Islamism and Democracy in Egypt: Converging Paths?

By Damien Pieretti


	Khairat al-Shater, a Muslim Brotherhood deputy and top financier, arrives at the al-Galaa court Dec. 10, 2007 (AFP photo/Khaled Desouki).

IN A WORLD WHERE Islamic fundamentalism is increasingly perceived as our generation’s Communist empire, it has become increasingly important to resist the temptation to fuse every grassroots-driven Islamist political organization into one evil monolithic category—such as that of, say, Islamofascism. Prior to the removal of Saddam Hussain from power in 2003, U.S. foreign policy, when confronted with widespread nationalism that sometimes, but not always, took the form of Islamist ideology, favored exclusivist authoritarian regimes as the lesser of two evils. This archaic Cold War policy has been discredited by several major backlashes, most notably that of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the time has come to consider the role which indigenous political forces like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood can play in the development of democratic political culture in the Middle East.

When this reporter first decided to meet with a member of the Ikhwan, or “Brotherhood,” this past fall, several of my Egyptian friends, who were admittedly upper-class, tried to persuade me to reconsider. “Don’t trust them,” they’d advise, “they hate Americans.”

I was a bit taken aback to hear such reactions, but decided to carry on anyway—and discovered that my subject, Mohammed Farouk Zayat, was anything but dangerous or prejudiced. Dressed in a black suit, shirt and tie, this 26-year-old accountant and graduate of Cairo University was as eager to learn about Western conceptions of Islam as he was willing to answer my questions.

I began by asking, “Should women be forced to wear the headscarf?”

“We do believe that all Muslim women should wear the hijab,” he answered, “however, in such matters, as in religion, there can be no compulsion.”

The last part of his answer reflected a Sura from the Qur’an that states “there is no compulsion in religion.” This same principle was affirmed last summer by the Egyptian Mufti Ali Gomaa when addressing the question of apostasy in Islam. In an interview with Misr al-Youm, he maintained that conversion to Christianity from Islam did constitute a sin, but that it should forever remain a matter between the individual and God—suggesting that Islam’s Azhar establishment promotes a more progressive viewpoint on civil liberties than the Egyptian president. Since, as part of their reforms, one reform, al-Ikhwan would abolish the president’s authority to regulate religious institutions, it is unclear which direction their ascendancy to power would pull Azhar on this question involving religious freedom.

I also asked Mohammad whether his organization saw the apparent breakthrough in the 2005 legislative elections, in which the Brotherhood competed and won 80 seats, as a sign of hope for democracy in Egypt. He seemed to think that the electoral victory was cancelled out by other factors on the ground. One of their biggest issues right now seems to be the incarceration of Khairat al-Shater, a long-standing deputy to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as one of its primary benefactors. Men such as al-Shater constitute the cornerstone of the financial networks that enable the Brotherhood to provide the extensive social services that win them such widespread popularity among the Egyptian public, particularly members of the lower classes.

Technically, Egypt is still in a state of emergency, imposed following the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, and renewed ever since by his successor, current President Hosni Mubarak. As a result, it remains illegal to organize political associations of over five people—and while opposition parties are not technically illegal, their activities are highly monitored and controlled. Recently, security forces have been persecuting Muslim Brotherhood circles in prominent universities, including Cairo University, Helwan, Mansourra, and Ain Shams. Not only are Islamic associations often curbed at such institutions, but students and faculty have been detained for months on end. Students and faculty at the American University of Cairo (AUC) believe the government also employs students as spies in their classrooms.

Unfortunately, this has been the Brotherhood’s reality since the assassination by security forces in 1948 of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, followed by Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s complete suppression of Brotherhood activities after consolidating his revolutionary regime during the 1950s.

Despite being forced underground, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to expand its power base by appealing to widespread sympathies toward Islamist ideology and, more importantly, by filling the socio-economic gap unaddressed by the government—which, despite the billions it receives from abroad, invests more in its own survival than in the well-being of its people. By financing various social services ranging from health care and education to food drives and the establishment of community centers, the Brotherhood is perceived to be true to its populist platform.

The party’s popularity, however, is by no means limited to the urban masses living in poverty. Young professionals like Mohammed Zayat who work as accountants, engineers, or even paralegals, demonstrate that the movement is becoming increasingly middle class (although many Egyptians deny, perhaps rightfully, that their country can even boast a middle class). Nevertheless, the Brotherhood remains highly popular with students at major universities, in large part because post-graduate opportunities for work and prosperity are often uninspiring, if they exist at all. While middle-aged and older citizens tend to shed their idealism and accept the status quo, universities and even high schools are proving to be important arenas for political and social activism. Mohammed was barely 17 when his sister’s husband brought him into the Brotherhood—evidence of how family networks, as well as educational institutions, are becoming important avenues for the group to expand its power base.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood would probably win a parliamentary majority if allowed to compete on equal footing, not all Egyptians welcome the idea of an Ikhwan-led government. The big question is whether, once in power, the Brotherhood would adhere to the ideals of consensual democracy and pluralism or would instead, as an AUC political science student put it, “be like the Nazis in 1933 and betray the system”?

Statements like that of Muhammad Habib, the Brotherhood’s first deputy chairman, affirming his organization’s position that neither women nor Christians would be able to run for president in the Brotherhood’s Islamic political framework, certainly are cause for concern. Students from upper-class backgrounds are too habituated to Western political culture to risk kissing it all good-bye in one fell swoop. Although often critical of their totalitarian government, Egyptian students attending expensive private universities like AUC ultimately represent the commercial aristocracy’s willingness to support Mubarak’s authoritarian capitalist regime. The Brotherhood is unlikely to gain a tangible political presence in government until this cultural elite decides it can trust the Islamist organization’s intentions.

Hosni Mubarak has dominated Egyptian politics since he assumed the presidency in 1982, and the Muslim Brotherhood is not the only political group to be deeply frustrated with his party’s monopolization of both executive and legislative authority. The political tension between his regime and Egyptian public opinion became clear last September, when editors of three opposition newspapers, including al-Destour, were thrown in jail after publishing stories that allegedly threatened national security. The stories in question had dealt with the increasingly apparent deterioration of the president’s health.

Indeed, Mubarak has been seen in public only once since last summer, leading the most daring of street pundits to suggest that the president already is deceased. What will happen upon Mubarak’s death is uncertain, as his son and heir apparent, Gamal Mubarak, in addition to facing widespread opposition simply because his ascension to the presidency would constitute hereditary succession, is also seen by many within the party and the military establishment as too weak to rule.

Regardless of which faction within the ruling National Democratic Party prevails in the post-Mubarak scuffle for power, the army, as well as major contingents from the business community, can be expected to usher in a candidate who will protect their current status and political interests. This is not to say, however, that democracy will never take hold in Egypt. If the next president comes from civilian rather than a military background, such as Gamal Mubarak or former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, popular opposition groups like the Brotherhood or Kifaya may gradually see their parliamentary presence more accurately reflect the level of their support, as happened in the 2005 parliamentary elections. History suggests, in fact, that it is gradual rather than revolutionary change that usually proves more effective, long-lasting and just in reforming society and its political system. If this indeed is the case, Egypt might not be on such a dark path after all.

Damien Pieretti, a student at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Affairs, spent the fall semester studying at the American University in Cairo.