Indonesian Presidential Election’s Hard-Fought Second Round

By John Gee


A man at a Jakarta newsstand reads a July 6 newspaper filled with reports on the previous day’s presidential election. Major Indonesian newspapers hailed Indonesia’s first direct presidential election as an historic milestone and called on the nation to respect the outcome (AFP photo/Farjana K. Godhuly).

INDONESIAN PRESIDENT Megawati Sukarnoputri has a fighting chance of winning re-election following her better-than-expected performance in the July 5 presidential elections. As no candidate secured more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off between the two leading contenders will be held Sept. 20.

The most formidable candidate in the earlier race was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former lieutenant general who had been in charge of security affairs in Megawati’s government. His Democratic Party came from nowhere to win a respectable 57 parliamentary seats in the April general election. With his promises to fight corruption and provide the strong leadership that has been lacking under Megawati, he attracted such strong support that there never seemed any doubt that he would emerge as the leading contender in the first round. The big question was: Who would he face in September?

Retired general Wiranto looked like a strong contender. He was officially supported by Golkar, the party that won the biggest vote in the general election, and was endorsed by Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, the 35 million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which also told its followers not to vote for a female candidate—implicitly an anti-Megawati move, as she was the only woman running for the presidency.

Wiranto’s base of support was not as formidable as it seemed, however. He won the Golkar nomination only after a brief but bitter fight with party chairman Akbar Tandjung. Wiranto supporters have claimed that Tandjung secretly supported Megawati in the hope that the ex-general would be defeated, leaving Tanjung well placed to head off any challenge for the party chairmanship later in the year. Tandjung denies this, but the Golkar party machine certainly was not fully mobilized behind its official candidate. Neither was the NU solidly behind Wiranto at its grassroots level, as the results of the July poll showed.

Megawati understood very well that her only chance of re-election was to win second place in the first round and then focus upon rallying support for the September contest. Before the NU came out in support of Wiranto, she had chosen its chairman, Hasyim Muzadi, as her vice-presidential running mate. The NU suspended him from the chairmanship, but he was still expected to be able to attract some support from members. Megawati also courted support from inside Golkar. Her tactics were successful. In the first round, Bambang won 33.5 percent, Megawati took 26.6 percent, and Wiranto came in third with 22.2 percent.

An opinion poll conducted by the Washington-based Independent Foundation for Electoral Systems suggested that Bambang would win the next round handsomely, with 65 percent of the vote against 25 percent for Megawati. If the president found this discouraging, however, she did not show it. While Bambang concentrated on winning grassroots support, Megawati focused on bringing established organizational networks over to her side, though she was seen to do her share of baby kissing and handshaking, as well. She offered eight cabinet seats to Golkar in exchange for its support. In a bid to attract support from the NU and the political body associated with it, the National Awakening Party, she met former president Abdurrahman Wahid at her home. As the head of NU, he exercises great influence within the party—but, understandably, has had a distinctly chilly relationship with Megawati since, as his vice president, she took part in ousting him from office, and replaced him. Her approach to the Muslim United Development Party, which won 8 percent of the general election vote, was successful: it has openly declared its support for her.

Even if these maneuvers sway support to Megawati, however, she would still need the Bambang bandwagon to run out of steam ahead of the September election in order to win. If she does, it would be a victory for the status quo in Indonesia and, as such, would leave those whose hopes for change have drawn them to Bambang’s campaign dissatisfied. Whether a Bambang victory would make any real difference is another question: rather than overturning the status quo, his past record suggests that he would readily adapt to it if the presidency becomes his.

Logic of Philippines’ Iraq Pull-out

“It’s disappointing to see a decision that sends the wrong signal to terrorists,” said White House spokesman Scott McClellan. “Weakness is provocative,” stated Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. “I don’t believe in the long run it’s going to buy the Philippines any greater immunity from future terrorist attacks,” said Australian Prime Minister John Howard.

They were criticizing Manila’s decision to withdraw its 51-member army and police contingent from Iraq in exchange for the life of a captive truck driver. Some of the comments in the pro-war media were harsher, but President Gloria Arroyo stood by the withdrawal decision unapologetically. She told a gathering of Philippine diplomats: “I’m not about to bare a bleeding heart to defend my position.”

In its foreign policy, the president explained, the Philippines had to take account of the position of overseas Filipinos: “Unlike the U.S., Australia, Bulgaria and other countries, we have 1.5 million Filipinos who live and work in the Middle East and 4,000 are working in Iraq.” (See Luz Baguioro’s article, “Arroyo defies criticism over pullout,” in the July 24 Straits Times.)

Within her own country, the move was the most popular Arroyo had made in connection with the Iraq war. Pressed by the Bush administration to sign on to its “coalition of the willing” in the weeks before the invasion, the Philippine government agreed to allow U.S. military aircraft to overfly the country and to make refueling stops. Such was the public opposition to involvement in the war that even this limited measure of engagement had the support of only 10 percent of the population, according to a poll conducted in February 2003. This did not deter the government from later committing a token “humanitarian” force to Iraq for a limited period. It had been due to return home in August this year, but the threat to the life of Angelo de la Cruz led to the pullout being brought forward to meet the kidnappers’ July 20 deadline.

Like millions of his compatriots, de la Cruz had left his country in search of work so that he could support his family. Iraq was a risky destination, but so are some of the others to which Filipino migrant workers go. Women domestic workers stayed in Lebanon during the civil war years of the 1970s and the Israeli invasion of 1982; Filipinos have been killed and wounded by Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel, and two were among the non-Muslims gunned down by al-Qaeda terrorists in an office building in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, this past May. Altogether, some 7.5 million Filipinos are currently employed overseas, women mostly as domestic and care workers, and men as construction workers and merchant seamen. Last year, they remitted home $7.6 billion, making up 7.5 percent of the Philippines’ GDP. Theirs is a crucial contribution to a debt-burdened and struggling economy, and is recognized as such by the government.

Within the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are major employers. They are generally regarded as safe places where comparatively good earnings can be made. At the same time, there are numerous accounts of domestic workers suffering violence and sexual abuse from members of the families who employ them, and the authorities are seen as being all too ready to take the word of the family against theirs. In instances such as these, migrant workers often have felt let down by the softly-softly approach preferred by their own government, which does not want to upset its ties with host countries.

Relatives of overseas and returned workers have become a strong and increasingly activist interest group in the Philippines. Organizations lobbying for the rights of those employed abroad were given added clout last year, when overseas workers were given the right to vote in national elections while out of their country.

No wonder President Arroyo finally chose to accept her people’s demands to ensure the release of Angelo de la Cruz. It is easy for those who pushed for the invasion of Iraq to chide her for “giving in to terrorism,” but they might be better advised to adopt a contrite position about launching the attack on spurious pretexts in the first place and then dragging friendly states into the mire with them, against the better judgment of their own people.

A Costly Stance on Hostages

South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun saw his public approval rating halved over his handling of an incident in which Kim Sun Il, a translator employed by a trading company in Iraq, was taken hostage by the Tawhid wa’l-Jihad terrorist group, which demanded that South Korea reverse its decision to send 3,600 troops to Iraq. The planned deployment was already unpopular in Korea, but opposition intensified with the hostage crisis. Roh did not back down, and Kim Sun Il was brutally killed.

Following his murder, the Thai government announced that its forces in Iraq would withdraw as scheduled in September and not be replaced. Two Thai soldiers have been killed there.

Do They Understand?

Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim country with a population of 25 million, has taken a strong stand against terrorism, in words and deeds. While supporting the Palestinians, it has opposed armed attacks on civilians by Israel and Palestinian militants alike. Currently the chair of the Islamic Conference Organization, Malaysia is America’s tenth largest trading partner.

In this year’s general election, the ruling coalition won a big victory over the Islamist party that was its main rival, and it did so under Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, a leader who called for a progressive Islamic society which respected the rights of all citizens and encouraged economic and social development. Last October, Badawi became prime minister, succeeding Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, a leader whose criticisms often had stung Washington.

In short, there was every reason why a U.S. administration that says that it wants to work with those in the Muslim world who oppose extremism, and to co-operate with “moderate” leaders, should have made the most of the opportunities presented by Badawi’s July 18 to 20 visit to the U.S. Instead, it proved unimaginative and insensitive. The Malaysian prime minister had congenial meetings with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the congressional caucus on Malaysia, as well as with Secretary of State Colin Powell. Badawi met the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council (Asean is the Association of South-East Asian Nations) and a number of businesspeople interested in Malaysia. His meeting with George W. Bush, however, lasted a mere half an hour.

Maybe the president was busy, or perhaps there are more useful channels for substantive discussions. The brevity of the meeting sent out the wrong message, however: it suggested that Malaysia and its prime minister was not very important to the Bush administration and that its opinions carry little weight. Not smart; not considerate.

John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore, and the author of Unequal Conflict: The Palestinians and Israel, available through the AET Book Club.