Sacred Rage

By Robin Wright. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985. 315 pp. $17.95.

Reviewed by Robert G. Hazo

In the overflowing cauldron of confusion and ignorance that is called public dialogue about foreign affairs, Islamic fundamentalism has rapidly become one of the hottest new ingredients. Despite the importance of this explosive factor in the Middle East, embarrassingly little is known about what it is, what causes it, and, above all, what lasting impact it is likely to have.

Being neither a professional Middle East analyst nor a longtime student of the area, Robin Wright has not tried to produce a definitive study. Instead, she provides a competent journalistic narrative of recent fundamentalist developments, based on personal observations in Iran and elsewhere. She also addresses the pivotal questions.

Her answer to the question of what fuels Islamic fundamentalism is the title she has chosen: Sacred Rage, The Wrath of Militant Islam. That rage is directed against manipulation by foreign (especially colonial) powers; occupation of Islamic territory by aliens (Israel); the failure of some secular movements, from Baathist socialism to hereditary monarchy, to address foreign and domestic policy problems; pandemic corruption; and the absence of institutions through which discontent can be voiced effectively. As Ms. Wright puts it:

The loss of morale and confidence in public institutions slowly, almost unnoticed at first, led many Muslims, Shia and Sunni, to turn inward. And inward they found Islam. It offered no strange, new slogans or complicated alien ideology nor reliance on an outside force that compromised independence.

Religious revivals are not always, or even often, religiously motivated. The revolution in Iran which gave impetus to Islamic fundamentalism, upon which Ms. Wright has focused, can be understood as much more of a national repudiation of the Shah than a pro-Khomeini movement. Support of the relatively sophisticated Iranian middle class, not known for its religiosity, was essential for the revolution to succeed.

The defection of most of the middle class as well as a number of Khomeini's early, key collaborators strongly suggests that neither group really wanted what it got. In fact the reason many Moslems fear fundamentalism is that they now know precisely what they will get if it triumphs.

Whatever the reason for fundamentalism's success in Iran, there is nothing accidental about its subsequent appeal. It offers power to those who hunger for it; open, successful defiance of Western powers to those who deplore their influences; and the appearance of incorruptible leadership for which many pine. Whatever else Khomeini and many of his followers are, so far they seem not to be for sale.

These qualities explain fundamentalism's appeal to more than merely marginal constituencies beyond Iran in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Sudan (which has adopted the Sharia or Islamic law as its national code), Tunisia, Morocco, and within the PLO. Ms. Wright's book provides valuable detail about the impact of fundamentalism in these areas and others. She pointedly notes that fundamentalism's appeal is not restricted to Shia Moslems. Many Sunnis, especially the young, have flocked to its standard.

As Ms. Wright correctly observes, the movement's appeal has been enhanced by the Western reaction to it, particularly in the U.S. Emphasizing what we call "terrorism" and what they call "martyrdom" plays into the fundamentalists' hands. Martyrdom thrives on the existence of a menacing opposition.

This is not the only cycle that must be broken if we are to improve our position in the area. Toward that end Ms. Wright offers a chapter entitled "The Options: The United States." In it she repeats, persuasively, much of the sound advice that other disinterested commentators have Oven American governments regularly over the years: Stop backing corrupt, unrepresentative regimes; take a more balanced view toward the Arab-Israeli conflict (although this prescription does not receive the emphasis it deserves); direct more attention and effort to the causes of unfriendly behavior rather than devoting so much to controlling its effects, and do not expect rapid or radical change for the better. Regarding Iran itself, Ms. Wright makes it clear that there is no quick fix and that, in fact, we can do relatively little to influence the direction of the present regime, particularly in the absence of diplomatic relations.

As to how long fundamentalism will last as a major force and how far it will go while it lasts, Ms. Wright offers no definitive judgment. One can venture an educated guess that what we are witnessing under the banner of fundamentalism is more likely to be a relatively short lived mass phenomenon than a major historical turning point in Middle East history. Precisely because it cannot accommodate modern reality, fundamentalism very likely will aggravate the agony of Islamic attraction to and repulsion by the West and, as a result, collapse.

Robert G. Hazo is Chairman of the Middle East Policy Association and Senior Public Policy consultant of the American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee.