. The United States rejected the approaches, saying it would use its own channels if it were interested, the diplomats said.

Ultimately, the United States chose Israel as its conduit, a move that added insult to injury in the eyes of America's Arab allies. And it is here that the pitfall lies for Iran's leaders, who have won important strategic and tactical advantages from their contacts with Washington.

In recent weeks, Iranian leaders have not ruled out further contact with the "Great Satan," although they have attached conditions: the release of arms bought and paid for by the Shah but not delivered under President Carter; recognition of Iran's central role in regional affairs; and changes in US policy toward Israel and the Shiites in Lebanon.

At the same time, Iranian officials have vehemently denied any connection whatsoever with Israel. Rafsanjani reminded the faithful gathered recently at a Friday prayer meeting in Tehran that Baghdad was but a way-station on the road to the liberation of Jerusalem. The United States may be the enemy, but in Iranian eyes it is a legitimate, recognized state. On the other hand, Iran refuses to recognize Israel and has regularly called for its replacement by an Islamic entity. Iranian leaders are hard-pressed to justify their dealings with Israel. Embarrassment and uncertainty over how to confront the issue may explain the recent arrest of a Jewish parliamentarian on charges of sexual misbehavior.

Meanwhile, Iranian leaders have made no secret of their enjoyment of President Reagan's predicament. Besides the crucial US arms sales, they have gained other advantages, including:

• For the first time since the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, the United States has publicly recognized the Iranian revolution. President Reagan called it "a fact of history" with "influence in the Islamic World." Iran has sought such recognition since Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979. The President's statement could have far-reaching implications for US Middle East policy, which has historically been based on ties to conservative, pro-Western forces in the region.

• US credibility with its European allies and conservative Arab friends has been seriously undermined. For the third time in a decade, Iran had demonstrated an uncanny ability to humble the United States. Western diplomats in Tehran say the Reagan administration repeatedly rejected European and Arab offers to establish a channel of communication between the United States and Iran. They say their offers followed expressions of Iranian interest in contacts with the United States under the condition that they be kept secret.

• Public confirmation of US arms supplies to Iran will ease the burden of Iran's war against Iraq. It will broaden Iran's access to the international weapons market, lower black market arms prices, and open new channels to suppliers such as Brazil, Argentina, and South Korea, which have been reluctant to deal with Iran in the past. The perceived US tilt toward Iran may also erode morale in Iraq, already shaken by two significant Iranian military successes in 1986.

In addition, a combination of attacks on Arab-owned oil tankers in the Gulf and arm twisting within OPEC persuaded Saudi Arabia to reverse radically its oil policy and back Iranian attempts to raise oil prices. Iran needs to replenish its coffers to meet domestic food bills and to continue the Gulf war.

President Reagan has concluded that some elements of the Iranian leadership are seeking closer ties to the West. In fact, however, Iran has materially furthered its goals by subtly encouraging both the United States and the Soviet Union to vie for influence within Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran.

James M. Dorsey, a Washington-based free-lance writer, is a frequent visitor to Iran.