After a Year in Power, Pakistan’s Ruling Gen. Pervez Musharraf Has His Work Cut Out for Him

By M.M. Ali

The military government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf has just completed one year in office. While it is tempting to try and assess whether Pakistan is any better off today than it was a year ago, one must ask instead whether a year is sufficient time to reverse the downward spiral that has characterized Pakistan for the past several years.

On the other hand, the motive for the military coup that toppled the government of Nawaz Sharif was not so much to arrest the national malaise that was crippling the country as it was to reassert the army’s place and position in Pakistan’s national scheme of things. Indeed, it can be argued that the immediate catalyst for the coup was Sharif’s summary dismissal of the previous army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat.

Squandered Decades

It is willingly acknowledged by all that Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, had provided Islamabad with a rather extended window of opportunity to grow and develop, while New Delhi was flirting with the notions of neutrality and socialism. India was in bed, largely unproductively, with the former Soviet Union for some 45 years following its independence in 1947. Pakistan, however, squandered that same time in an equally or even more unproductive affair with the United States.

Although individual Pakistanis certainly enriched themselves, the country as a whole deteriorated progressively. It was during this time, in fact—because of its membership in U.S.-sponsored military pacts and bilateral defense treaties—that Pakistan’s military machine gained an undue importance. Little or nothing was done to strengthen Pakistan economically or educationally. Prolonged military interventions also sapped the country’s political energies and almost killed its democratic potential. Politicians of all shades used the ballot box not to serve the country, but to further their own interests. No one was accountable—and no one is answerable still—for his or her deeds.

On Oct. 12, 1999 it was déjà vu all overagain. It took perhaps less than an hour for Generals Mohammed Aziz Khan and Muzzafar Osmani, two of the country’s top commanders, to propel General Musharraf into political power. By now, however, the generals may have discovered to their consternation what a mess they stepped into! It is, after all, the privilege and prerogative of the Almighty alone to create order out of chaos within a week. It is anyone’s guess how long it will take Musharraf.

Delivery Time

In a bid to ease external pressures and silence internal anxieties, General Musharraf presented a “devolution plan” and promised national elections in two years’ time. Specifics of the plan and the veracity of the promise have been questioned from various quarters. Provinces feel that the plan undermines their authority over local administrations. To be honest, however, the Pakistani public is in no great rush to see the dirty old game of politics revived. Pressure in this regard comes more from the international community.

It is the economy that is devastating Pakistan—and it is here that Musharraf has to deliver. Pakistan’s foreign debt is in the neighborhood of $35 billion, and rising. The national budget can be summarized easily: over 80 percent goes toward debt servicing and military expenditure, and the rest is left for “development” programs. Foreign exchange reserves are minimal.

The country’s day-to-day survival largely depends on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Paris Club and/or bilateral assistance. Pakistan has been on the verge of defaulting with international lending agencies several times in recent months. Indeed, the Karachi Stock Exchange and the national pulse rise or fall in direct response to the feelers that emanate from the IMF and World Bank. The latest sigh of relief was in response to the likelihood that the IMF would approve a letter of intent for $600 million as a standby arrangement, with the first tranch of $200 million to be disbursed in 4 weeks. This, it is hoped, will open up foreign commercial inflows.

Prospects appear to be bright for the World Bank and ADB to provide $1.3 billion in funding, and the Paris Club may offer $1.6 billion in debt restructuring. For the time being, Islamabad’s hopes rest on promises made by Washington, London, Tokyo and Riyadh.

Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz (no relation to the general), now on loan from New York City Bank, obviously is not on a joyride in Pakistan. He has to work not only on the external front but, perhaps even more dauntingly, he faces the stupendous task of cleaning up the internal mess left behind by former leaders Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto and Gen. Zia ul-Haq.

In addition to rescuing the economy, General Musharraf also has promised to cleanse Pakistan society of the graft and corruption that has eroded the country, particularly in the last two decades. The culprits are familiar faces, and the sources of corruption also are well known. To go after them in real earnest, however, leads the regime down uncomfortable paths because, along with civilians and politicians, military personnel have been involved in dubious dealings as well. Many may have retired, but they still are alive and have connections to the present brass. Accountability will have to be selectively enforced, therefore, and the going will be slow. Meanwhile, the trial of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, is likely to go on for a while longer.

While Pakistanis focus on the internal law-and-order crisis or the emotional Kashmir dispute with India, General Musharraf has his work cut out for him. It is not the kind of work, however, that a military leader is trained to perform. There is no command performance here!

Prof. M.M. Ali is a consultant and specialist on South Asia based in the Washington, DC area.

SIDEBAR ONE

The Washington Gossip Mill and Pakistan

Living in Washington, one comes across so many “knowledgeable sources” and “scoops” that, by the end of the day, little or nothing survives—because each piece of information cancels out the other. In fact, Wall Street has become so immune to Washington musings that it barely reacts anymore, even to tangible indicators of impending disasters. Nevertheless, Washington pundits and spokesmen keep dropping discreet and not-so-discreet pieces of “classified” information that are picked up by the international press, at least, and broadcast from different world capitals with their own slants and twists. Then there is the inside-the-Beltway gossip mill that keeps churning out politically sexy stories around the clock and keeps the cocktail circuits busy.

Most Washington pontificators appear to take a certain satisfaction in splitting regions of the globe even further apart than they already are. Whether this is from the sheer habit of gossip, or is a deliberate leak to establish a mindset or defuse an impending shock, one is never certain. Among the speculative stories that keep emerging in this nation’s capital include the possible further breakup of Indonesia, the division of Sudan into two separate entities, separating northern from southern Iraq, various scenarios for the creation of a Kurdish state without disturbing the balance of power among Iran, Iraq and Turkey—or the splintering of Pakistan in the next decade or two.

Indeed, when attention is not focused on the Middle East or the Balkans, the nuclear-ready India-Pakistan subcontinent is a favorite Washington subject. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger’s disclosure in an Oct. 21 speech at Georgetown University that in 1999 the U.S. had had to intervene to avert a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan set pundits abuzz trying to figure out the truth of the statement and the exact circumstances of its occurrence. Interestingly, there was no special reaction either from New Delhi or Islamabad. However, with Pakistan’s decision the following week to conduct military exercises along its border with India, talk of enhanced tension between the two South Asia rivals revived.

—M.M.A.